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The War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1714) is undoubtedly one of 
the most important wars in the history of Catalonia. Its consequences 
have shaped the political and economic Catalan panorama of the last 
300 years, and its stamp on society is still so present that battles like 
Almansa (1707) and especially that of September 11th in Barcelona (1714) 
have become reference dates in the country’s culture. Nevertheless, the 
conflict is quite unknown, as there are not many works attempting to 
explain it from a military and political point of view.
The first important point, which is often not even considered in Catalan 
and Spanish historiography, is the global dimension of the war; it is not 
a civil conflict in Catalonia, and not even a struggle for the Spanish 
throne between the pretenders Charles of Austria and Philip of Bourbon. 
Almost all European countries were involved (especially Spain, France 
and England, but also the Netherlands, the Austrian empire, Savoy and 
Portugal, to mention just a few). It is therefore clear that the reasons 
behind the will of each government to fight in this war were completely 
different, and economic and political, and even religious, motivations 
became intertwined.
The war was fought all over Europe, but also in other parts of the planet 
like America. Catalonia was clearly one of the areas with the greatest 
number of war actions, because of its great geostrategic importance as 
a wedge between Spain and France. If we focus on the war operations 
in Catalonia, we can see how soldiers enrolled in the most diverse 
European armies battled for strong points and clashed in large and often 
very bloody pitched battles (both on land and at sea). The English army 
stands out as it bore the burden of the defence of Catalonia throughout 
almost the whole of the war in the number of soldiers involved as well as 
the money invested. This issue is certainly not mentioned much in works 
dealing with the War of the Spanish Succession for several reasons.
From the English point of view, the endless stream of successes achieved 
by the English army in Flanders under the command of John Churchill, 1st 
Duke of Marlborough, focus the majority of English works on this war 
on the operations in northern and central Europe, leaving Catalonia as 
a sideshow.
From the Catalan point of view, however, the scales are tilted towards 
political instead of military issues. It was with England that the Vigatans1 
signed a pact in Genoa in June 1705, according to which Catalonia would 
turn against Philip and support the cause of Archduke Charles. Therefore, 
1 Vigatans was the name given to Archduke Charles’ supporters during the War of the 
Spanish Succession, as opposed to botiflers, Philip’s supporters.
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without the support of Queen Anne and the Whig government, the role 
of the Catalans in this war would have been much less important. But at 
the same time, it was England that broke the clauses of the treaty during 
the negotiations that put an end to the War of the Spanish Succession. 
The so-called «English treason» (as it is known in Catalonia) is one of the 
key factors in explaining the withdrawal of Allied troops from Catalonia 
and why England left the country in the hands of King Philip.
It must be noted, however, that contrary to the opinion of classical 
historiographic works, this peace did not leave Catalonia in a desperate 
situation in which the Catalans decided to stand fast and defend their 
land against all odds. Charles (then already Emperor Charles VI) still 
considered the Catalans as his subjects (and these considered themselves 
as part of his empire). It could be considered that the peace treaties 
brought in some kind of balance of forces, as they prevented France from 
helping Philip in his attempt to crush the Austriacists.
When Louis XIV massively intervened in Spain, in spring 1714, Charles 
and the Whigs unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the cooperation of 
the English government, then in the hands of the Tories, in sending some 
kind of help to the besieged city of Barcelona. But the political scenario 
in London prevented Charles’ wishes and the Catalan State disappeared 
as a result after September 1714.
As this is a work on military history, we do not want to condemn or 
justify the actions of the English government during the war and the 
peace negotiations, nor focus on political issues. Our aim is to give a 
general overview of the massive English intervention in Catalonia by 
studying the English army, its finances, its battles and its sieges, among 
other aspects. In our work we use rather unknown primary sources, never 
studied before, which provide key economic data for understanding the 
great effort England made in sustaining the war in Catalonia from 1705 
to 1711. Regarding the main military actions in which the English army 
took part, we have studied these from primary text sources, allowing 
the main characters themselves to explain the events. In this way, we 
use official English sources and soldiers’ accounts as well as the huge 
amount of written material from the Narraciones Históricas by Francesc 
de Castellví, the most detailed historiographic work on the military 
actions in the Peninsula during this war.
This book is divided in two parts. In the first, the English intervention 
in Catalonia is analysed from different points of view, focusing on the 
army finances, the political scenario and the various military units that 
fought in Catalonia. The second part is an account of the main battles 
fought by the English army in the Principality.2  We have explained the 
2 Principality of Catalonia is a legal term (Principatus Cathaloniae) appeared during the 
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account from the viewpoint of the main characters of the battles, in 
order to show how war was waged during the 18th century and how the 
English soldiers perceived the war in which they were fighting. It is worth 
remarking the great number of sieges, so common in this war, as of the 4 
military actions analysed in the book, three are sieges (Barcelona 1705 
and 1706, Lerida 1707) while only one is a pitched battle (Almenar, 
1710).
In summary, the aim of this work is to provide new data on the English 
intervention during the war, especially from the side of military history, 
in the hope that it will provide a better understanding of this landmark 
in the history of Catalonia. England’s role in the conflict was decisive, 
from the Allied landing in Barcelona in 1705, to its end on September 
11th 1714.
14th century and was used for all lands under the jurisdiction of the Catalan Courts, and is 
not a kingdom in itself but an area whose sovereign was the king of the Crown of Aragon. 
In the 18th century it was used as a synonym for Catalonia. It must be noted, however, that 
the term Principality of Catalonia also includes the former County of Roussillon, which at 
the time of the War of the Spanish Succession was under French sovereignty (and it has 
remained so until now).
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Part 1
 
The English Army 
in Catalonia
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“NO PEACE WITHOUT SPAIN!” 
 
 
 
The Catalan point of view
“England is to blame for the Catalan defeat in the War of the Spanish 
Succession. England broke the agreements reached with the Catalans 
and left the country to its fate against Spain and France simply because 
the English government did not want Charles to become King of Spain, 
in addition to being Emperor of Austria.”
        The English point of view
“It was impossible to remove Philip V from the Spanish throne, because 
Castile did not want Charles as a king. The same happened to Joseph 
Bonaparte during the Napoleonic invasion a century later. This, along 
with the severe defeat in Almansa (1707), made final defeat just a matter 
of time.”
These two points of view on the English3  intervention in the War of the 
Spanish Succession in the Iberian Peninsula are common in the great 
majority of published works on the war, usually written during the 19th 
century and thereafter.4  They are clearly two mutually exclusive points of 
view, but in analysing the European political scenario at the beginning of 
the 18th century, we quickly realize that reasoning along these lines is too 
simplistic, especially taking into account the great economic, political 
and military complexity of the major and minor powers at that time. 
We should attempt to build a richer and more global image if we 
want to understand what happened in Catalonia regarding the English 
intervention during the war.
3 Strictly we can also speak about British intervention, instead of English intervention, 
as the Act of Union was signed in 1707. However, as all contemporary primary sources 
refer to English and not to British, in this work we will use the first term.
4 For the Catalan point of view see Soldevila (1995) or Soler (1998, p.165-166) for a 
popular history. For the English point of view see Falkner (2005, p. 222), Mahon (1832, p. 
393) or Chandler (2000, p. 283).
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The political and military scenario
As in almost all great wars fought in the previous 
200 years, many of the troops and much of the effort 
were focused in Flanders. Here, the Allied army of 
English, Dutch and Imperial troops defeated the 
Bourbon armies defending the French border time 
and time again. The overall command of these 
allied forces was given to a brilliant commander: 
John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. 
Under his command the English regiments formed 
the core of the Allied army which defeated the 
French and conquered the territory of present-
day Belgium, and even crossed the borders of the 
kingdom of Louis XIV, the absolutist monarch of 
France.
Flanders was not the sole stage of war outside the 
Peninsula. There were also military actions in Central Europe, along the 
route of the Danube linking France with the Austrian Empire. Northern 
Italy also became another hot spot of this war, where a balance was 
reached between the Bourbon forces and the Allied under the command 
of Eugene of Savoy.
The Duke of 
Marlborough, one 
of the more brilliant 
commanders of the time 
(Wikimedia).
Europe in 1700 (ICC).
 X.Rubio (ed.)  13
Marlborough had full powers, not only in the 
military sphere, but also in the diplomatic, and was 
empowered to conclude treaties on behalf of Queen 
Anne. This was essential, given the difficulties in 
handling such a complex alliance of countries, with 
diverse and often conflicting goals. From a Catalan 
point of view, we cannot understand the English 
role in the peace negotiations (which led to the 
withdrawal from the war) without considering what 
was happening on all these fronts, and especially in 
Flanders.
During the final phases of the war, the Allied 
troops were already invading France, following 
the battles of Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706), 
Oudenaarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709). In 
1711, after crossing the so-called Ne Plus Ultra 
line, Marlborough laid out plans for ending the war 
by occupying the Bourbon core lands (Chandler, 
2000, p. 288-298). However, Marlborough was 
forced from office because of his wife’s stormy relationship with the 
Queen and her subsequent dismissal from court, as well as the growing 
disagreements between the Tory and Whig factions.
It is then in the Parliament of England where we will find many elements 
for understanding this complex muddle. Unlike the absolutist French 
and Spanish monarchies, independent from any kind of parliamentary 
control, the English political scenario was a complex net of intertwined 
Louis XIV, absolutist 
monarch of France.
Battle of Oudenaarde, 
July 11th 1708, according 
to Tindal  (ICC).
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ideas and interests which met in the modern London, creating one of the 
more unstable but also creative societies of that time. In a little over 50 
years, England witnessed a military dictatorship under Oliver Cromwell, 
a brief restoration under Charles II, and finally the Glorious Revolution 
(1688), in which William of Orange-Nassau was crowned King of England 
as William III, despite Jacobite attempts to regain power.
At the beginning of the 18th century, Anne, William’s daughter, was 
Queen of England, amidst a constant struggle with Parliament, divided 
between the Whig and the Tory parties. While the former wanted to 
remove the French supremacy in continental Europe once and for all, the 
latter had close connections with France and with the Jacobites and were 
opposed to war.
At the beginning of the war the government was in the hands of moderate 
Tories, led by Sidney Godolphin and with the Queen’s support. Godolphin 
gradually shifted towards Whig points of view, and the party rose to 
predominance. Among the Whigs one of the most influential character 
was Marlborough’s wife, Sarah Jennings, Queen 
Anne’s intimate friend, and a fervent supporter of 
the Whig cause, Sarah Jennings managed to make 
her husband one of the main characters in the war 
(Chandler, 2000, p. 58-59). The English war effort 
was thus closely tied to the Whig predominance 
in Parliament, where budgets were approved and 
treaties negotiated. There were indeed Whig 
representatives who sealed a treatise with a group 
of Catalan representatives from the vigatans 
faction, the Pact of Genoa, according to which 
England would help in the anti-Bourbon revolt on 
the lands of the former Crown of Aragon. From 
that very moment, and until the end of the war, 
the Whigs (then also known as «the war party») 
strived to reach a sufficiently decisive military 
victory to put an end to the French hegemony in 
Europe. So much so that after the great victory 
at  Ramillies (1706), the government took on the 
motto «No peace without Spain», because one of 
the binding clauses for allowing peace negotiations 
with France was the removal of Philip from the 
Spanish throne (Falkner, 2005, Appendix 1).
The English economic expenses in the war grew gradually, but despite 
certain significant defeats (like that in Almansa (1707)) war seemed 
to turn against the Bourbons, who were immersed in an even greater 
financial crisis.
Queen Anne (ICC).
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At the end of 1710, owing to various factors including the growing 
enmity between Queen Anne and the Whigs,5  overwhelming financial 
expenses and the Dutch withdrawal from war, the Tories took over in the 
English government (Muñoz and Catà, 2009, p. 85). This party, opposed 
to war, saw that the time had come for initiating peace feelers with Louis 
XIV and Philip V, always from a position of strength obtained through 
military victories. Nevertheless, the first action was forcing Marlborough 
from office, as the great general had fallen from favour in the English 
court.6  Now freed from a successful military leader, the Tories reached 
a very advantageous peace treaty with France, which kept Gibraltar and 
Port Mahon in English hands and left Philip as King of Spain. For the 
Catalans the outcome was the defeat of September 11th 1714, but this 
brief analysis shows how English reality was rather complex and that the 
crowning of Charles as Emperor was not reason enough, on its own, for 
explaining the English behaviour with Catalonia.
5 Especially with Sarah Jennings, Marlborough’s wife, dismissed from the court in spite 
of the former friendship with Queen Anne (Chandler, 2000, p. 279-280).
6 Marlborough and his wife repeatedly asked for the office of Captain-General and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, held by Marlborough during the war, to become a post 
held for life. The answer was always negative and raised many suspicions, as 50 years 
before, Oliver Cromwell had made a similar move, was proclaimed Lord Protector and thus 
turned England into a de facto military dictatorship (Chandler, 2000, p. 238).
Sidney Godolphin, the 
main character of English 
policy during the War of 
the Spanish Succession 
(Wikimedia).
The decisive Allied 
victory at Ramillies, 
according to Tindal (ICC).
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The peninsular theatre of war
Putting aside the English political scenario, we 
now focus on analysing the Catalan position in 
this context.
The first thing is that it was England who, almost 
single-handedly, afforded the Catalans some hope 
of success. It was the English navy which secured 
materiel shipments to the troops in Catalonia, as 
well as the transport of regiments for its defence 
(English regiments, but also Imperial, Portuguese 
and Dutch regiments). It was English money 
which, to a large extent, armed the Catalan 
troops.7 Finally, it is interesting to note that the 
English officers were the most offensive-minded 
against the Bourbons, sometimes with disastrous 
results.
The English activities in the Iberian Peninsula began in Portugal. As 
early as 1703, England sent troops to this country, and a huge amount 
of money in yearly instalments, which served 
to maintain the fighting Portuguese troops. 
Ironically a large part of this money came from 
Bourbon funds, as in 1702 a great English fleet, 
while attacking the port of Vigo, ran into the 
galleons carrying Americas treasure, escorted by 
a French-Spanish fleet. The English victory in the 
ensuing battle, under Admiral Sir George Rooke, 
gave a huge booty worth over a million pounds 
sterling (Parnell, 1905, p. 37), probably used later 
for managing the first war years, besides sealing 
the alliance between England and Portugal.
After successfully assaulting Gibraltar in 1704, 
Lord Peterborough, the sole commander of the 
land forces in the Peninsula, was ordered to sail 
to Barcelona with a large military force, while the 
Pact of Genoa between Catalan representatives 
and the English government was sealed.8 Once 
Barcelona was Allied-occupied, the revolt rapidly 
spread all over Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon. The support for the 
Austriacist cause in Catalonia was a clever Allied move, because of 
7 See Espino (2006, p.128-129) and Porta (1984, p.306-308).
8 On the great squadron that sailed to Barcelona, see Porta (1984, p. 345-352).
Sarah Jennings, Duke 
of Marlborough’s wife 
(Wikimedia).
Archduke Charles of 
Austria (Wikimedia).
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its strategical situation as a wedge between both Bourbon crowns. 
Louis XIV quickly reacted and sent an army against Barcelona in the 
spring of 1706. After a tough siege, the defenders won thanks to the 
English help and the Catalan effort: the English fleet transported large 
reinforcements while the country revolted, destroying Bourbon supply 
lines. The outcome was the destruction of Louis and Philip’s forces and 
a swift Allied march against Madrid, now defenceless.
Nonetheless, in the following year the massive French contribution, in 
men and money, rebuilt the Bourbon army in the Peninsula, which in the 
fields of Almansa, under the command of the Duke of Berwick, reduced 
to nothing the previous year Allied victory. In this battle the majority of 
Peninsular Allied troops were wiped out, including most of the troops 
defending the Portuguese theatre and almost all English regiments.
The traditional historiography sees this battle as the turning point in 
the war, the point marking the beginning of the Allied defeat, as soon 
afterwards all Valencia and Aragon fell in Bourbon hands. But the 
English government decided to get even more involved with Charles and 
Catalonia. Expenditure in the Peninsula doubled and more than twenty 
new regiments were raised. This, along with the successful attack by 
the Duke of Savoy menacing Toulon (which sank the whole French 
Mediterranean fleet), prevented the Bourbon forces from occupying 
all the Catalan lands during 1707-1708.9 At this point the English 
government, convinced of forcing Philip to give up the Spanish throne, 
even suggested sending Marlborough and the main part of the Flanders 
troops to Catalonia.10 The idea did not succeed, as Marlborough was 
opposed, arguing that it would mean a disaster for the Dutch, left alone 
against the bulk of the French army. The final agreement was to raise 
a new army in Catalonia to reconquer the ground lost in the Peninsula, 
while keeping Marlborough and his men in Flanders.11 Moreover, Charles 
was greatly successful in the diplomatic sphere, even being confirmed as 
a King of Spain by the Pope (Montaner et al., 2006, p. 9).
At the start of the 1710 campaign, then, a new and impressive Allied 
army was ready to act, with even more men than the one who fought 
at Almansa. Under the command of the imperial Marshal Guido 
Wald Rüdiger, Count of Starhemberg, the core of the Allied infantry 
and cavalry was formed by English regiments, under General James 
9 Berwick was forced to divert part of his forces to the defence of Toulon and was unable 
to campaign beyond Lerida, as he initially intended. See Paoletti (2006) and Ostwald 
(2000).
10 Among the supporters of this idea, demanding the raising of 20,000 men in Catalonia, 
is James Stanhope, who afterwards became Commander-in-Chief of the English forces in 
the Principality.
11 For the arguments see Chandler (2000, p. 203-204).
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Stanhope, the architect of the Allied victory at Almenar, which opened 
the way to the advance into Aragon (Rubio, 2008). After Almenar, the 
Bourbon army retreated from Catalan lands and soon afterwards was 
annihilated in Zaragoza. The victory in Zaragoza allowed Charles III to 
enter Madrid unopposed and be crowned as King of Spain. This last 
move was probably too risky, as it gave time to the Bourbon supporters 
to reorganize and stretched the Allied supply lines. The decision was 
taken mainly by the English commanders, who wanted Charles to be 
crowned quickly and thus end the war the short way. (Castellví, 1997-
2002, vol. III, p. 181-188).
At this point the situation seemed desperate for the Bourbon arms, 
so Louis XIV considered abandoning his grandson and reaching an 
agreement with the Allies to leave Philip without the Spanish throne. 
This was a wise decision, as besides losing Spain, France was about to 
be invaded; the Sun King had his own problems and could not help Philip 
anymore. However he decided to rebuild again the Bourbon army in Spain 
as a last attempt to turn the fortunes of war. This action unexpectedly 
turned the tide again, now in favour of Bourbon interests.
The Duke of Vendôme rebuilt the Bourbon army, which now had large 
contingents of French troops. This new army threatened Starhemberg at 
Madrid while, at the same time, a French army under the command of 
the Duke of Noailles attacked Northern Catalonia towards Girona. The 
Allied army, forced to defend Catalonia, its logistic and political base in 
the Peninsula, began a disadvantageous retreat from Castile, chased by 
Vendôme. Because of various arguments with Starhemberg, Stanhope 
led the English troops along a different route from the rest of the imperial 
army and made a nonsensical halt in the village of Brihuega, while the 
rest of the army kept on marching. Vendôme seized the opportunity 
and isolated the whole of the English army, forcing it to surrender. The 
next day Vendôme clashed with Starhemberg at Villaviciosa; though 
indecisive, the result allowed the Allies to reach Catalonia unmolested 
and establish a new line of defence in the Cardona-Manresa-Igualada 
axis, which was to last until the end of the war.12
The great English defeat in Brihuega happened just as the Tories rose to 
power. Obviously such a defeat was nothing short of traumatic in England 
and the government had to rebuild the peninsular army once more, as it 
had to do in 1707, after Almansa. The huge amount of money and men 
involved in the project tilted the scales towards peace and confirming 
Philip on the Spanish throne.
12 The Bourbon attempt to cross it in 1711 led to the battles of Prats de Rei and Cardona, 
which resulted in important Allied victories.
 X.Rubio (ed.)  19
With all due differences taken into account, the Iberian Peninsula was a 
kind of Vietnam for England, a place of never-ending war, which raised 
the costs in money and manpower year by year. Adding to that the 
fact that it was not a defensive war, but one fought far away from the 
homeland, this scenario encouraged the supporters of peace, who were 
strengthened as the war progressed, finally forcing the withdrawal from 
war at an especially delicate point for the English military.
This all contradicts the hypothesis defended by many English historians, 
according to which the true reason for the English withdrawal from war 
was the inability to control Castile, caused by the defeat in Almansa, 
and the civilian resistance. This last point on civil resistance is worth 
remarking because the English works usually point out the similarities 
of this situation and that witnessed by the defeated Napoleonic troops 
in Spain during the Peninsular War. In comparing both wars, 19th century 
English historians accepted this reasoning for explaining the English 
defeat in the peninsular theatre during the War of the Spanish Succession, 
but the fact is that there were no civil armed groups threatening the 
Allied march on Madrid in 1710. In fact, if we apply the same line of 
reasoning to the other side of the conflict, we would be unable to explain 
how the troops of the Two Crowns (Spain and France) controlled Aragon, 
Valencia and especially Catalonia, even more taking into account that in 
this case there were indeed instances of irregular warfare.13 In the 18th 
century the ideas of total war and nation at arms were unknown, but not 
so during the Napoleonic wars a century later. Thus, the requirements 
that could lead to a general popular uprising against the occupying forces 
were simply not fulfilled (and were intrinsically impossible). It is in this 
way how Philip was able to occupy and keep control of the Austriacist 
lands, using a great number of Spanish and French troops and a brutal 
repressive policy.
Turning to the traditional Catalan point of view, firstly we must underline 
the fact that the Catalan authorities never thought, during the final phase 
of 1713-1714, that they were fighting alone.14 They always considered 
themselves subjects of Charles III (then already Emperor Charles VI), 
and, correspondingly, he always considered Catalonia as part of his 
13 It should be noted that the typical irregular warfare of the 18th century, based on 
sudden attacks and skirmishes by small groups of soldiers for the control of the logistical 
resources of an area (the so-called petite guerre or kleine Krieg), is very different from the 
guerilla warfare of later centuries. While in the first case the actions are performed by 
professional fighters, with goals established by their commanders, in the latter the clashes 
are usually arbitrary and performed by civilians.
14 For example, in a letter written by Marquis del Poal in May 14th 1714 to the Catalan 
authorities, he suggests to publish the letters received from the Emperor, in order to raise 
the spirits of the Catalans. It is worth remarking that in all the reports written by Poal to 
Barcelona City Council (Consell de Cent) he considers himself a subject of the Emperor 
(Bruguera, 1871, vol. I, p. 651-653).
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kingdom. But for the Catalan historiography of the 19th century, the idea 
of resistance against all odds was much more comforting. On one side, 
it fitted with the Romantic ideals emanating from the French Revolution. 
On the other, at that time the European culture was divided between 
francophiles and germanophiles15 and the siding of the Catalan historians 
with the former made the War of Succession an uncomfortable conflict, 
with Catalonia allied with the Austrians against the French. In this way 
it seemed much more politically correct to explain how Catalonia was 
abandoned by the Austrians, leaving out the fact that the Catalans then 
considered themselves subjects of Charles and members of the Austrian 
Empire (Alcoberro, 2005). 
The Austrian troops left Catalonia in 1713, following the treaties that also 
forced the withdrawal of French troops. This led to a military equilibrium 
between Catalans and Spaniards, in which the Spanish, ruined by the 
war, were unable to successfully occupy Catalonia. When the French 
intervened again, in the spring of 1714, Charles tried to help his Catalan 
subjects. According to Charles himself, in a letter to James Stanhope, 
he was not helping Barcelona because without the aid of the English 
fleet he had no squadrons which could oppose the Bourbon ships in the 
Mediterranean and thus the city remained isolated from imperial lands 
(Mahon, 1832, p. 302). This letter, dated September 8th 1714, shows 
how a faction of English Whigs wanted to intervene in Catalonia again 
under Stanhope’s leadership (also a close friend of Marlborough). This is 
clear proof that the union of Austria and Spain under the same sovereign 
was feared by only one side of the English politicians, the Tories, who 
were against the war from the very beginning. For this reason we can 
conclude that the issue of the union of Austria and Spain was but an 
excuse for negotiating peace, and not the true reason. Even before the 
death of Emperor Joseph I in 1711, the Tories were already defending a 
more peaceful stance than that supported by the Whig government. In 
this scenario, a seemingly private affair like the break between Sarah 
Jennings, Marlborough’s wife, and Queen Anne was probably a decisive 
factor; Anne thereafter gave more support to the Tories, which greatly 
contributed to the final outcome in favour of peace negotiations and to 
Marlborough’s fall into disgrace, even retiring into a self-imposed exile.
Study of a lesser-known primary source 
In order to provide new insights on these issues it is worth analysing a 
primary source which has received little attention so far. It is the book 
An Impartial Enquiry into the management of the war in Spain, published 
in 1712 by John Morphew at the request of the Ministry at Home.
15 This tension was of political origin and ultimately led to First World War.
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This work is a collection of administrative documents and accounts on 
the conduct of the war by the English troops in the Iberian Peninsula. The 
reason behind the publication was the defence of Lord Peterborough’s 
actions, Commander-in-Chief of English troops from 1705 until 1707. 
This Tory military leader was accused by the Whigs of deliberate 
incompetence in order to make the Allied offensive fail, because, without 
any clear reason, he opposed Charles’ troops advance into Madrid in 
1706. Moreover, he was responsible for some other weird actions (like 
not wanting an attack on Barcelona in 1705 or not pursuing the retreating 
French troops in 1706), so much so that he was forced from office just 
before the Battle of Almansa. Then a harsh argument raised between 
Tories and Whigs on Peterborough’s actions, and was still lively in 1712 
when this work was published.
Among certain interesting information, there are records of all councils 
of war from the capture of Barcelona in 1705 to the Battle of Almansa. 
Two parts are especially informative: a list of shipments of English 
troops to Spain and a yearly report on the statement of account and 
the expenditures regarding the Iberian Peninsula. While the former is 
useful for understanding the complexity of military operations and the 
constant transfer of troops from one front to another one, we will focus 
on the latter, trying to correlate the government-approved expenditures 
with the political actions taken. 
An overview of expenditures
From this source in the first graph we have summarized the total English 
expenditure in the Peninsula, in pounds sterling by year  (see Fig. 1). 
This document ends July 18th 1710. For this year, analysing the daily 
expenditure including service pay, supplies, suppliers’ payments, etc. we 
calculated a projected expenditure until the end of that year.16 The result 
is quite interesting, as it disproves the thesis according to which after 
the Battle of Almansa the English government lost any hope of victory 
in the Peninsula. In the year after the defeat there is a great increase in 
the budget (almost 20% higher than in 1707), the rationale of which 
will be commented later, but it is related to the rebuilding of the army. 
16 Considering that until July 18th 1710 984,501 pounds had already been spent, we 
have a daily expenditure of 4,947 pounds. If we then extrapolate this figure to 365 days 
we obtain the value represented in the graph, 1,805,655 pounds. Of course this is just a 
rough figure, but analysing the expenditure of previous years, the expenditure rate is quite 
regular, so the extrapolated value should not be very different from the amount the English 
government had spent during the whole year.
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While in 1709 the expenditure becomes stabilized because there are no 
new troops sent to the Peninsula nor any important changes,17 in 1710 
there is a significant increase again in the budget, giving a final push for 
Philip’s defeat. As is well known, the first results were those expected: 
Charles was crowned in Madrid, but the massive intervention of Louis 
XIV turned victory into defeat in Brihuega.
In the graph we can also see how expenditure rises year by year (except 
in 1709, for the reasons mentioned earlier). While in 1703 and 1704 
all money goes to other zones of the peninsular stage (especially to 
Portugal), in 1705 the occupation of Catalonia begins and so the 
expenditure becomes greater year by year, as besides maintaining the 
Western front (Portugal), there was a new army to be created in the 
Eastern front (Catalonia,18 Aragon, Valencia).19
The fronts in the Iberian Peninsula
In Figure 2, we show the yearly evolution of expenditure on both fronts 
(the blue line is the Western front, the orange the Eastern).
17 Raising a new regiment is much more expensive than maintaining one already formed, 
as raising a new regiment means acquisition of weapons and clothes, recruiting of troops, 
etc.
18 Catalonia is the English and Austriacist core land in the Eastern front. Except for some 
isolated military campaign, the great majority of expenditures is related to the Catalan 
lands, where troops were stationed.
19 We included the expenditure for the Gibraltar garrison in the Eastern front accounts, 
as this is the way the English agents managed them in this document. Anyway, it does not 
distort the graph, as it represents a very small and quite regular amount.
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This is a quite revealing graph on the English intervention in the 
Peninsula, even when we restrict ourselves to the recorded data, without 
the calculated projection for 1710. The expenditure for Portugal remains 
approximately constant around 200,000 pounds sterling per year, while 
it rises enormously in the case of Catalonia. Beginning in 1705, in the 
following two years the budget doubles and in 1708 reaches the figure of 
a million pounds sterling. And taking into account that the data for 1710 
end in July and that by that date 800,000 pounds were already spent, it is 
not difficult to conclude that this year would have witnessed the greatest 
expenditure by the English government.
This difference between both fronts shows the different political stances. 
While the Western front is but a diversion, where the English government 
pays the Portuguese crown a yearly amount for remaining at war against 
Philip, the Eastern front is the core of the English policy in the Peninsula: 
each year the involvement is greater, not only for defending Catalonia, 
but also for twice creating an army (in 1705-1706 and in 1710) which 
defeated the Bourbon troops and reached Madrid.
Thanks to the exquisite accuracy with which expenditures were 
recorded in this document we can analyse where all the money went in 
greater detail. For each front we have divided the expenditure in four 
chapters: payments to the crown (Portuguese or Austrian), raising and 
maintenance of English regiments, transport of troops, and casualties 
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(supplies and ransoms for prisoners of war, hospitals, physicians, 
reparations to wounded), to which we added a general fifth chapter on 
other expenditures, including the few entries not fitting any of the former.
The Western front
Figure 3 shows the expenditure divided in 5 chapters (crown in blue, men 
in orange, transport in yellow, casualties in green and other expenditure 
in brown).
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The first thing worth noting is that the two main chapters are payments 
to the crown and maintenance of troops. The first, except for 1705, 
is virtually constant throughout the war, with a mean value of nearly 
150,000 pounds per annum, paid as maintenance for 13,000 Portuguese 
combatants according to the treaties between both crowns. The 1705 
exception coincides with a peak in troop maintenance. This is probably 
due to the fact that having a much larger number of English troops 
defending Portugal, the payments to the Portuguese crown were 
deemed no longer necessary. On the other hand, with the arrival of 
Allied troops in Catalonia, the maintenance of English troops in Portugal 
plummets, as the majority of troops were transferred to Barcelona and 
Valencia. From this time there is a slight increase in the expenditure for 
troop maintenance, but never reaching the ceiling of 400,000 spent in 
1705. The casualty chapter is constantly low, as there were no major 
Figure 3: Expenditure 
in the Western front by 
chapters.
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engagements with English participation on this front, so no ransoms were 
paid. The yearly expenditure in the casualty chapter corresponds almost 
exclusively to the maintenance of a hospital and the payments to the 
army physicians and surgeons. Regarding transport there is a significant 
amount of expenditure only at the beginning of the war, when many 
regiments were transferred from England and Ireland to Portugal. From 
this point on, and taking into account that transport from Portugal to 
Catalonia is included in the Eastern front books, there is no expenditure 
related to transport. This is confirmed by the embarkation documents, 
as there are few transfers to Portugal after 1705.
The Eastern front
Figure 4 shows the expenditure breakdown for the Eastern front, quite 
different from the previous one:
Firstly, the difference in expenditure between both fronts must be noted. 
Not only is the total amount vastly greater in Catalonia (in the final years 
it reaches 5 times the amount spent in Portugal), but for the large part it 
is destined to the English troops
Regarding troop maintenance, the graph shows a constant increase in 
the expenditure, reaching 600,000 pounds in 1707. After the defeat in 
Almansa and the destruction of the English army, a great reform was 
initiated, in which the number of regiments in Catalonia was greatly 
reduced, as many of them were disbanded or merged due to their low 
1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
700,000
800,000
900,000
1,000,000
Eastern front
Crow n
Men
Transport
Causalties
Other
Year
Po
un
ds
 s
te
rli
ng
Figure 4: Expenditure 
in the Eastern front by 
chapter.
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numbers. This is the reason behind the smaller maintenance in 1708, 
although the total expenditure in this year is higher than in the previous 
year. Nonetheless, in 1709 there is again a great increase in the expenditure 
for maintenance, 200% higher, which coincides with the final rebuilding 
of the English army in Catalonia.20 The trend for 1710 was even greater 
than in 1709, confirmed by the arrival of new reinforcements from other 
theatres of war to serve under Starhemberg and Stanhope and fighting 
in Almenar, Zaragoza, Brihuega and Villaviciosa. Beginning in 1705, the 
numbers include entries for the two regiments detached at Gibraltar and 
Alicante.
Related to the maintenance chapter are the casualties. The figures for 
this chapter are clearly greater on this front than on the Western one, 
as the main battles were fought here (3,713 pounds during the 8 years 
on the Western front, against 138,801 pounds on the Eastern front). 
Moreover, the consequences of the Almansa defeat are clear in the 
annual breakdown, especially for 1708. During the 18th century, as can 
be seen in this document, the governments paid the enemy to maintain 
prisoner troops, and it is also seen that the English, contrary to other 
nations, had their own campaign hospital to look after the wounded, and 
that large amounts were paid for the physicians and surgeons caring for 
the soldiers. Finally, it is somewhat surprising to find entries regarding 
large payments to officers having lost a limb or to families having lost 
a relative in the war. The document is therefore an extraordinary tool 
for researching into the caring of wounded soldiers and the treatment 
of prisoners in the 18th century, an issue highly under-represented in the 
literature. It shows a much kinder behaviour than might be presumed, 
with payments to the soldiers’ widows, and even for the physicians and 
surgeons’ widows.21
Regarding transport, two years show a significant increase in the sea 
traffic to Catalonia. This matches the years in which the two English 
armies on the Eastern front were raised: the first in 1706 coincides with 
the defence of Barcelona and the push towards Castile; the second, in 
1708, coincides with the shipments of new recruits to Barcelona in order 
to rebuild the army after the defeat in Almansa.
In the «Others» chapters, the surprising Government payments to 
Eugene of Savoy are included. Eugene was the commander of the Allied 
troops in Northern Italy, where no English regiments were present. This 
document, then, shows how, besides paying for its own operations as well 
as those of the Portuguese, the English crown allocated large amounts 
20 See Castellví (1997, III, p.19-20)
21 For instance, there is an entry for 100 pounds sterling addressed to the widow of a 
physician from an English hospital in Catalonia.
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of money to its Austrian allies, helping them in supporting fronts where 
no English troops were stationed. The level of involvement and strength 
implied by these data is revealing, as it shows England as the great power 
supporting the Great Alliance and the nation that was most stubbornly 
fighting to win the war.
A curious and quite interesting entry in the document is the payment 
in 1706 to a publisher for a booklet on correct behaviour addressed to 
English troops. The publisher, who was paid 14 pounds sterling, was 
Joseph Downing, and the booklet was entitled The Soldier’s Monitor. 
Being serious advice to soldiers, to behave themselves with a just 
regard to religion and true manhood. The English authorities, then, 
were concerned that their mainly Protestant and Anglican troops should 
behave correctly towards the local Catholic population, although results 
were disparate.
Finally, the most difficult chapter to interpret is that of payments to 
the crown. As Charles was from the House of Hapsburg and was the 
main beneficiary of a victory, the English do not give him any yearly aid 
for his help against the Bourbons, as is the case with the Portuguese. 
Nonetheless, there is a very interesting set of entries for payments to 
nobles switching sides in the war, passing to the Austriacist field and 
stating their allegiance to Charles III. Many of these nobles were probably 
Catalan.
In this chapter there is a peak in 1706, with an expenditure of 67,276 
sterling pounds, and another, even higher, in 1708, with a total of 337,043 
pounds, followed by a value still fairly high in 1709 (69,971 pounds). Our 
hypothesis is that these peaks correspond to different situations. The 
first peak in 1706 shows the efforts of the English government in helping 
Charles in his raising of various regular regiments. This date coincides 
with the raising of the Catalan regiments (mountain fusiliers,22 Catalan 
Guards, etc.) and this fact suggests that the troops raised by Charles 
were, in fact, paid, armed and supplied by the English government, at 
least at the beginning. This fact is confirmed by other entries, in which 
the government makes payments to Charles for using his troops in the 
Iberian Peninsula.
It is also suggestive to relate the 1708 maximum to the decrease in the 
English troops maintenance that same year. It must be remembered 
that after Almansa, Valencia and Aragon fell in Bourbon hands, as well 
as Lerida, and the Allied army was almost destroyed. For defending 
Catalonia the English government, which already had thousands of 
troops stationed in other theatres, paid a large amount of money to 
22 Mountain fusiliers was a kind of professional light infantry, organized in the same 
way as the line infantry.
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the Austrian Empire for sending some 5,000 troops to Catalonia from 
Italy. Therefore, at a time of dire crisis and shortage of manpower, the 
government sent and kept Austrian troops on Catalan lands, paying more 
than 300,000 pounds.
Finally, the 1709 expenditure is allocated to the raising of an artillery 
train for replacing the one lost in Almansa. The raising of this siege 
artillery train means that Parliament endorsed a great investment to take 
the offensive, as it is evident that these large guns are only needed if 
you are going to attack an enemy strongpoint. All this suggests that in 
1709 and 1710 the government was still heavily involved in the war in 
Catalonia, strengthening its will to defeat Philip and making Charles III 
King of Spain.
Some unknowns
As the entries of the document are quite brief, some doubts arise. We 
want to underline some of these unknowns, the solution of which could 
shed new light on various issues regarding this complex war.
Firstly, in 1709, we find the acquisition of 27,000 «Pistoles». The reason 
is clear: it is necessary to arm all troops recently raised and this number 
does not appear disproportionate bearing in mind that each trooper 
was equipped with two pistols. The problem is that instead of using 
the English term pistol, the Catalan one is used, raising doubts on the 
possible difference between both weapons. The entry also suggests 
the idea that these thousands of pistols were manufactured by Catalan 
gunsmiths, although the number seems totally unfeasible for the Catalan 
industry of the time. Weapon manufacturing was certainly important in 
Catalonia, especially in Ripoll and Barcelona, but the number is so high 
that the aim of the accountant in recording an entry in a foreign language 
in an official English document remains unknown.
Similar to this entry we find another in 1710, for the acquisition of 4,000 
Spanish Pistoles» to be shipped to Portugal in exchange for a large number 
of horses. In this case the figure could indeed have been assumed by the 
Catalan weapons industry, and the term «Spanish» could be related to 
the miquelet gunlock (also known as the Spanish lock or the Catalan 
lock) with which the weapons would be equipped. It seems clear that 
the war brought great profits to some Catalan manufacturing industries, 
especially to weapons manufacturers. It is the interesting to ask whether 
the same is true regarding other supplies like clothes, ammunition bread, 
artillery trains, etc. accounted for in the document, as the answer could 
give some hints on the reasons behind the staunch Catalan support to 
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the Allies during the war: Barcelona became the Austriacist capital in 
the Peninsula and, as a such, the political, social and economic centre of 
Charles III’s court and of a kingdom, something that had not happened 
for many centuries.
An entry of 1709 cites a certain Colonel Wythers, to whom 300 
pounds are paid for his extraordinary expenditure while serving in a 
Catalan regiment. A similar case, presented in the document on troop 
embarkations, explains the raising in 1708 of 5 regular battalions of 
Catalan infantry after the defeat in Almansa, in order to defend Catalonia. 
According to the document, two of them formed Blosset’s Regiment, 
another two Lord Gallway’s Regiment and the last was christened 
Regiment Saragossa, probably formed by Aragonese Austriacists. We 
suppose Gallway was one of the commanders of Gallway’s Regiment, 
but it is a very late date, as it is believed that all these regiments were 
disbanded in mid-1708. Anyway, both entries suggest that the presence 
of Catalan men in English-paid regiments might be higher than is 
currently accepted, which would mean an increase in the (already quite 
high) numbers of Catalan troops in Austriacist regiments during the 
war.23
«It is not for the interest of England to preserve the Catalan 
liberties»24
There is no doubt that England’s withdrawal from the Peninsula is largely 
to blame for the final Catalan defeat of 1714. Nonetheless, as we have 
tried to show in this chapter, neglecting the internal political struggle 
in England leads to a simplistic vision of the facts that took place in 
the final stages of the War of the Spanish Succession. Moreover, until 
now the huge financial effort that the Catalan adventure implied for 
England has not been properly emphasized, and the faith with which 
Parliament kept a military lead in the Peninsula, defending Catalonia 
and threatening Castile until 1710, has not been sufficiently highlighted. 
Undoubtedly this investment (not only in money, but also in manpower 
and political assets for the Whig government) is, for any nation, far more 
important than abiding by the clauses of a treaty, like that of Genoa. 
Around 1700, the English economy was on the verge of collapse, due in 
part to the various military conflicts at the turn of the century which, 
23 See, for instance, Parnell (1905, p. 267), in which it is explained how these regiments 
were formed by Catalan soldiers commanded by English officers.
24 Sentence attributed to Lord Bolingbroke, England’s Prime Minister, during the Utrecht 
negotiations in 1713 (Soldevila, 1995, p. 11).
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in fact, were not threatening the country security.25 It is clear then that 
the great financial effort was one of the determining factors in England’s 
withdrawal from war.26
All the same, to underrate the importance of military actions, as has 
been done too commonly, is of no help in clarifying the situation. As we 
have proven with the analysis of the expenditure, the English government 
was not willing to withdraw from the Peninsula after Almansa; quite the 
25 Among these conflicts, those related to Flanders were especially important. The 
financial situation was truly desperate, and was partly corrected by Isaac Newton, 
appointed to the post of Warden of the Mint, who brought in reforms and assisted in the 
Great Recoinage, decisively improving the English economy.
26 See the comments on the widespread corruption in the English army stationed in 
Catalonia in Falkner  (2005, p. 227-228). Many episodes of corruption were related to 
dummy battalions. Despite being completely false, if we consider other sources such as 
hospital entries or statements of accounts, they reflect the English government’s concern 
for the continuous economic cost of the war.
Europe after the treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt.
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contrary, it invested even more resources in trying to turn the situation, a 
goal achieved at least temporarily. However, the great defeat in Brihuega, 
worse for the English than that of Almansa (because all officers and 
rank surrendered) was key in the rise to power of the “party of peace”. 
The Tories, after guaranteeing political hegemony and the cooperation 
of Queen Anne, sped up peace feelers in order to pin down a treaty 
favouring England, leaving aside the Austrian allies, and especially the 
Catalans. It is in this context that we must consider the publication of 
the anonymous work The Deplorable History of Catalans, one of the 
numerous weapons used in the struggle between Tories and Whigs, 
as the latter were still defending Charles III as King of Spain in 1714. 
The Whig current of opinion sympathetic to the Catalans had at least 
some reward, as it prevented the English fleet from helping Philip in the 
sea blockade of Barcelona, as promised by Lord Bolingbroke (Soldevila, 
1995, p. 12).
Queen Anne’s death, in August 1714, caused a new political change 
favouring the Catalan Austriacist cause, as the new King George I was 
a fervent Whig supporter. Immediately preparations for sending help to 
Barcelona were initiated, but the fall of Barcelona into Bourbon hands 
thanks to the massive French intervention, prevented the time needed 
for an Austriacist revival.
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The English army, as all other European armies 
involved in the War of the Spanish Succession, was 
organized according to an administrative structure 
allowing the fluid management of thousands of 
men. The basic unit was the regiment, commanded 
by a Colonel, which grouped several hundreds 
of soldiers of the same kind (infantry, cavalry 
or dragoons). These were professional forces of 
volunteers working in the army for a variety of 
reasons. These soldiers, usually from the lower 
class and impoverished areas were commanded by 
officers from the lesser nobility, who had bought 
entry to the different ranks (Lieutenant, Captain, 
Colonel) by buying commissions. In this system the 
Colonel bought a commission for commanding a 
regiment from the highest army authority (usually 
the King). This patent allowed him to sell the lower 
offices in the unit ladder, and with the money obtained he recruited, 
clothed and armed the soldiers. The Colonel’s direct subordinates were 
the Captains, each of which commanded a company (often clothed at 
their expense) with support from Lieutenants and the non-commissioned 
officers.
Training was a key factor in combat, as combat systems were based in 
complex linear formations which, due to their very nature, were quite 
difficult to control and manoeuvre during a battle. For this reason 
the drill, under the responsibility of sergeants major, was paramount 
to guaranteeing the unit’s performance, increasing its firepower and 
improving its efficiency in combat.
Soldiers each year received a uniform with the regimental colours, which 
identified them and gave a more homogeneous image to the unit. In the 
English regiments red was the most common colour (hence their later 
name of redcoats) but each had a different distinctive colour, which was 
used in the facings (linings, hems and braiding on coats). The colours 
might be different each year, and adding to that the constant changing 
of commanding colonels, it is sometimes quite difficult to individually 
identify each English unit that served in the Catalan campaigns.
James Stanhope was 
the commander of 
all English forces in 
Catalonia from 1708 
to 1711.
An irascible character, 
his disagreements with 
Guido von Starhemberg 
were constant, due to 
his tendency to adopt 
aggressive tactics. 
Although Stanhope’s 
tactics often gave great 
results, they were also 
one of the reasons 
behind the English 
defeat in Brihuega, as 
Stanhope refused to 
follow Starhemberg’s 
retreat route to 
Catalonia, so fatally 
dividing the Allied 
forces.
THE REGIMENTS INVOLVED
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Preliminary notes
As we will see in this chapter, information regarding the presence of 
English regiments in the Peninsula, and especially in Catalonia, is scarce, 
fragmentary and often contradictory. Some significant problems are the 
constant transfer of regiments from one stage to another (especially 
between Portugal and Catalonia), the several written forms of proper 
names, and, especially, the lack of a numerical standards in the 
organization of 18th-century English army. Regiments are distinguished 
by their kind (foot, horse, dragoons) and by the Colonel’s name. Another 
problem is the high casualty rate among the officers, as the death or 
leave of a Colonel sometimes meant a change in the regimental name. 
In the following list we have named the regiments according to the first 
officer commanding them in the Peninsular campaign.
We have tried to compile a coherent list of all regiments present in 
the campaigns, using the work Narraciones Históricas by Francesc de 
Castellví, and two especially interesting sections of the report published 
by the Ministry at Home An impartial enquiry into the management of 
the war in Spain as the main sources. The first is the listing of regiments 
embarked to the Peninsula from 1703 to 1708, where the number of 
troops participating in Almansa is recorded. The second is the report on 
the expenditures caused by the war in the Peninsula, already discussed 
in the previous chapter, and where we can find references to the various 
regiments, as new materiel had to be purchased on a regular basis.
Another source consulted, despite not being strictly a primary source, is 
a collection of the information included in various English archives. The 
work, in six volumes, gathers all officer’s names serving in the English 
army in the years 1661-1714, with many documentation related to the 
casualties in combats.27
We have also used some war accounts,28 as well as two more recent works 
attempting to gather all available information on the English army.29 It 
must be stressed, however, that the data provided by these sources is 
sometimes contradicted by primary sources, and this is a proof that there 
is no correct general overview yet of the English regiments involved in 
the War of the Spanish Succession. Lastly, the research carried out at 
the Arxiu de la Diputació Provincial de València and the Biblioteca de 
Catalunya regarding English wounded soldiers entering the hospitals, has 
confirmed many of the data gathered and has allowed  some regimental 
colours to be identified.
27 Dalton (1902).
28 See, e.g. Mahon (1832), Falkner (2005), Parnell (1905).
29 Grant (2004) and Barthorp (1980).
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Cavalry and dragoons
Mounted English units that took part in the War of Succession were 
considered by their contemporaries as the best in Europe. Having few 
strictly regiments of horse, regiments of dragoons assumed similar tasks 
on the battlefield with excellent results, like in the Battle of Almenar, 
for example. So, to the usual dismounted infantry, petite guerre and 
reconnaissance tactics, typical of this kind of arm, the cavalry charge 
with sword in hand of the regiments of horse is brought in.
The English regiments were divided into many troops, which on the 
battlefield were grouped into 2 or 3 squadrons, each with a strength of 
150 troopers.30 However, the regiments were usually at understrength; in 
Catalonia, as in the other war theatres, the regiments had just around 50 
or 60% of their theoretical strength.
Although the English dragoons should have been divided in companies, 
instead of troops (because of their original basis as mounted infantry), 
contemporary documents use both names, because they performed 
typical tasks of regiments of horse.
English cavalrymen were always superior to their French and Spanish 
counterparts, due largely to their aggressiveness and tactics. Their 
commanding officers were always imbued with the traditional spirit of 
considering the cavalry an offensive weapon, and James Stanhope was 
the main example of this, although with diverse results. All the same, 
contrary to the Bourbon cavalry, the English cavalry tactics were aimed 
more at the use of cold steel weapons than the use of firearms. The 
triumph of these tactics during the War of the Spanish Succession was 
decisive for the cavalry’s evolution in the following years, in which it 
was used more and more in Stanhope’s and Marlborough’s way.
30 For more information see, e.g. Chandler (1990, p. 42-50).
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Trooper and grenadier of 
The Royal Regiment of 
Dragoons, 1708.
One of the companies of 
the regiment grouped, as 
was usual in regiments of 
foot, the best soldiers of 
the regiment as grenadiers, 
with their distinctive 
uniforms.
Drummer of The Royal 
Regiment of Dragoons, 
1708.
As dragoons were 
considered mounted 
infantry, orders were issued 
by means of drums, rather 
than trumpets used in the 
regiments of horse.
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Major General Daniel Harvey’s Regiment of Horse 
The sole regiment of horse present on the Catalan war stage arrived 
in the Peninsula in the first expeditionary force sent to Portugal. It 
is one of the more active regiments, and took part in the Battle of 
Almansa (with 227 troopers). It suffered heavy casualties (at the 
end of 1707 it had less than 150 soldiers) and was rebuilt as a 
regiment of dragoons. It later fought in Brihuega and played an 
outstanding role in the Allied victory of Almenar.
Royal Regiment of Dragoons 
Along with Harvey’s, this is the first mounted 
unit to arrive in the Peninsula, and was sent to 
Portugal at the end of 1703. In April 1705, under 
the command of Lord Raby, the regiment is sent to 
Catalonia to support the anti-Bourbon revolt. The 
regiment fought here until the defeat in Brihuega. 
In these years the regiment was present in many 
engagements, although it did not take part in the 
Battle of Almansa (as it was garrisoned in Cullera31) 
nor in the Battle of Almenar (as it arrived when the 
Bourbon cavalry was already defeated).
Uniforms of The Royal Regiment of Dragoons, 
1706. The uniform on the right is a drummer’s, 
much more decorative than that of the private (on the left) as it is a non-commissioned officer.
31 Village located in the zone of Marina Baixa, in Valencian Country.
Soldier of Harvey’s Regiment of Horse, with a uniform 
contemporary of the Battle of Almenar (1710).
Uniform of Harvey’s Regiment of 
Horse, 1710. A trooper’s was not 
very different from that of a private, 
except for the fact that they wore 
boots instead of shoes.
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General Major Conyngham’s Regiment of Dragoons
This is probably a regiment with an Irish basis, considering the names of the officers. It arrived in 
Portugal at the end of 1704, with the second expeditionary force under Lord Galway. Some months later 
it embarked again, and under the command of Lord Peterborough fought in the battles for Catalonia 
in April 1705. In 1706 it left for Valencia, where the majority of soldiers (150) were captured in Elche, 
leaving just 51 troopers present in Almansa under the command of Major General Killigrew. Afterwards 
the commanding office goes to Major General John Pepper. The regiment is reinforced with 2 troops 
from Guiscard’s Regiment and remained in Catalonia until the end, fighting in Almenar, Zaragoza and 
Brihuega.
Brigadier George Carpenter’s Regiment of Dragoons
Only a detachment of 100 troopers from this 
Regiment was present in the Peninsula, probably 
grouped as a squadron. It arrived in October 1706, 
under command of Count of Rivers and fought in 
Almansa. At the end of 1707 was transferred to the 
Northern theatre and no more entries are recorded 
in the documents. Carpenter, though, was later the 
commander of the English cavalry in the Battle of 
Almenar.
Uniform of George Carpenter’s Regiment of 
Dragoons at the time of the Battle of Almansa.
Count of Essex’s Regiment of Dragoons
Like Carpenter’s, only around 100 troopers from this regiment arrived in the Peninsula, in October 1706. 
They fought in Almansa and the regiment was disbanded at the beginning of 1708, its troopers being 
distributed among the other regiments of dragoons in Catalonia.
Lord Rochford’s Regiment of Dragoons
This regiment arrived in Catalonia at the end of 1708, with Major-General Wills’s expeditionary force, 
trying to secure the Austriacist Catalan territory against Bourbon attacks. It fought in Almenar, where the 
colonel died. With Nicholas Lepell as new Colonel, it surrendered in Brihuega.
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Edward Pearce’s Regiment of Dragoons
Formed from Lord Barrymore’s Regiment of Foot during 1705-
1706, this unit was in Almansa, where it was recorded at a 
strength of 273 troopers. It was discharged at the beginning of 
1708 and its remaining 192 soldiers were incorporated in other 
mounted units. Nonetheless, there is an entry in the account book 
according to which in August 24th 1709 420 pounds were paid 
for the maintenance of the “Peirce [sic] Regiment of Dragoons”, 
casting doubts on the true date of discharge.
Pearce’s Regiment of Dragoons, the uniform received by the 
soldiers after the 1706 transformation.
Marquis de Guiscard’s Regiment of Dragoons
De Guiscard’s Huguenot troops were recruited for the unsuccessful expedition to Languedoc, planned 
for raising an uprising against Louis XIV. The expedition failed due to bad weather and disembarked in 
the Peninsula, where fought in Almansa at a strength of 228 men. After the defeat, Guiscard’s Regiment 
withdrew to Catalonia, where it was dissolved at the end of 1708. Its 287 troopers reinforced other 
regiments, especially Pepper’s.
Peterborough’s Regiment of Dragoons
Raised in 1706 in Valencia with English soldiers from various units 
of foot, the regiment fought in Almansa with 303 troopers under 
command of Frans von Nassau, because Peterborough had gone 
to England. With Nassau the regiment withdrew to Catalonia and 
participated in the 1710 campaign, in which the Colonel died in 
the Battle of Almenar. The regiment served until his surrender in 
Brihuega, with James Stanhope as Colonel.
Peterborough’s Regiment of Dragoons, raised in Valencia.
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Infantry
At a time when sieges of cities and fortresses were more common than 
field pitched battles, the infantry was the core of all armies. With pikes 
already eliminated, soldiers equipped with muskets and bayonet were the 
backbone of the English army, participating in assaults and defence in 
various sieges, and in great pitched battles, forming kilometre-long lines 
with thousands of men.
The organisation of English units of foot was based on the equivalence 
between the administrative unit (regiment) and the tactical unit in battle 
(battalion). In many other armies the organisation was different, with 
multi-battalion regiments (usually 2 to 4), so it must be noted that English 
regiments had always fewer combatants than those of other armies. 
A battalion was divided into a dozen companies, one of which was a 
grenadier company. This elite company grouped the best, as well as 
tallest and bulkiest, soldiers, had better pay but performed the riskiest 
and most dangerous actions of the regiment, acting as a vanguard in 
breach assaults, performing flanking protection, laying ambushes, etc.
The theoretical strength of a company was around 100 soldiers, giving a 
regiment of around 1,000 men. Nevertheless, regiments were usually at a 
strength of 30-40% of this figure, and in Catalonia regiments of just 200 
men are recorded, while the usual figure is around 400.
The power of these small regiments was quite noteworthy. English 
tactics were different from the typical 4-rank, salvo-firing, used by the 
French. They formed in 3 ranks and a battalion was split into 16 platoons 
firing in turn at a constant rate. This splitting into platoons gave a weaker 
firepower but theoretically continuous, making it more effective than 
that of the enemies.32
English regiments (including marines) had an outstanding role in the two 
sieges of Barcelona (attacking in 1705 and defending the following year) 
as well as in the unsuccessful defence of Lerida (1707). Casualties in 
these combats were high, as shown by the continuous drain of colonels 
and higher officers.
32 As an interesting sidenote, it must be noted that the infantry manual written by 
Colonel Joan Francesc Ferrer, published in 1714, considers both formations. This shows the 
importance the English tactics had in the Catalan army (Ferrer, 1714, p. 238-240).
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Left to right: grenadiers from Gorges’, Borr’s, and Hamilton’s Regiments. These companies of grenadiers were decisive 
during the sieges of Barcelona in 1705-1706. The picture shows that one of the distinctive items in the grenadiers 
uniform was their headgear: the grenadier stocking cap (right soldier) or the mitre (other soldiers). These were much 
longer hats than the usual ones, giving the grenadiers an even more impressive look.
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Brudenell’s Regiment of Foot
The unit of foot commanded by Colonel Brudenell was one of the first sent to the Peninsula, arriving 
in Portugal in 1702. It defended this front until joining with the troops disembarked in Catalonia after 
1705/1706. In 1707, just before the Battle of Almansa, the regiment was practically disbanded and it 
was not present in the Allied defeat. In 1708 Colonel Johnson was in charge of the regiment, which was 
transferred to Flanders and transformed in a regiment of marines one year later.
Lord Montjoy’s Regiment of Foot
It disembarked in Portugal in 1703 and followed a similar path 
to Brudenell’s Regiment until 1707. It joined Peterborough’s 
(and later Galway’s) troops and fought in Almansa with a 
strength of 508 men. It suffered heavy casualties during the 
battle but it was present in the Peninsula until 1709, as in 
July a payment of 645 pounds was sent to Lord Montjoy by 
way of maintenance of the regiment. This is quite a small 
figure, so we can deduce that the regiment was somewhat 
weakened.
Uniforms of two privates from Montjoy’s Regiment admitted 
to Valencia hospital during 1706.
Lord Portmore’s Regiment of Foot
Sent to Portugal at the start of the war, it fought in Almansa with 462 men. Afterwards it withdrew to 
Catalonia without suffering many casualties, as in November 1710 it had a strength of 410 men. Its later 
military actions are not known, but if the regiment was not disbanded, then it was transferred to another 
front, as there are no more entries related to it. According to the colonel’s list, Piercy Kirk takes the 
command of the unit in September 1710.
William Stuart’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment followed the same career as Portmore’s, and disembarked in Portugal at the end of 1703. 
Fought in Almansa with a strength of 467 men and had 388 soldiers in November 1707, after the retreat 
towards Catalonia. Its later actions are not known.
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Stanhope’s Regiment of Foot
It disembarked in Portugal in 1703, and probably the large part of 
the regiment was captured during the siege of Portalegre in 1704. 
But in April 1705 there are payments recorded to the regiment, then 
commanded by Colonel John Hill. It joined Galway’s troops and fought 
in Almansa with 472 men. In November 1707 it had a strength of 472 
soldiers which were probably transferred to other regiments or to other 
theatres of war, since it no longer appears in the documentation.
Stanhope’s Regiment, 1707 uniform (already under the command of 
John Hill).
Barrymore’s Regiment of Foot
Present in Portugal during 1703-1705, it became Pearce’s Regiment of Dragoons, as seen before. It 
must be noted, however, that at the end of 1708 Barrymore disembarked in Portugal with a new regiment 
of foot, which served there until 1710.
Holcroft Blood’s Regiment of Foot
It arrived in Portugal in 1703 and fought in Almansa with a strength of 461 men. It was one of the English 
regiments with most casualties, as in November 1707 it had only 266 soldiers. Later the regiment 
disappears from the payment records, so it was probably disbanded during that year’s reforms. Although 
some sources say that it served in the Peninsula until 1710 under the command of Colonel Joseph 
Wightman, there are no entries under this name in the payments roll for this theatre of war.
George Wade’s Regiment of Foot
The first actions of this regiment in the Peninsula are somewhat confusing, as although many documents 
place it there in 1706, according to the embarkations documentation it was assigned to Portugal from 
Flanders in 1703. However, we know for sure that from 1707 on it was one of the main units of the 
English army in Catalonia. It fought in Almansa (with a strength of 458 men), Almenar and Zaragoza, 
before surrendering in Brihuega with all troops under Stanhope.
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Regiment of Foot Guards
A strong detachment of this elite regiment33 
disembarked in Portugal at the end of 1704. 
Despite not appearing in the account books 
(because it was not a full regiment), it is clear 
that it fought in the Battle of Almansa  with 
400 men. The surviving troops were probably 
returned to the home regiment after the 
defeat, since there are no more records of its 
presence in Catalonia.
33 This unit is nowadays the famous regiment of the Grenadier Guards.
Officer, grenadier and private from 
the Foot Guards during 1707. Blue 
facings are traditional in the Royal 
Guards, as can also be seen in the 
Royal Regiment of Dragoons and 
the Royal Fusiliers.
Left to right: private, grenadier 
and drummer from the Foot 
Guards in Barcelona, 1706.
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Earl of Donegall’s Regiment of Foot
It disembarked in Portugal at the end of 1704. According to the embarkation roll, brigadier Richard 
Gorges replaced Donegall as regimental colonel in April 1705, when the regiment is sent to Barcelona 
and Donegall receives the command of the English army in Catalonia (he died in a counterattack against 
the castle of Montjuïc, during the siege of Barcelona in 1706). Like the rest of the army in the Eastern 
front, it was integrated with Galway’s forces and fought in the Battle of Almansa with a strength of 616 
men, under Richard Gorges. It was disbanded during the 1707-1708 reforms.
Southwell’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment, commanded by Colonel Southwell, had a leading role in the attack against Barcelona in 
1705. The officer’s roll of the regiment states that the Colonel commission was given to William Southwell 
on February 6th 1706, but the admissions to the hospital contradict this information, so although the 
Colonel was James Rivers, Soutwell was probably commanding the regiment before having his official 
commission. It was one of the few English units present at the Western Peninsular front throughout the 
war. It fought in Almansa (with 505 men), survived the reforms of 1707-1708 (when it had a strength 
of 411 men) and fought in Almenar and Brihuega. From 1708 to the end of war the regiment was 
commanded by Colonel Harrison.
Privates and grenadier from Richard Gorges’ Regiment 
of Foot in 1706, when it defended Barcelona against the 
Bourbon attack.
Private and grenadier from Gorges’ 
Regiment in 1706. Note how uniforms 
can differ considerably from one batch to 
the next, although in this case regimental 
facings are maintained.
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Hamilton’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment disembarked in Barcelona in 1705, but it did not fight in Almansa, due to its low numbers. 
It was later reformed and transferred to the Flanders theatre, where it served until the end of the war.
Soldiers from Hamilton’s Regiment during the taking of 
Barcelona in 1705. From left to right: sergeant, private, 
two grenadiers and drummer. Different ranks had various 
and distinctive combinations of the traditional English 
red and regimental facings (in this case, brownish).
Officer from Hamilton’s Regiment in 
1707. The Union Flag or Union Jack, 
the official flag of the United Kingdom, 
was used for the first time in the 
17th century, although its use was 
probably not widespread among the 
English (later British) army. During the 
18th century it was a combination of 
England’s flag (Saint George’s cross) 
and Scotland’s flag (Saint Andrew’s 
cross). Saint Patrick’s cross (Ireland’s 
flag) was not added until 1801.
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Elliot’s Regiment of Foot
Like Southwell’s, the regiment commanded by Elliot saw action for the first time in the fight for Barcelona 
in 1705. Afterwards it was stationed in Gibraltar as part of the garrison defending this strategical place 
from Bourbon attacks. It remained in this post until the end of the war.
. 
Charlemont’s Regiment of Foot
The unit commanded by Lord Charlemont took part in the successful Allied siege of Barcelona in 1705. 
Its colonel was replaced by Colonel Alnutt in 1706. The regiment defended Montjuïc in the 1706 combats 
and later fought in Almansa with a strength of 412 men. It suffered so many casualties that it was 
disbanded shortly afterwards.
John Caulfield’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment sailed from Ireland to Catalonia in 1705 and fought in Almansa with 470 men, under the 
command of Phineas Bowles. This officer commanded the regiment during the rest of war, when the 
regiment joined Stanhope’s forces and took part in the battles of Almenar and Brihuega.
The Royal Fusiliers
The regiment was sent to Barcelona in 
February 1706, in order to break the siege 
of the city. Afterwards, it continued in the 
defence of Catalan territory. In spring 
1707 it was stationed in Girona and then 
marched to Lerida in order to defend the 
city after the defeat in Almansa. Under 
command of Lord Tyrawley it withstood 
the siege but eventually surrendered 
and was captured. However, there is 
a payment entry for Tyrawley troops in 
1710, so it can be assumed that part of 
the regiment was not captured at Lerida 
and still served in Catalonia.
Left to right: private, grenadier and drummer 
from The Royal Fusiliers in 1706.
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Breton’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment arrived in Barcelona 
at the same time as The Royal 
Fusiliers, under the Bourbon threat 
to the city. It joined Galway’s forces 
and it was present in Almansa 
with 428 soldiers. It survided the 
1707-1708 reforms and, although 
appearing in the 1709 and 1710 
payments, did not take part in the 
battles of Almenar and Brihuega, 
and was probably stationed as a 
garrison in Catalonia until the end 
of the war.
Private, grenadier and drummer from 
Breton’s Regiment at the Battle of 
Almansa.
Soldiers from Breton’s Regiment 
in 1706. From left to right: private, 
grenadier and two drummers.
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Lord Mohun’s Regiment of Foot
The unit commanded by Lord Mohun (often spelled Mobun in the documents) arrived in Catalonia as 
a reinforcement in February 1706. It did not take part in the Battle of Almansa due to its low numbers, 
like many other regiments. The regiment was reinforced again and the command passed to Colonel 
Dormer, who led the unit in the Battle of Almenar and the final campaign of 1710-1711. It was captured 
in Brihuega.
Lord Mohun became famous for his constant duelling, and in fact he died in a duel in 1712, a fact quite 
commented in the English press.
Thomas Caulfield’s Regiment of Foot
Disembarked in February 1706 in Barcelona, Thomas (Toby) Caulfield’s unit remained just one year in 
the Peninsula, and did not fight in Almansa, due to its low numbers. Then it was transferred to Flanders.
Charles Hotham’s Regiment of Foot
The unit commanded by Hotham was assigned garrison tasks in the fortress of Alicante from the end 
of 1706. Besieged in 1709, the regiment surrendered with all other troops. The remaining troops were 
discharged at the end of the year.
Siege of 
Alicante, 
according to 
Tindal (ICC).
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Rungannon’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment arrived in Barcelona in 1706 and had a very unfortunate performance, as it was captured in 
its entirety after leaving the fortress of Alicante and did not take part in the Battle of Almansa. Afterwards it 
was reformed under the command of Marquis de Montandre, largely completed with French Huguenots. 
It remained in the Peninsula until 1710, when it was paid 600 pound for raising new troops. However, we 
do not know where was it stationed, but it did not take part in the Battles of Almenar and Brihuega, so 
probably it was not with Stanhope’s army marching to Castile.
Watkins’ Regiment of Foot
It arrived in Gibraltar in October 1706 and was part of the garrison protecting the place from Bourbon attacks until 
the end of the war, according to the records in the account book, like Elliot’s Regiment.
Scots Guards (Scottish Regiment of Foot Guards)
This regiment, commanded by Colonel Mark Kerr, took 
part in the Battle of Almansa (with a strength of 429 men), 
6 months after its arrival in the Peninsula. After the Allied 
retreat, it took part in the defence of Catalonia in 1708-
1710, contributing to the Allied victories of Almenar and 
Zaragoza, but eventually surrendering in Brihuega like the 
rest of the English army.
Private and grenadier from the Scots Guards in 1709. Note 
the blue facings, like all other royal regiments.
Nassau’s Regiment of Foot
Very little is known about this regiment, as it is not recorded in any secondary source consulted. But 
according to the embarkation roll, this unit disembarked in Barcelona in October 1706, and took part in 
the Battle of Almansa with 422 soldiers. The account book also records some payments to Nassau’s 
troops in 1706, thus confirming its existence. The regiment was probably disbanded in the 1707 reforms, 
as this colonel is the same Frans von Nassau who took command of Lord Peterborough’s Regiment of 
Dragoons and died in Almenar in 1710.
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Frédéric de Sybourg’s Regiment of Foot
This mainly Huguenot regiment was assigned to the defence of Alicante in October 1706, where it 
remained until the assault and taking of the city by the Bourbon army, where it was captured in its 
entirety.
Paul de Blosset’s Regiment of Foot
This regiment was raised with Huguenot troops and remained in Alicante with Sybourg’s Regiment 
during 1706 and 1707. That year it was disbanded and the soldiers joined Sybourg’s, but soon thereafter 
Blosset is given command of a powerful Catalan two-battalion regiment, commanded by English officers 
(with a strength of 407 and 508 men). This emergency measure was taken after the defeat in Almansa 
in order to defend the Catalan lands, and the soldiers were English-paid. The last payment is recorded in 
1709, so it could be presumed that once the military situation improved these battalions were disbanded.
Farrington’s Regiment of Foot
This unit arrived in Catalonia in October 1706 but did not fight in the Battle of Almansa and it was 
somewhat weakened. Some sources place it in Flanders, but in fact it was in the Peninsula until 1709, 
when the payments end. However, it must be noted that some paid regiments returned temporarily to 
England for some months to rebuild them and raise new troops. This might be a reason for the lack of 
records concerning this unit in these years.
Mackartny’s Regiment of Foot
The regiment disembarked in October 1706 and took part in the Battle of Almansa (with a strength of 
494 men). After the Allied retreat in 1709 the command passed to Colonel Sutton and was transferred to 
Flanders, where it served until the end of the war.
Pearce’s, Newton’s, Sankey’s and Stanwix’s regiments of foot
These four regiments disembarked in Lisbon in June 1707 to reinforce Austriacist positions on the 
Western front after the Battle of Almansa, where many regiments defending the Portuguese border had 
been disintegrated. They remained there until the end of the war, without noteworthy military actions, 
except for the unsuccessful attempt to join forces with Stanhope. 
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Mordaunt’s Regiment of Foot
Arriving in October 1706 in Barcelona, Mordaunt’s 
Regiment fought in Almansa with 532 men. After the retreat 
it took part in the defence of Catalonia and in 1708 the 
command passed to Windsor. Although it was present in 
1710 in the Peninsular theatre of war, its exact assignment 
is unknown, as it did not take part in the Battles of Almenar 
and Brihuega.
Private and grenadier from Mordaunt’s Regiment in 1707, 
with the uniform worn at Almansa.
Allen’s Regiment of Foot
When Richard Gorges took command of Donegall’s Regiment, Thomas Allen 
assumed the command of his former unit. Afterwards Allen was replaced in 
1708 by Colonel Moore, who was in charge of the regiment until 1710. Its 
exact assignment is unknown, but it was in the Eastern front.
Uniform of Allen’s Regiment, according to various records from the Valencia 
hospital archive.
Lord Galway’s Regiment of Foot
Like Blosset’s Regiment, this unit was formed in 1707 with two Catalan battalions for fear of a Bourbon 
attack against Allied positions in Catalonia. It had a strength of 491 and 502 men and was disbanded in 
1708, following the recovery of the Allied presence in Catalonia.
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Regiment of Foot of Saragossa
This unit was created in 1707 with Aragonese soldiers, and followed the same path as Lord Galway’s 
Regiment, being disbanded a year after it was raised. It was a strong unit, with 424 men, and must not 
be mistaken for the Aragonese regiment created by Charles III in 1706.
Whetham’s Regiment of Foot
This unit is not widely documented. It arrived in Catalonia at the end of 1708 and is recorded in the 
payments on this front 1710. Its presence in Almenar or Brihuega is uncertain, as it is not cited in any 
source.
Munden’s Regiment of Foot
Arriving in Barcelona in the last massive shipment of English troops (end of 1708), it took part in the 
last actions of the war, including Almenar, Zaragoza and Brihuega. In this last battle the regiment was 
captured in its entirety.
Lepell’s Regiment of Foot
Although this regiment would seem to have arrived in Catalonia in 1708, 
there are entries in the account dating back to 1705. Its assignment is not 
known but in 1710 Lepell was replaced by Colonel Richard, who led the unit 
in Almenar and Zaragoza.
Uniform of Lepell’s Regiment from 1707 to 1711, when it was already under 
command of Colonel  Richard.
Humphrey Gore’s Regiment of Foot
Not a highly documented unit, it was created in 1707 and arrived in Catalonia at the end of 1708. It took 
part in the Battle of Almenar.
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Paston’s and Carle’s regiments of foot
Little documented units, they arrived in Portugal at the end of 1708.
Saunderson’s Regiment of Marines
This marines unit was present in the conflict from the very beginning and had 
a leading role in the taking of Gibraltar. Afterwards it took part in the attack 
on Barcelona in 1705 and was later assigned to the defence of Girona. Its 
final action, under command of Charles Wills, was in the defence of Lerida 
during the 1707 siege, where it surrendered when the city capitulated. The 
remaining men of the regiment were embarked again in 1709.
Charles Wills’ Regiment of Marines, during the siege of Lerida in 1707.
 
Churchill’s and Borr’s regiments of marines
Not very documented units, their presence in the Eastern front 
is based on secondary sources only. In the account books two 
active regiments of marines are continuously cited, from the 
combats for Barcelona in 1705 until the end of the war, which 
could correspond to these units. The command of Joshua 
Churchill’s regiment passed to Harry Goring in 1711.
Private and grenadier from Borr’s 
Regiments of Marines, during the 
1705 combats for Montjuïc and 
Barcelona.
English Marine. An 
admission to the 
Santa Creu Hospital 
in Barcelona is from 
1705 and under the 
name of Rooke’s 
Regiment. As this 
is the name of an 
English admiral, it 
is not known which 
regiment this soldier 
belonged to.
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Artillery
Unlike other arms, there were few completely 
artillery regiments until well into the 18th 
century. Although artillery trains were unified 
under the name Royal Artillery, they were 
organized, as in the rest of the armies of the 
time, as scattered batteries, gathered or split 
according to specific needs. All personnel and 
soldiers related to the artillery were uniformed 
in the same patterns as the other arms of the 
army. In the Peninsula they took part in all 
battles involving the English, and they were 
especially noteworthy in the Battle of Almenar.
Uniform of the English artillery officers during 
the siege of Barcelona in 1706.
Origins of the soldiers
In the archives of the General Hospital of Valencia there are some 50 
admissions of soldiers enlisted in the English army. In the admission form, 
besides the colours of the uniforms (information used by Francesc Riart 
for the figures in this book), the origin and age of the privates and NCOs 
of Lord Peterborough’s army during the campaign of Valencia is recorded. 
These data are very useful for drawing a picture of a typical soldier of the 
18th century.
The first thing we can see from the analysis of this information is that, in 
fact, the majority of the soldiers enlisted are Irish. This is not surprising, 
as Ireland has for many centuries, and especially in modern times, been 
a recruitment place for armies of all Europe (Spain and France had Irish 
regiments, as well). As at the beginning of 18th century Ireland was under 
English control, it is not surprising that a good part of the English army, 
and especially the privates, were formed by Irishmen.
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The younger soldier appearing in the documents was 17 years old, the 
sole English drummer recorded. Nevertheless, the common idea that 
drummers were always the younger soldiers is not correct, as the mean 
age of all drummers from all armies who are admitted to the hospital 
is 27, with drummers of 40 and 46 years of age. It can therefore be 
assumed that the drummer being the youngest English soldier admitted 
is just a coincidence, not repeated in other nationalities. Moreover, as 
there is but one admission, the data has no significance.
Regarding the oldest soldier, he was 47. This is not especially old, as in 
other armies soldiers of 50 and 60 were recorded. These data suggest 
that there was no maximum age for enlistment and that a soldier’s 
career could last all his life.
The mean age does not differ much from that of other countries, being 
28.1, over a sample of 47 soldiers. This is interesting, as 28 years is 
quite an old age compared with soldiers from other historical periods, 
especially in 20th century, when compulsory conscription lowered the 
usual age of soldiers to the range of 18-25.
Moreover, a substantial difference between the mean age of English 
soldiers (around 30 years) and the mean age of Irish soldiers (26 years) 
can be seen. This could be tentatively explained by the levies raised in 
different years in each British Isle, although it could also be attributed 
as a distinctive younger Irish enlistment age.34
Regarding age distribution, Figure 5 shows a histogram where the 
number of soldiers admitted as a function of their age is represented. 
The majority of soldiers are grouped in two age ranges: from 20 to 24 
and from 28 to 33. Although this is too small a sample for achieving a 
conclusion, one can tentatively assume that the two ranges correspond 
to two levies raised in different years, with a group of older veterans 
having campaigned for some years, and a second group of fresh 
recruits.
We find this same distribution when we separate the admitted soldiers 
by nationality (English and Irish), as can be seen in Figure 6.
There are no noteworthy differences between both nationalities, 
although in the younger group of soldiers there is a clear predominance 
of Irishmen, compared to the second group of older soldiers, where 
they are more evenly distributed between both nationalities.
34 Further research on Marlborough’s army demographics could support or refute this 
hypothesis.
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The analysis of this small sample of soldiers admitted to the hospital 
shows how the English army was composed, more or less in equal shares, 
by English and Irish soldiers. The age range of these soldiers was 20-35 
years, with soldiers somewhat experienced and mature. 
This was important, as units formed by veteran soldiers were more 
combat ready than a regiment full of fresh recruits, who knew nothing 
about war and did not know what a battle was.
Figure 5: Age histogram for soldiers 
in the English army admitted to the 
Hospital of Valencia.
Figure 6: Soldiers distribution by age 
and nationality.
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The year was 1713 when Captain George Carleton, an English officer of 
His Majesty’s Royal Navy, spent seven days on leave at the hermitages 
on Montserrat mountain. He was impressed by the mountain’s enigmatic 
landscape and the austere, but generous and open life of monks and 
hermits who lived there. Although he would have liked to stay longer, 
he could not because, in his own words, the life of a soldier was “the 
perfect antithesis of a hermit’s life”. In addition, foreigners could only 
reside on the mountain for a week at most. During his stay, the hall of 
offerings was shown to him among other places. There he saw sumptuous 
wonders like the diamond-encrusted sword offered by Charles III, “then 
King of Spain and Emperor of Germany today”, which had the inscription 
Pulchra tamen nigra (Black, but beautiful). Although he declared himself 
an ardent Protestant, he showed respect for old Catholic habits and tried 
to understand Catholic rituals. 
He sometimes 
fell into the most 
naïve ignorance, 
as when he kissed 
the face of the 
Virgin instead of 
her hand before 
the distressed 
monk who 
a c c o m p a n i e d 
him. On other 
occasions he 
adopted Catholic 
attitudes not 
so much out 
of devotion 
but rather as a 
precaution. 
For example, it was known that if a Protestant soldier (and therefore a 
heretic) died for any reason, then the devout people did not give him 
a Christian burial for fear that the corpse would infect everything 
around. Therefore, like many other English soldiers posted in the Iberian 
Peninsula, the captain had a blessed rosary in his pocket as a trick and 
apparent guarantee of holiness (Defoe, 1809, p. 245-248). 
Basically, Carleton knew the country and its diverse regional traditions 
because he had spent almost a decade in the Peninsula being in the first 
line of the main episodes of the War of the Spanish Succession.
THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION AS SEEN BY AN 
ENGLISHMAN
Montserrat, segons una il·lustració feta per un tal Mr. de Fer el 1705 (ICC).
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English literature on the War of the Spanish Succession
George Carleton, to whom we refer at the beginning of this chapter, was 
a Protestant, a proud Englishman with a military career, an open-minded 
and critical observer of everything surrounding him. He unfailingly 
supported Queen Anne, and he thought it was a good thing fighting for 
his country while defending a fair cause.
Although it is difficult to believe, given the abundance of details about 
his life in Catalonia, this is a character  belonging to the English literature 
of the period. The text is found in Memoirs of Capt. George Carleton, 
an English officer and it is an exceptional primary source of the time 
and context described, although it is completely fictional with regard 
to narrator and first hand experienced facts. Carleton’s character is the 
product of the inventiveness of Daniel Defoe, one of the founders of the 
English novel and author of the famous Robinson Crusoe, as well as The 
Life, Adventures and Piracies of the Famous Captain Singleton and Moll 
Flanders.
It is true that there was a Captain Carleton, but he never wrote any 
collection of memories. Defoe used his name to give veracity to a story 
based on several handwritten notes of Sir Harold Williams, a military man 
as well, and which Defoe filled with historical news using the material 
collected from other sources that were already circulating at the time in 
the form of informational gazettes or biographies. As a businessman, 
Defoe travelled to France and Spain several times. These visits provided 
him with more personal descriptive details that may be found when he 
relates certain landscapes or customs, bringing memories closer to the 
genre of travel narrative.
Regardless of the validity of this text as a primary source, and admitting 
that it is at least suspicious since we are dealing with a novel, the fact is 
that the character created by Defoe is an excellent mirror in which the 
English view on the War of the Spanish Succession is reflected, so it 
may be useful to analyse this character to understand how the country 
experienced the conflict.
England and the War of the Spanish Succession 
The War of the Spanish Succession caused a major uproar in the English 
society of the time. The policy revolved around the wartime events 
that took place in Europe. Gossips in the Court corridors dealt with 
the performance of generals and high commanders sent to the front. 
Abroad, agents and ambassadors sent to other courts made a diplomatic 
effort to arrange an alliance that, on the battlefield, did not always work. 
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Meanwhile, the accumulated years of war progressively emptied the 
English Treasury.
The war was also a before and after with regard to the influence that 
public opinion might have on politics. And the case of the Catalans was 
always on everyone’s lips, as shown by later writings as The Case of the 
Catalans Consider’d or The Deplorable History of the Catalans, published 
in London on the fateful year 1714, the last chance to get help to come 
to the aid of Barcelona before its imminent fall.
In fact, the Tories were pioneers in using the so-called “war of the pen” 
in their favour. The main example of this party propaganda belongs to 
another father of the English novel, Jonathan Swift, the author of the 
famous Gulliver’s Travels. In 1711 he published the pamphlet Conduct of 
Allies, which had a great success and in which he defended a European 
peace without Charles III as the Spanish monarch (The Deplorable History 
of the Catalans, 1991, p. 76).
The leading English figures acting in Catalonia between 1705 and 1711 
are mentioned in the work of Daniel Defoe. The novel first appeared 
in 1728 in a London printing office. Defoe wanted to present the most 
recent history of England while recalling the Anglo-Dutch wars in 
the late 17th century. However, the main goal of such a complete and 
exhaustive review of the War of the Spanish Succession was to justify the 
acts of  one of the most important English military commanders during 
the first stage of the war in the Peninsula, Charles Mordaunt, Earl of 
Peterborough, a military man and politician.35 As we shall see later, Defoe 
and Peterborough belonged to the most conservative wing of the English 
politics. In fact, the writer conceived the novel as a panegyric in favour of 
the actions and decisions taken by Peterborough on the battlefield. The 
work presents a bold Peterborough who can not implement their brilliant 
strategies because of other allies. However, as we have said throughout 
this book, this was not exactly true. Peterborough always had a passive 
attitude, following the canons dictated by his party, opposed to the war.
The Glorious Revolution and the start of the war
Defoe sets the beginning of Carleton’s military career in 1672, the same 
year in which London was threatened by the Dutch fleet. Trade played 
a decisive role for the future of the European powers. France promoted 
Colbert’s mercantilism, marked by a strong intervention of the state, 
just the opposite of the Dutch liberalism. From the mid-17th century, and 
with the support of a weak alliance with France, England disputed the 
35 As we can see, Peterborough had a permanent group of friends who made a true 
propaganda campaign in his favour, thereby supporting Tories’ stance on the war.
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commercial supremacy in naval battles against the Dutch fleet, then the 
most powerful in Europe. James II finally concluded peace in 1674 due 
to popular pressure, which cried out to quit the war against the United 
Provinces and stop the voracious expansionism of Louis XIV. So, the 
English turned the tables and allied with the Dutch, who at the time 
were allied to Spain, the Austrian Empire and German principalities. 
Peace between the United Provinces and France was signed in 1678 in 
Nijmegen, leaving France surrounded by potential enemies.
In addition to these facts of war, the reign of James II was marked by 
other facts that caused the Revolution of 1688, better known as the 
Glorious Revolution. This was mainly triggered by the king giving 
important offices to the Catholics in a clear abuse of personal power 
and even harshly repressing opponents. The continuity of a Catholic 
monarchy was against general opinion in London and the Glorious 
Revolution began when various English Members of Parliament 
contacted the Dutch Stadtholder, William of Orange (married to Mary, 
James II’s daughter) to ask him to land troops in England and finish 
with the Stuart dynasty, which they did in 1688. In the first part of his 
memoirs, Captain Carleton briefly explains the abdication of King James 
II and how the monarch fled the country to settle in France. William III 
of Orange and Mary accepted the joint titles of King and Queen, i. e. 
neither of them was simply a regent but instead both were full monarchs, 
in exchange for promoting Parliament’s liberties. In 1689 the monarchs 
signed the Bill of Rights which reaffirms the constitutional monarchy of 
England, thus starting a new era for the country, characterised by the 
consolidation of English Protestantism, the influence of Parliament on 
the government and the European alliances against France. The Act of 
Toleration contributed to the climate of freedom that went on under the 
more liberal Whig ministers’ term of office.
The revolutionary William III of Orange had fought for nearly the entire 
last quarter of the 17th century against the expansionist ambitions of Louis 
XIV. Meanwhile, the French monarch played his cards to try to return the 
Stuart family to the English throne by causing uprisings and rebellions 
among their Jacobite supporters. Therefore, relations between France 
and England were already rather complicated with the outbreak of the 
Spanish succession problem. The whig party became the main promoter 
of the war in Europe when they opted for the cause of Archduke Charles 
and formed the first alliance against a possible Bourbon union.
In 1702, when “the war was proclaimed, and preparations accordingly 
made for it, the expectations from all received a sudden damp, by the as 
sudden death of King William.” The Dutch Stadtholder, who had fought 
on many battlefields, died due to complications caused by a fall from his 
horse while hunting. Carleton continues explaining (Defoe, 1809, p. 95):
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He [France] flattered himself, that that long-lived obstacle to his ambition 
thus removed, his successor would never fall into those measures, which 
he had wisely concerted for the liberties of Europe; but he [France], as 
well as others of his adherents, was gloriously deceived; that God-like 
queen, with a heart entirely English, prosecuted her royal predecessor’s 
counsels; and, to remove all the very faces of jealousy, immediately on 
her accession dispatched to every court of the great confederacy, persons 
adequate  to the importance  of the  message,  to  give  assurances 
thereof. 
 
The God-like queen to whom the captain referred to is Queen Anne, who 
played a key role during the War of the Spanish Succession. Anne was 
the sister of Mary II of England and William III of Orange’s sister-in-law. 
During the Glorious Revolution, Anne left her father and switched over 
to the Dutch newcomer’s side, even before James II had abdicated. Her 
reign coincides exactly with the war facts during the European conflict, 
as she was enthroned in the spring of 1702, when Allied military 
preparations were under way, and died of gout in the summer of 1714, 
when the Barcelona defenders were still resisting the Bourbon siege 
without foreign help (only to finally surrender on the fateful September 
11th). It is worth mentioning that during her reign the Treaty of Union 
was concluded, which gave rise to a Great Britain united under one 
Parliament.  
English political parties 
In the mid-17th century, the English political scene finally took shape and 
remained unchanged until the mid-19th century, when improvements and 
wide-ranging changes to the electoral system of the United Kingdom 
were introduced after the Reform Act of 1832. In modern times, the 
continuing wars in defence of various monarchs as well as Cromwell’s 
Republic established a division into two blocks still used today, at least 
with regard to the terminology used. The term Tory derives from an 
Irish root that originally defined an outlaw. Usually, the Tories were 
the royalist supporters of the most traditional monarchy and had full 
support from the Church of England, and as conservative politicians they 
were generally hostile to great reforms. In contrast, the Whigs became 
the great defenders of constitutional monarchy against any absolutist 
tendency. In economic terms, they supported free trade and gave priority 
to the emerging industry and not to the privileges of large landowners.
The members of the Whig party were directly affected by the reign of 
Charles II, who excluded them from Parliament following his principles 
of absolute monarchy. The Glorious Revolution was marked by the 
booming liberal wing, though William III of Orange ruled in a balance 
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between the two parties. His prime minister was a moderate Tory, but 
soon the Whigs dominated the decision-taking in politics. Queen Anne 
tried to carry on with the balance of her predecessor and sought the 
complicity of the most moderate Tories, like the minister of economy 
Lord Godolphin,36 and the military man Lord Duke of Marlborough, the 
latter ended up repudiated by the most radical Tories. The Whigs were 
the main supporters of the war in favour of Archduke Charles, and in 
1704 they dominated Parliament after Duke of Marlborough’s victory 
at Blenheim. By 1706 the Whigs were encouraged and strengthened in 
such a way that the Tories had been displaced from the big decisions. 
But Queen Anne was always sceptical about the willingness of the 
liberals to support the war and she began to support the Tories so far 
left out, who saw with horror how the royal treasury emptied because 
of the war costs. Moreover, the enmity between Anne and Sarah 
Jennings (Marlborough’s wife) made the Queen drift further from the 
Whigs and the English commander. The Tories became more powerful 
in Parliament with the forced resignation of Lord Godolphin in 1710 
and they began discussing peace agreements with France.
Notably, in 1715 the Whigs returned to power again, where they 
remained as the dominant party of government until the 1760s. Seeing 
these political changes with the comfort offered by the historical 
insight of something that has already happened, we can understand 
the decision of the Catalans to continue the war against Philip V before 
the fall of Barcelona. It was a logical resistance, since it was a way to 
gain time waiting for a new turn in European politics that could revive 
Archduke Charles’ cause.
War begins in Europe
The first serious clashes between the French and Allied armies took 
place in Northern Europe. The Imperial troops advanced and it seemed 
they did not know defeat. The news arrived in London while our captain 
was there. His comments hint at the propaganda and patriotic meaning 
of Defoe’s Memoirs when, euphorically, the main character describes 
the first combats of the war (Defoe, 1809, p. 96):
36 Sidney Godolphin (1645-1712) held the position of High Lord Treasurer for most 
of the war. Accustomed to move in the court’s atmosphere, he managed to lead the 
Tories to government in 1700. He took control of finances of the first stages of war and 
worked in close cooperation with his colleague Marlborough. During the conflict, he and 
Marlborough eventually allied with the Whigs. A series of cases of corruption in which 
he accused political enemies finally turned against him, to the point that he was forced 
to resign in 1710; as we have seen, a key factor in the rise of Tory government and the 
end of the war. 
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The first campaign gave a noble earnest of the future. Bon, Keyserwaert, 
Venlo, and Ruremond, were found forerunners only of Donawert, 
Hochstet, and Blenheim. Such a march of English forces to the support 
of the tottering empire, as it gloriously manifested the ancient genius of 
a warlike people, so was it happily celebrated with a success answerable 
to the glory of the undertaking, which concluded in statues and princely 
donatives to an English subject, from the then only emperor in Europe. 
Regarding the Iberian Peninsula, the Allied offensive began in Lisbon 
in the spring of 1704, when Philip V declared war on the neighbouring 
country after knowing that Archduke Charles had moved to the 
Portuguese court and had established there a meeting point for all 
Imperial operatives. At the same time, a small f leet commanded by 
Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt (an Austrian military man who had 
been Viceroy of Catalonia in Hapsburg Spain and became quite popular 
among the Catalans) landed some troops near Besòs river to try to cause 
a revolt in the Catalan capital. This was a failed attempt and, given the 
reluctance of the citizens, the Imperial troops once again embarked 
for Portugal, but not before gathering a handful of Catalan Austriacist 
supporters.
On the way southwards, Darmstadt 
joined the bulk of the Imperial navy 
under the command of the English 
Admiral George Rooke.37 When 
the fleet encountered the garrison 
that defended Gibraltar’s strategic 
enclave, it began shooting cannons 
and eventually captured the Rock. 
The strangest thing is that Gibraltar 
did not pass into Austrian or Dutch 
hands, but is still a British colony. As 
it is mentioned by some historians, 
when the Prince of Darmstadt 
conquered the garrison the Imperial 
emblem was raised. 
But according to Defoe, Rooke’s angry soldiers flew Queen Anne’s 
insignia, so the Rock became an English territory even before the 
provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht. 
37 George Rooke (1650-1709) was an English military man and naval strategist with an 
irregular history. He participated in the great wars of late 17th century against the Dutch 
first and then against the French. After 1702 he sailed along the Spanish coast attempting 
small raids in Cadis and Vigo. Tired of gossip about his naval competence, he left military 
service in 1705.
Capture of Gibraltar by the Allies in 1704 (ICC).
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As a professional soldier, Captain Carleton became anxious in his interim 
post in London’s court. The city’s comfortable life was not for him and 
he hoped to reload his musket and step on to a battlefield. Therefore, 
he told his superior he wished to know Spain, because he knew that an 
Allied expedition was preparing a massive landing in Barcelona. The Earl 
of Peterborough was the supreme general of the fleet. No sooner said 
than done (Defoe, 1809, p. 99):
[...] and so when all things were ready, I embarked with that noble lord 
for Spain; to pursue his well-concerted undertaking; which, in the event, 
will demonstrate to the world, that little armies, under the conduct of 
auspicious generals, may sometimes produce prodigious effects.
 
Captain Carleton arrived in Lisbon when the city was seething with 
Austriacists. The year was 1705 and Lord Peterborough’s large expedition 
had the young Archduke Charles in person, while the Imperial alliance 
was in a phase of expansion on all fronts in Europe. In Tangiers, they met 
with Cloudsley Shovel’s English squadron, which the well-known Prince 
of Darmstadt later joined. The army first set sail for Denia, where they 
won public support for the Archduke’s cause thanks to Joan Baptista 
Basset. Afterwards, they entered Valencia where found no enemy troops 
and were hosted by the citizens with tokens of gratitude and support. 
Finally, the Imperial navy arrived off the coast of Barcelona in late 
August.
Defoe explains how Carleton landed with his regiment near the Besòs 
river and pointed the guns at Barcelona. The city of that time is described 
by the captain in this way:
[…] Barcelona is one of the largest and most populous cities in all Spain, 
fortified with bastions; one side thereof is secured by the sea, and the 
other by a strong fortification, called Monjouick [Montjuïc]. The place 
is of so large a circumference, that thirty thousand men would scarce 
suffice to form the lines of circumvallation. It once resisted for many 
months an army of that force; and is almost at the greatest distance from 
England of any place belonging to that monarchy. 
Indeed, in 1697 Barcelona was besieged by the French and eventually 
surrendered. As we can see from this exposition, though, Defoe did not 
know the city well, as Montjuïc is not on the other side of the sea, and 
he does not mention some noteworthy geographical features (especially 
the Tibidabo mountain and the Collserola range, west of the city).
By mid-September 1705 Montjuïc surrendered and later, on October 9th, 
Barcelona capitulated. Defoe presents Carleton as a main figure in these 
actions, gaining recognition as a soldier when he managed to transport 
and make operative some guns pointing at the Gate of Saint Anthony 
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(Defoe, 1809, p. 148). He met James Stanhope, a promoted Brigadier 
and Lord, who was to become the most distinguished English soldier 
in Catalonia. From the very first combats in Montjuïc he stood out for 
his virtues “tam Marte quam Mercurio”, that is, comparable to Mars for 
his military skills and to Mercury for his ability as administrator. The 
following excerpt, from Defoe’s  thought on this officer, is representative 
of an English patriot and Tory point of view (Defoe, 1809, p. 156):
Brigadier Stanhope […] truly he behaved, all the time he continued 
in Spain, as if he had been inspired with conduct; for the victory at 
Almanar [sic] was entirely owing to him; and likewise at the battle of 
Saragosa he distinguished himself with great bravery. That he had not 
success at Bruhega [sic] was not his fault; for no man can resist fate; for 
it was decreed by heaven, that Philip should remain King of Spain, and 
Charles to be emperor of Germany. Yet each of these monarchs have 
been ungrateful to the instruments which the Almighty made use of to 
preserve them upon their thrones; for one had not been king of Spain but 
for France; and the other had not been emperor but for England.
When Barcelona fell to the Allied side, Viceroy Velasco left the city. 
Shouts of “viva” and “visca” were heard all through the city. At the 
beginning of November, Barcelona was placed in the very centre of 
European politics: “according to the articles, Charles the Third made his 
public entry, and was proclaimed king, and received with the general 
acclamations, and all other demonstrations of joy suitable to that great 
occasion.” 
From then on, the former Palau de Mar was the official residence of 
Charles III until his return to Vienna to be crowned Emperor, at the end 
of 1711. However, Barcelona served still as royal residence for Charles’ 
wife, Empress Elisabeth of Brunswick, who remained in Barcelona.
English withdrawal
We have witnessed how English policy-making was above its monarchs. 
The Parliament started the war in Europe and assumed almost all the 
expenditure derived from the war, as shown in the graphs presented in 
this book.  
The English political scenario favourable to war under the Whig 
government came to an end in spring 1710, when the liberals fell from 
power due to financial problems caused by the expenditure generated 
by the war in Europe, while the glory of great generals like Marlborough 
was tarnished with accusations of misappropriation of funds and 
attempts to extend war just for his personal glory. The Tory cabinet came 
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to government as supporters of an early peace agreement, especially 
now when land gains had been achieved. As soon as the conservative 
faction controlled Parliament, secret peace feelers with France were 
initiated, in order to find the best solution for ending the war, leaving 
aside their Allies.
The new European scenario was confirmed by the death of Joseph I, 
Austrian Emperor and Charles’ III brother. The pretender left Catalonia 
and returned to Vienna, where he was crowned Emperor. It was the 
perfect scenario for England to negotiate peace under the excuse of the 
danger of a new European hegemony under the House of Hapsburg.38 
Contacts among belligerent countries strengthened until the English 
achieved Philip’s V renunciation of the French throne, thus neutralizing 
the danger of a Bourbon union under the same monarch. In summer 1712 
hostilities fell all over Europe, waiting for the final deliberations. The 
Allies wanted the war finished and, for instance, the Duke of Ormond, 
who replaced Marlborough in the European front, was under strict orders 
from the Tory cabinet not to take part in new offensive actions.
Captain Carleton had had enough adventures. It was 1712 and he was in 
a remote village of La Mancha. He had been taken prisoner three years 
before but had managed to obtain the protection of the Irish College of 
Madrid and was known among the villagers for his good manners and for 
being on good terms with the nobility as well as the lower classes. One 
day he received a letter informing him of peace negotiations. He possibly 
received news on the London Preliminaries signed in 1711, which paved 
the way to the final peace treaty signed in Utrecht. Carleton left La 
Mancha and visited Madrid with a visa, where he set up his return to 
England. He travelled through Burgos, Vitoria, Bilbao and San Sebastian 
and he was not alone as he met some lost English soldiers and officers 
who were heading towards the French border as well. Ports in the Basque 
Country and Aquitaine allowed the docking of English ships to gather the 
arriving prisoners. His companions embarked on the warship Gloucester, 
while he embarked on the Dover. After a nasty, stormy voyage, Carleton 
disembarked at Dover on the last day of March 1713. Eight years had 
passed since his departure. 
As usual in this situation, the Captain ends his book with an interesting 
description on the changes he observed in his country (Defoe, 1809, 
p. 460):
I took coach directly for London, where, when I arrived, I thought myself 
transported into a country more foreign than any I had either fought or 
pilgrimaged in. Not foreign, do I mean, in respect to others, so much as to 
38 The Netherlands had lost any interest in the war after Marlborough drove the French 
out of the nearby lands.
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itself. I left it, seemingly, under a perfect unanimity: the fatal distinctions 
of Whig and Tory were then esteemed merely nominal; and of no more 
ill consequence or danger, than a bee robbed of its sting. The national 
concern went on with vigour, and the prodigious success of the Queen’s 
arms, left every soul without the least pretence to a murmur. But now on 
my return, I found them on their old establishment, perfect contraries, 
and as unlikely to be brought to meet as direct angles. Some arraigning, 
some extolling of a peace; in which time has shewn both were wrong, 
and consequently neither could be right in their notions of it, however an 
over-prejudiced way of thinking might draw them into one or the other. 
But Whig and Tory are, in my mind, the completest paradox in nature; 
and yet like other paradoxes, old as I am, I live in hope to see, before I 
die, those seeming contraries perfectly reconciled, and reduced into one 
happy certainty, the public good.
Nevertheless, in Catalonia the withdrawal of Allied troops had a much 
more gloomy outlook. The political changes arrived in Catalonia in 
September 1712: English, Dutch and Portuguese troops left the country 
to the indignation of the people of Barcelona. Only the Imperial troops 
remained in the city, under the new viceroy and great commander Guido 
von Starhemberg. All hope fell on Empress Elisabeth of Brunswick, who 
maintained the guarantee of the Imperial commitment in defending 
Catalonia. 
European political routes determined the fate of Catalonia. Elisabeth 
of Brunswick left Barcelona in March 1713 to join her husband Charles 
VI of Germany. In June, Starhemberg signed the Pact of l’Hospitalet 
with Bourbon representatives, by which the Imperial troops handed 
over the main Catalan fortresses and the French troops evacuated the 
Peninsula, agreeing not to intervene again. In July the last Imperial 
ships left the shores of the Besòs beaches. Without Allied help, the 
authorities of Barcelona took the decision to withstand as long as 
possible against Philip, the King of a ruined country deeply weakened 
for all of the concessions to the Allied powers. So Philip was incapable of 
overpowering the Catalan resistance until, in summer 1714, the massive 
French army intervention tilted the scales in the Bourbon direction. 
Queen Anne died soon thereafter, but it was already too late for the 
supporters of Charles III.
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Part 2
The battles in Catalonia
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The first action of war involving English troops in Catalonia was the 
attack on Barcelona in 1705. Despite  contrary voices, the English fleet 
landed troops near the city of Barcelona on April 23rd, and unsuccessfully 
tried to capture it. After weeks of uncertainty in which the Allied army 
was not strong enough to undertake offensive actions, a conclusive 
attack on Montjuïc, headed by Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, 
captured the castle and allowed the Allies to besiege the city.1 The 
Bourbons surrendered shortly afterwards and the Allies entered what 
would become their political and logistical base in the Iberian Peninsula 
for the remainder of the war.
English doubts
Initially, the attack on Barcelona generated serious doubts among 
the English officers. It was difficult to attack the city because it was 
garrisoned by a large Bourbon contingent and at the beginning the 
Catalans did not collaborate much with the Allied army. 
For these reasons, the officers met and proposed to the Queen that the 
expedition should leave Catalonia and that troops should be sent to the 
North Italian theatre of war. There was a strategic impasse between 
April and September, a time in which, aside from the capture of certain 
areas of the Catalan coast (especially Mataró), there was no significant 
military action. 
1 To be precise, a siege dans les formes, which consists of establishing three parallel 
trenches progressively, each closer to the enemy wall, until the wall is breached and the 
final assault is launched.
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By contrast, in politics, Archduke Charles achieved increasingly 
important support from the Catalans, as he granted favours and positions 
to individuals and populations supporting his cause, while resolutely 
defending Catalonia.
This is, for example, the record raised in the council of war held in the 
Allied camp almost four months after arriving in Barcelona (Freind, 
1707, p. 28-31):
At a Council of war, consisting of General Officers, held at Major General 
Connyngham’s quarters in the Camp before Barcelona, Aug. 28. 1705
PRESENT
The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.
Major General Connyngham.
Major General Schratenbach.
The Right Hon. the Earl of Donnegal. 
Brigadier P. de St. Amant.
The Right Hon. the Earl of Peterborow.
The Lord Vis. Charlemont.
Br igadier Richard Gorges.
Brigadier James Stanhope.
The Right Hon. the Lord Vic. Shannon. 
Col. Hans Hamilton Quarter Master General. 
Collonel Charles Wills, Adjutant General.
Having overcome the highest difficulties in submit ting our 
Judgements, declared in three Councils of war, suppor ted with 
undeniable Reasons, to His Majesty’s Pleasure, and the Inclinations 
of our General, provided we had been assisted as in the last Council of 
War we desired, we are confident His Majesty will allow we gave even 
a most unreasonable mark of our Respect, having contented to expose 
the Troops under our Care to visible Ruin, without any prospect of 
Success, and against all the Rules of War:
We have been delayed by Disappointments in all we were made to 
expect, wanting Men and Time to carry on the Siege, and diver ted by 
several Resolutions intimated from His Majesty, sometimes for a March, 
sometimes for a Siege, so little provided with Intelligence from the Place, 
that we were obliged to Land the Forces without the least Advice, and 
that made an Argument for an Attempt against a Town, with a Garrison 
near as
.
 strong as ourselves, without any Correspondence in it suitable 
to what has been told, which Siege must require more than two third 
par ts of our Men on Duty ever y Day, by the demand of our Engineers.
And having notice from Admiral Wassenaer of the positive time of the 
depar ture of the Dutch Ships, some Days before which the Dutch 
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General assures us he will embark his Troops, and the Engineers 
not under taking to make a Battery even in that time, since the 
Fleet, besides the Marines, which in all our Computations of the 
Strength of the Army, we had reckoned upon to compose a par t 
of it, are not able to furnish towards carrying on our Works above 
nine hundred Men, of which, only three hundred can work each 
Day, instead of 1500 for daily Service, as we had desired; so that 
the whole assistance that the Fleet can give, being added to the 
number of effective Foot we have now fit for Service, including, the 
Battalion of Guards, will make in all but 8515 Men, out of which 
5000 Men must be daily employed, either to work at or guard the 
intended Trenches and Battery.
And, since eight Deputies of the Catalans did declare to the Earl 
of Peterborow that they would not promise any number of Men 
to work at our Trenches and Batteries, or in any Place where they 
should be exposed to Fire, which they said could not be expected 
from undisciplined Country-People,
And, whereas we expressed in our last Council of War, that our highest 
Concern was, that we should be disabled from pursuing any other real 
Service, by staying to endeavour to make a fruitless attempt,
And, seeing our general Instructions are explained, and the first. 
Services intended to plainly directed anew in several Letters signifying 
Her Majesty’s Pleasure,
It is the unanimous Opinion of this Council of War that the proposed 
Attempt on Barcelona for eighteen Days cannot be made, but that the 
Forces be immediately embarked for the probable Service, and the 
Support of the Duke of Savoy. 
The fights for Montjuïc
The increasing support of the Catalans for the Austriacist cause, and the 
imminent onset of winter forced the Allies to attempt an attack before 
having to retreat because of bad weather or enemy presence. It was 
decided to attack Montjuïc by surprise, using the army camped out at 
the mouth of the Besòs, while simulating its march towards Tarragona.
On the night of September 13th 1705, when the forces arrived at the foot 
of Montjuïc, presumably to continue to Tarragona, an attack was made, 
according to Castellví (1997-2002, vol. I, p. 519-534):
Empezóse la marcha en tres cuerpos: uno de 1000 hombres, mandaba 
el mismo Milord [Peterborough]; otro, el príncipe [Jordi de Hesse-
Darmstadt] y otro, Stanhope, apartados alguna distancia. No lejos 
God save Catalonia! England’s intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)   74
del pie de la montaña de Montjuïc descansaron las tropas. Milord y el 
príncipe hablaron a solas. A las 10 de la noche retrocedieron del camino 
que seguían y descansaron al pie del monte y refrescaron las gentes. 
Dispusieron el ataque: milord Peterborough a la derecha, a la parte de la 
lengua de sierpe, hacia el mar; el príncipe con mil hombres, a la izquierda, 
a la parte de sobre Santa Madrona, que debía internarse en el foso y 
pasar a la puerta del castillo o fortificación vieja; el brigadier Stanhope, 
con mil hombres, a cortar el paso entre la ciudad y el castillo. El príncipe 
dio dos guías a Milord, la principal el capitán Ignacio Barnadás; dos a 
Stanhope; tres traía el príncipe, y el Dr. Casellas, práctico del terreno. 
Milord, el príncipe y Stanhope empezaron la marcha. La caballería, con 
la gente de Vic, a la Cruz Cubierta. 
Las guías de Milord le condujeron con felicidad a la derecha de la Virgen 
del Port, subiendo a la montaña sin ser advertidos. Las guías del príncipe 
le condujeron por Safont y debiendo tomar a la izquierda de Santa 
Madrona le condujeron por angostas sendas, que en partes sólo podía 
ir un hombre de frente por no alarmar la guarnición. Esto ocasionó dos 
inconvenientes: no llegó con su cuerpo hasta el crepúsculo del día 14. 
Guiaba la vanguardia de 400 granaderos el brigadier Ricardo Gorges 
y el coronel Sontevel. Esto fue la ocasión de ser descubiertos de los 
fusileros del coronel Manegat, que estaban en aquel declivio fuera del 
foso; disparando, alarmaron la guarnición, que se puso en defensa. No 
obstante, el príncipe llegó antes de haber amanecido dentro del foso de 
la obra nueva. Milord llegó primero a la parte de la lengua de sierpe y 
penetró las obras exteriores y llegó en lo interior de la obra nueva con 
poca resistencia; dominó todas las obras exteriores hasta la Ferrería, 
edificio en el medio de la obra nueva que le sirvió de defensa al fuego 
del castillo. 
El príncipe prosiguió el avance; advirtió que el cuerpo de Stanhope aún no 
había ocupado el paso de comunicación de la plaza al castillo a impedir 
el socorro, que los guías erraron el camino. Pasó Peterborough a unirse 
al príncipe. Dejando mil hombres en el lugar ocupado, penetraron toda la 
obra nueva y fortificación exterior. Los defensores se retiraron a la obra 
vieja u homenaje, dirigiéndose a la parte que mira a Barcelona, pasando 
por dentro del foso a ocupar el paso entre la ciudad y el castillo. Los 
aliados hacían un vivo fuego. El fervor de los sitiadores les condujo hasta 
el mismo foso del Bonete, no obstante del vigoroso fuego de los sitiados, 
y llegaron hasta la puerta del castillo viejo, siguiendo a los sitiados, con 
tal ímpetu que de todos entraron en el interior del castillo. 
At the precise moment at which the Allies were making significant 
progress in the attack on the castle, Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt 
fell mortally wounded. As in Castellví’s text, it is worth remarking that 
 X.Rubio (ed.)  75
the loss of an officer, especially if he had charisma among the troops, as 
was the case of Prince George, might plunge the soldiers into a state of 
considerable disruption.
En el tiempo de este fuego quedó herido de una bala el príncipe en una 
rodilla, en el mismo lugar que en Flandes años antes había recibido otra. 
Le tocó una arteria. Prosiguió el avance, despreció el golpe, animando 
al combate. Poco después se ató un pañuelo. Faltóle el vigor y quedó 
inhábil al valor. Le retiraron a casa de María la Pastelera, en el declivio 
del monte. Murió dos horas después en los brazos del ayudante general 
Leopoldo Errigo de Fortinez [sic], de cuyo manuscrito de las campañas 
que hizo en Cataluña debe la posteridad quedar informada de diferentes 
particularidades.
Herido el príncipe y retirado, la gente de su mando, a cuyo frente les 
inflamaba con el ejemplo, empezó a confundirse, retrocediendo de la 
empresa. La duración del fuego de más de dos horas dio tiempo de 
recobrarse los generales de la plaza del impensado suceso. Marcharon a 
socorrer el castillo con 600 infantes, mandados por el general marqués 
de Risbourg, precediendo el conde de la Ribera con 200 irlandeses 
de su regimiento. Éste introdujo en el foso del castillo los irlandeses. 
Faltaban guías a los ingleses. Creyeron por el lenguaje ser los irlandeses 
de los suyos; éstos cortaron el cuerpo más adelantado de todo el de los 
aliados; al tiempo que los defensores desde la frente hacían un recio 
fuego. Rindieron 283 de los aliados; de los holandeses, el sargento mayor 
Van der Vost, los capitanes Rik y Jaucourt, tres tenientes, dos alféreces, 
el capitán de Ahumada, 30 soldados, los demás ingleses, y en toda la 
acción perdieron los aliados más de 500 hombres y los sitiados hasta 180. 
Quedó el coronel Arlen prisionero. 
At the same time, Archduke Charles began to share out military 
commissions among Austriacist Catalans who came to Montjuïc to 
participate in the fighting. Notably, as both the Allied troops and 
defenders were exhausted after the former fights, Catalan reinforcements 
proved to be decisive in conquering the castle. Finally, the joint action 
of ground troops and the English fleet dismantled the Bourbon soldiers’ 
stiff defence, who surrendered on September 17th.
En este tiempo el príncipe Enrique de Darmstadt rehízo la gente y con 
grande denuedo ganó terreno con dos avances. Milord Peterborough 
animaba los suyos. Les dijo en alta voz: «Morir o vencer, que hoy será de 
nosotros la gloria». Milord inflamaba el ardor con el ejemplo. Consideró 
propio lo que antes juzgaba ajeno triunfo. El vigoroso esfuerzo de Milord 
hacía persistir en el empeño. No obstante, avivado más el esfuerzo de 
los sitiados y fatigada la gente de la duración del combate, fue precisado 
a desistir del empeño. Se fortificó a la punta del baluarte del Rey que 
mira a Santa Madrona y se apostó al mismo tiempo en la obra nueva 
dicha la Ferrería, unido ya el cuerpo de Stanhope, que llegando tarde 
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no pudo apostarse entre el castillo y la plaza e impedir el socorro al 
castillo. Milord recibió una leve herida. El príncipe Enrique, pasado 
el sombrero. Los aliados desde luego volvieron contra el castillo tres 
cañones que hallaron en la obra nueva. Milord luego después de herido 
el príncipe Jorge mandó desembarcar 1500 ingleses de la marina, 270 
holandeses con artillería, que a las 12 del mediodía llegaron a Montjuïc. 
Introducido el socorro en el castillo, pasaron a la ciudad con el triunfo 
de los prisioneros. El teniente coronel don José Clauser, f lamenco, que 
bajó luego a dar el aviso a Velasco de estar introducido el socorro, 
Velasco le respondió: «Con todo esto los ingleses se mantienen en la 
lengua de sierpe y Ferrería». Clauser respondió: «Si V. Ex. quiere, con 
100 caballos y alguna infantería yo me pondré en paraje de donde les 
obligaré a desamparar la obra exterior que ocupan, que será en la Cruz 
Cubierta; o llevaré a V .E. prisionero al archiduque. Esto lo considero muy 
conseguible, porque he advertido que los ingleses desde su real marchan 
a Montjuïc». Velasco le dijo: «Ejecutadlo». Al salir de la puerta le repitió: 
«Hacedlo. Advertid que esto que permito ha de ser con la suposición que 
no ha de perderse un hombre y habéis de responder de ello». Clauser, 
dicen, entendió el enigma. Le respondió: «No me empeño a eso». Los 
sitiados no emprendieron desalojar los sitiadores, que se fortificaron a 
su placer. Era practicable el intento, porque el abrigo de la artillería del 
castillo les daba esperanza y la fatigada tropa de tan obstinado combate 
facilitaba el logro.
Entre 3 y 4 de la tarde don Antonio Peguera, seguido de la mayor parte, 
pasó a ocupar la montaña de Montjuïc entre la ciudad y el castillo. Los 
Puig, don Antonio Perera y José Antonio Martí marcharon a la vanguardia 
con 350 hombres. A ellos seguía con 800 don Antonio. Desalojaron 
la gente de los sitiados, que se retiraron después de hora y media de 
combate al foso de la ciudad. Ocuparon el baluarte de la ermita de San 
Pedro Mártir con dos cañones. Fue el primero que penetró, don Francisco 
de Llar, joven de 15 años. Señorearon todo el declivio del monte hasta 
tiro de fusil de la plaza. Ocupado San Bertrán, hicieron una humeada. Se 
separaron ocho navíos que pusieron áncora a la parte del río Llobregat. 
Desembarcaron pertrechos y cañones. Milord dio disposición para la 
puntual paga de los cabos de Vic y su gente. Lo continuó en todo el mes 
de octubre, que se dividió la gente y se formaron regimientos. El día 15 los 
aliados empezaron a batir el castillo con 10 cañones y arrojaron bombas 
a la obra interior con cuatro morteros. La noche del 14 resolvió Velasco 
recobrar la comunicación de la plaza con el castillo. La oscuridad de la 
noche favoreció el llegar a manos del gobernador de Montjuïc, coronel 
don Charletta Caraccioli, el orden de hacer una salida al amanecer del día 
15. El gobernador salió del castillo, auxiliado de la gente que había salido 
de la plaza; encendióse un vigoroso fuego, abrióse paso; volvieron a la 
plaza la gente que no era precisa en Montjuïc.
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A las 8 del día los de Vic y paisanos ocuparon otra vez la montaña. A 
las 10 y media de la noche empezó el bombardeo desde el mar y puso 
en confusión a la ciudad. El 16 los sitiadores añadieron hasta 15 cañones 
y 8 morteros contra el castillo. A la noche continuó el bombardeo 
contra la ciudad. Milord supo por un desertor el puesto donde estaba 
la pólvora. Informó a un hábil bombardero holandés, nombrado Derker. 
El 17 continuó el fuego y el bombardero tiró con tanto acierto que a 
las 3 de la tarde prendió el fuego en 60 barriles de pólvora. Voló parte 
del lienzo de muralla que hace frente al mar y a Barcelona y la puerta 
principal y entre las ruinas quedó muerto el gobernador y parte de la 
guarnición. Los sitiadores ocuparon desde luego por asalto las ruinas. 
Los sitiados pusieron bandera y se rindieron a discreción en número de 
285, 19 oficiales, y tomaron 7 banderas, y luego se canjearon con los 
prisioneros que había en la plaza.
In this description Castellví probably used Bourbon sources, because 
the story is almost identical to De la Cruz’s version (1706, p. 209-
211).
The Prince died of wounds as a result of the fierce clash and the 
tables of the campaign were simultaneously turned: the conquest of 
the castle provided the Allies with an excellent basis to besiege the 
city, which eventually opened its doors to the Austriacists.
The decision to attack
The obstinate efforts of Archduke Charles and Prince George of Hesse-
Darmstadt to defend the Catalans were undoubtedly the determining 
factor for the Allied troops to try a daring assault on Montjuïc’s defences, 
a fact acknowledged even by Peterborough’s defenders. However, these 
tried to have the English officer accredited with the attack. The assault 
enabling Montjuïc castle to be occupied by the Allies was actually led 
by both Peterborough and Hesse-Darmstadt, as seen in the previous 
excerpt, but after the Archduke and the Prince had repeatedly requested 
the English to attack the fortress (Freind, 1707, p. 32-36).
Thus we see it was resolved to embark all the troops for Savoy, which 
indeed was the first design of his Lordship’s Expedition. But the 
King of Spain taking a sudden resolution to stay by his Catalans, 
his Lordship [Peterborough] saw himself reduced to this Dilemma, 
either to go Home without attempting any thing, or take this attempt 
upon himself, contrary to the opinion of the General Officers and 
consequently to positive Instructions. His Lordship, who never cared 
for being a General without doing something, chose rather to trust 
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to the good nature of his Country, which he hoped would pardon 
his succeeding in so considerable an Action, though not strictly 
under taken by a formal order. My lord therefore now made use only 
of his own thoughts; and by an Uncommon ar tifice made that never to 
be forgotten attack upon for t Monjuick ,  the very foundation of all 
our footing in Spa in .  This, I know, some would at t ribute to the late 
Prince of Hesse: That brave Prince indeed had too great a share in the 
danger of this under taking; but as he had no Command in the Army, 
so he was not in the least concerned in the forming of this Design.
Next, Freind continues to defend Peterborough and tries to justify 
why the decision to attack is not in any official document or war 
coucil. This coincides with Castellví’s version whereby it was tried 
to keep the attack secret, even by simulating the whole army’s march 
southwards.
The injudicious, or rather impossible, proposals made by the Prince of 
Hesse, and insisted upon by him to the last, were the occasion of those 
unanimous Councils of War against an enterprise which promised such 
certain ruin: and the freedoms taken in discourse by that Prince had 
prevented any correspondence, for some time, between him and the 
Earl of Peterborow. So far was this Project against Monjuick from being 
proposed by that Price to his Lordship, that in truth the Earl of Peterborow 
was forced to make it a secret even to the Court; where resentments were 
very public and remarkable, upon orders to embark the artillery and the 
King’s baggage, which his Lordship gave out the better to disguise his 
real design. Nay; the excuse the Earl of Peterborow made to the Prince 
of Hesse, for inviting him to assist in an action he could not yet acquaint 
him with, was, that the indispensable necessity of deceiving the Enemy 
had made him resolve to surprise his Friends in an attempt, with however 
desperate, was yet the only possible way of carrying on the Siege with 
success. All I shall observe further upon this Head is that it was owned 
by all who were there, that had not his Lordship shown an unexampled 
Vigour and Courage, and exposed himself more than perhaps became 
one in his Post the Efforts of the Enemy and the mistakes of some of his 
own people had put this important enterprise beyond all retrieve. So that 
will be the least justice that can be done to his Lordship on this occasion 
to say, that few Generals could have accomplished what he did, and that 
fewer, considering his circumstances, would have attempted it.
It is hard to know whether the attack on Montjuïc was really 
Peterborough’s initiative, but other sources contradict this argument and, 
therefore, it is probably an excuse made a posteriori to defend the English 
commander’s  faltering performance. The controversy is not new and has 
been discussed extensively by other authors (Trevelyan, 1931).
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The Allied victory
As Montjuïc was being attacked, a fierce bombardment of the city began, 
which undermined the moral of the Bourbon garrison and breach the 
wall. However, the bombs falling unceasingly on the city caused great 
harm among civilians:
Los marciales bríos de Milord se enardecieron más con la toma de 
Montjuïc. Ésta facilitaba la de la plaza y enfervorizaba su ánimo porque 
la empresa a que iba ceñía sólo en sus sienes el triunfo. La tibieza en 
obrar se transformó en el más aplicado y vigilante cuidado. Tal es el 
estímulo de la propia gloria. Empezóse a abrir trinchera contra la plaza 
la noche del 19, sin permitir breve descanso a la tropa. Aplicáronse 
4000 infantes a la orden del general Stanhope, asistiendo Milord hasta 
el amanecer. Resolvióse batir la plaza con 50 cañones y llegaron hasta 
66, y 20 morteros. El mismo día 14 navíos pasaron a ancorar a la parte 
del río Llobregat. Rindióse la torre del cabo del río con 38 soldados. El 
mismo día a las 7 de la mañana desde los declivios del monte empezaron 
con siete morteros a arrojar bombas. Empezó la confusión en la ciudad. 
Los moradores no encontraron abrigo ni lo hallaba el virrey, que dejando 
el alojamiento del colegio del Obispo, pasó al monasterio de San Pedro y 
se refugió en un fuerte a prueba de bomba. El 20 los sitiados conocieron 
que los sitiadores se dirigían a abrir brecha entre la puerta de San Antonio 
y puerta de Santa Madrona. Empezaron a tirar líneas para la formación 
de la cortadura. Este día escribió el virrey dos cartas, una al marqués 
de Villagarcía, virrey de Valencia, dándole cuenta del estado de la plaza, 
para que se apresurase la marcha de la caballería; la otra, al teniente 
general don José Salazar, para que incesantemente marchase aunque 
no fuera más que con 600 caballos. Le advertía los señales y conducta 
para introducirse en la plaza. Este oficial no llegó a Lérida hasta 29 de 
septiembre, que halló la plaza rendida, como veremos. Estas cartas fueron 
interceptadas de los sitiadores en 22 que, copiadas de sus originales de 
los manuscritos de don Francisco Casamitjana, informaran al lector, que 
son como se leen al fin del año. El 21 los sitiadores empezaron a batir 
desde dos baterías, una de siete cañones y otra de ocho. La primera, en el 
cementerio de los judíos; la otra, bajo la fuente de la Satalia.  A la noche 
empezó de entrambas partes un vigoroso fuego de la fusilería y continuó 
el bombardeo de tierra y mar.
 La noche del 21 al 22 los sitiadores perficionaron dos grandes baterías 
de 42 cañones y al amanecer empezaron a batir la torre y arruinaron los 
parapetos de la muralla. A las 8 de la noche empezaron cinco balandras 
a arrojar bombas, y una llegó a la Cruz de Jesús. Las bombas penetraban 
toda la ciudad y los moradores no encontraban refugio, y en el espacio 
de día y noche arrojaron 380 bombas. El 23 los sitiadores empezaron a 
batir el lienzo de la muralla de San Pablo, arruinando las obras muertas. 
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Desmontaron 10 cañones de la plaza. Los sitiados entendieron era 
el blanco abrir la brecha. Continuaron con esfuerzo el trabajo de una 
grande cortadura. Crecía el horror porque en todas las partes de la 
ciudad las bombas ocasionaban desgracias.
Finally, the situation became unbearable for the defenders and the 
Allies called on the garrison to surrender, considering that it was 
feasible to come into the city through the breach, and that at any time 
they could launch a general assault that would surely succeed. After 
some hesitation, the city formally surrendered on October 9th 1705.
El 29 adelantaron los trabajos y continuó el fuego y a las 11 empezó 
el bombardeo desde el mar y a la noche arrojaron un gran número de 
piedras a la brecha. A las 9 de la noche calmó el bombardeo desde 
el mar y el de tierra arrojó muchas bombas a la cortadura. El 30 al 
amanecer continuó el disparo de la artillería y una bomba dio fuego a 
alguna pólvora en la cortadura y maltrató 20 soldados. El fuego de los 
sitiados era lento, pasáronse a la plaza dos bombarderos, que en ella 
no los había, y luego formaron una batería en la huerta de San Pablo. 
Dos bombas cayeron en el Hospital y maltrataron 10 personas. Los 
administradores pidieron permiso para pasar uno al campo a rogar 
no se arrojasen bombas en aquel pío edificio. No lo consintió Velasco. 
Los días 1, 2 y 3 fue muy continuo el fuego; el de los sitiados, muy 
lento. Los sitiadores arrojaron 480 bombas. La guarnición estaba muy 
cansada y la mayor parte era tropa nueva. Desertaba en gran número 
a la menor ocasión. La brecha era muy capaz. Faltábale poco para ser 
perficionada. El día 3 los sitiados apostaron en la brecha 100 soldados 
españoles y mayor número de italianos. Los sitiadores tuvieron aviso 
que en la cortadura habían preparado diferentes artificios de fuego 
para el caso de asalto. Dos días continuos dirigieron el bombardeo a la 
cortadura. Un desertor informó al mismo bombardero holandés que dio 
Barcelona’s landscape at the time of the battle (ICC)
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fuego a Montjuïc de los lugares donde los sitiados en la cortadura tenían 
la pólvora y pertrechos. Tiró con tanto acierto que a las 8 de la noche una 
bomba dio fuego a un barril. De allí se comunicó a otros y a las minas que 
tenían prevenidas los sitiados en caso de asalto. El estruendo fue grande. 
Hizo estremecer toda la ciudad. Muchos soldados fueron maltratados. 
Los demás de la cortadura y muralla retrocedieron hasta la Rambla, 
desamparando los puestos. No lo advirtieron los sitiadores, que sin costa 
hubieran ocupado la brecha, muralla y cortadura. A las 9 de la noche 
tuvo Milord el aviso del estrago y a las 10 envió un trompeta a la plaza 
con una papel a Velasco. En él le decía que sabía el estado de la plaza, el 
número y calidad de las tropas, el quedar arruinadas las defensas; que 
sabía el estrago que había padecido la guarnición; que no ignoraba que 
la brecha tenía 74 pasos geométricos; que estaba perficionada y capaz 
de admitir un asalto general; que le prevenía que en el presente estado 
era temeraria la defensa; que por último aviso le daba 5 horas de tiempo 
para resolverse a entregarle la plaza; que le ofrecía honrosa capitulación; 
que no ejecutándolo en el término prefijo no le daría capitulación y que 
le trataría con el último rigor de la guerra.
Engraving showing the English fleet which took part in the conquest of Barcelona 
in 1705 (ICC).
God save Catalonia! England’s intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)   82
BARCELONA 1706
The defence against the Bourbon 
troops besieging Barcelona in 
1706 was undoubtedly the most 
successful action of the Allied 
army in the Peninsula. The 
attack aimed to regain Barcelona 
for Philip V and Louis XIV’s 
side, and it would immediately 
have sealed the defeat of King 
Charles III and his subjects; 
however, the Allied success led 
to the total disintegration of the 
Bourbon troops, so the Allies 
managed to take the war menace 
from the Catalan border to the 
heart of Spain.
The attack on Montjuïc castle
Despite the initial success for the Allies in 1705, the limited number of 
Allied troops covering the Eastern front  of the Peninsula was a problem 
that did not go unnoticed by their commanders. The area to be defended 
was extremely elongated (Catalonia, Valencia and part of Aragon), so 
the units were dispersed throughout the country. In addition to this, 
the inadequate defensive structure of Barcelona was very vulnerable 
to attacks after the previous year’s fights (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. II, 
p. 83-93).
En estos días no eran pocas las zozobras que desvelaban a los dos 
príncipes competidores. Al rey Carlos no le era oculto lo indefenso de 
la plaza ni las instancias que continuaba el príncipe Antonio a inclinarle 
a salir de ella. Estas insinuaciones le eran molestas. Teníale cuidadoso la 
desconfianza que podía temerse de parte de las tropas porque no pocos 
de ellas habían tomado violentos el partido cuando se ocupó Barcelona 
y lo calificaba la deserción consistiendo la defensa únicamente en los 
naturales.
On the other side, a possible Bourbon offensive would have to try to 
control the Catalan hinterland, something very difficult because of the 
arge contingent of miquelets2 controlling mountain areas.
2 Miquelets was the name given in Catalonia to mountain fusiliers (light infantry). Contrary 
to popular belief, at this time the miquelets were not a militia, but a professional light 
Siege of Barcelona 1706, according to Tindal (ICC).
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Al rey Felipe le afligía el ver coronadas las montañas de milicias catalanas 
a quienes por su trato y afabilidad personal había procurado honrar 
y complacer. Ignoraba las severidades de su Ministerio y le causaba 
horror la resolución e inflamaba su blando ánimo. Vivía cuidadoso y 
con recelos de permanecer constantes los catalanes en asistir al rey 
Carlos. Consideraba que esto dilataría el asedio, que la permanencia 
en sostener el empeño daría motivo a las escuadras aliadas a llegar a 
tiempo de socorrer al rey Carlos. Este príncipe incesantemente aplicaba 
lo halagüeño y afable con todos a fin de empeñarlos a acelerar las 
disposiciones y demás importancias.
In these circumstances, the Bourbon army started the campaign 
by assembling on the Catalan border, and advanced without much 
opposition to the outskirts of Barcelona at the beginning of April 1706. 
The Count of Tessé was the French officer who led the siege, which should 
not have been difficult a priori, given the great disproportion between 
the Bourbon forces (about 28,000 soldiers) and the Austriacists’ (6,000 
to 7,000, including the Coronela).3
Tessé decided that the first action of the attackers had to be to capture 
Montjuïc, since it had been previously shown that once the fortress got 
conquered, the city surrendered in a relatively short time.
El día 3 muy de mañana el ejército del rey Felipe se acampó en Sarriá. El 
que mandaba el duque de Noailles, a la torre de Bellafilla. En este tiempo 
se unieron las partidas de uno y otro ejército. Luego el rey Felipe llamó 
a consejo en su presencia. Asistieron todos los tenientes generales y el 
ingeniero mayor Mr. de la Parra. Se dividieron los votos, causa las más 
veces de ser perjudiciales al soberano las resultas. El mariscal de Tessé 
y Mr. de la Parra fueron de sentir emprender la reducción de Montjuïc, 
alegando que las fortificaciones eran débiles, imperfectas y arruinadas; 
que en el breve espacio de tres días se ocuparía el castillo; que este 
impensado golpe haría descaecer del todo el ánimo de los barceloneses, 
de quienes el rey Carlos se prometía los mayores esfuerzos; que esto 
obligaría al rey Carlos a salirse de Barcelona y facilitaría a menos costa 
la rendición; que atacándose primero Barcelona, sucediendo la dilación 
que era precisa para abrir brecha, los naturales y milicias se habilitarían 
en el manejo y que sucediendo el caso de rendirse Barcelona las más de 
las gentes se retirarían a Montjuïc, donde harían los mayores esfuerzos, 
esperando el socorro que se prometían; que, disminuido el ejército en 
la empresa de Barcelona, no quedaría fuerza para atacar con vigor 
Montjuïc, reparadas con el tiempo en más defensa las fortificaciones; 
que, ocupando Montjuïc, desmayarían los ánimos de los catalanes 
infantry unit. In the contemporary English documents they also appear as Maccalas or 
Micalets. 
3 La Coronela was the urban militia of Barcelona, organized according to city guilds.
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porque el común del pueblo consideraba aquella irregular fortificación 
el más fuerte escudo de la Cataluña, que la experiencia había enseñado 
haberlo concebido así en el año antecedente porque luego que los 
aliados ocuparon Montjuïc había comparecido en el campo delante de 
Barcelona un gran número de catalanes; que en tanto que se expugnaría 
Montjuïc podrían introducirse emisarios en Barcelona que infundiesen 
a los barceloneses pacíficas resoluciones del rey, asegurándoles que se 
restablecerían con entera satisfacción de los comunes las infracciones de 
las leyes y privilegios que pretendiesen haberse alterado, retirándose los 
moradores a sus casas y dejar obrar las tropas y que podrían infundir las 
mismas voces en los pueblos. 
At the beginning of the siege, the Bourbon cordon was still f lawed and 
even 600 mountain fusiliers, under the command of Colonels Bac de 
Roda and Moliner i Rau, were able to enter Barcelona. Then a force of 
5,000 French and Spanish soldiers tried to position itself between the 
mountain and the city, and occupied the external convent of Santa 
Madrona, near the Drassanes (the shipyard).
En este tiempo sólo presidiaban a Montjuïc cuatro compañías de la 
Coronela, 200 hombres de la Guardia Real y 200 fusileros, parte de las 
milicias de Vilafranca y Mataró. 300 fusileros que guardaban aquellas 
avenidas dieron sus descargas y se retiraron a la línea de comunicación y 
desde allí pasaron a reforzar Montjuïc. Luego que los sitiados conocieron 
el designio, marcharon desde la línea de comunicación a socorrer 
Montjuïc 300 hombres de la guardia catalana. Los fusileros mandaba don 
Antonio Desvalls. 400 de Bac de Roda, siguiendo las referidas milicias. 
A la novedad del avance marchó el general conde de Uhlefeld con 600 
hombres de las tropas al socorro, siguiéndole un considerable número 
de paisanos y muchos de los ciudadanos. Luego se hizo pregón en la 
ciudad que las gentes que no estuviesen en cuerpos acudiesen a la línea 
de comunicación con sus armas a llevar que comer y otros a acudir a la 
atarazana a subir pertrechos y otros a subir agua que faltaba en el castillo.
Therefore, the efforts of both Allied regular troops and new Catalan 
fighters, along with the cooperation of civilians and particularly women, 
avoided the isolation of the castle, as they made possible to continuously 
bring supplies and ammunition from the city to the fortress. As can be 
seen from the troops referred to in the account, the bulk of the fighting 
during this stage was undoubtedly borne by Catalan soldiers, since most 
English units were in Valencia, away from this battle. Throughout the 
siege, fusilier units garrisoned the city and the castle, as mentioned in 
Castellví’s text.
It is worth noting the presence of Antoni Desvalls as a high-rank officer at 
the service of Charles III. Desvalls, later Marquis del Poal, would be one 
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of the leaders of the Austriacist army during the 1713-1714 campaign, 
as commander of the troops outside Barcelona and responsible for the 
Catalan victory in Talamanca (Hernàndez and Rubio, 2009).
On the other hand, the epic nature of the siege in the imagery of the 
period should not be underrated, as the two young monarchs were there 
trying to boost the morale of the troops with their presence.
Para más animar los naturales entre 3 y 4 de la tarde el rey Carlos, seguido 
de todos los generales y mucha nobleza, subió a reconocer Montjuïc. 
Registró todas las fortificaciones, habló con blando y majestuoso estilo 
a soldados y paisanos. Esto encendía más el ánimo y revivió el combate 
a las partes de Santa Madrona que lo arrojado pasó los límites del 
valor y pisaba los de la temeridad. Siguió la línea de comunicación y 
toda la muralla de la ciudad y en el tiempo que pasaba el rey delante 
del baluarte de los Tallers, llegaban al foso las milicias del partido de 
Manresa capitaneadas por don José y don Melchor Solá de Guardiola y 
por don Juan Bautista y don Francisco Cortada de Manlleu en número de 
600, que penetraron entre los sitiadores y al anochecer se introdujo en 
la plaza el coronel Mas de Roda con 500 fusileros en el tiempo que las 
milicias de Manresa voceaban con expresiones de alegría de hallarse en 
la estacada que oía el rey desde la muralla.
Although the Bourbon fleet disputed the control of the seas, for the great 
English fleet was in Valencia, regular Allied units finally began to come 
into Barcelona and boosted defenders’ morale. English regiments of 
Charlemont (foot) and Conyngham (dragoons) went to garrison Montjuïc, 
while the Foot Guards were stationed as reserves on the Rambla and 
other dragoons’ units guarded the communications between the castle 
and the city. In the following days, continuous attacks on the siege works 
were made by the defenders, and while some of these actions were quite 
successful, siege works continued until the night of April 21st, when the 
Bourbon troops unleashed the expected assault on the castle, after the 
failed attempt on the 11th and the constant bombardment from Bourbon 
batteries and vessels located near the mountain.
Antes de las 9 de la noche se empezó el avance, que pareció no dilatarlo a 
la mañana del 22 por no dar tiempo a los sitiados a reparar las defensas. Se 
ejecutó con tanto silencio que al advertirlo los defensores, ya señoreaban 
lo alto de las brechas. Empezó el fuego con ardor y continuó con tesón, 
sin poder los sitiadores de la derecha superar aquellas defensas. Tres 
veces lo repitió el general Puységur. La tropa de los sitiados se obstinó 
en la defensa que, enardecida de la emulación de ser los defensores de 
las reales guardias catalana y inglesa, daba más obstinación al combate. 
En este tiempo el teniente general marqués de Aitona al segundo 
avance penetró la izquierda de la dilatada brecha del baluarte de San 
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Felipe, cortó la retirada a la tropa aliada y hizo algunos prisioneros. 
Los sitiadores, ocupado aquel terreno, pasaron a cortar la retirada a los 
sitiados que aún defendían los nuevos trabajos de la lengua de sierpe y 
buey, que, enardecidos en la defensa, no advirtieron con la obscuridad de 
la noche internados los sitiadores. Confundidos unos con otros, empezó 
otro sangriento combate. En este tiempo milord Donegal, comandante 
de Montjuïc, que había bajado a la plaza, advertido de los tiros, subió con 
precipitación al fuerte. Enfurecido o de su descuido o de la desgracia del 
suceso, con 400 infantes puesto a su frente se arrojó espada en mano, 
pasando al baluarte de San Felipe. Al advertir monsieur de Fimarcon 
este arrojo, le dejó paso franco hasta cerrar con su gente la retroguardia 
de Milord. Entonces dio con grande ímpetu sobre los sitiados de que, 
advertido el mariscal de Tessé que ya ocupaba el baluarte, hizo marchar 
tambor batiente cuatro batallones. En esta pelea sin querer cuartel murió 
milord Donegal de tres heridas. Los sitiados se retiraron confusamente a 
un cordón que habían formado más interior de piedra y tierra. La acción 
duró cerca de 3 horas y el fuego hasta el amanecer. Al acabar el combate 
subieron a Montjuïc el mariscal Uhlefeld y general Saint-Amant. En esta 
acción los sitiados perdieron de la Guardia catalana 250, de la Guardia 
inglesa 150 con tres banderas y todos los oficiales, a la excepción de un 
alférez y entre ellos el coronel Cook, su comandante; de los holandeses y 
alemanes, hasta 280.
Although defenders belonged to the elite troops of Catalan and English 
armies, at this phase of the siege the situation within the castle seemed 
unbearable. Therefore, it was decided the garrison had to leave the 
fortress and go strengthen city’s defences, but civilians supporting the 
besieged troops did not understand this military decision and set off a 
surreal, confusing series of events, in which civilians decided to defend 
the castle and set aside the actions of regular soldiers.
Empezóse a retirar los pertrechos del castillejo. Lo advirtieron luego las 
mujeres que acudieron desde el amanecer a las atarazanas a cargarse 
de pertrechos para subir a Montjuïc, como acostumbraban. Advirtieron 
que bajaban pertrechos. Empezaron a esparcir la voz que Montjuïc se 
abandonaba, circunstancia que unida a la voz, que quieren muchos, que 
en estos días se había esparcido de que dentro de la plaza se habían 
introducido diferentes emisarios que con pretexto de celo al servicio 
del rey Carlos inspiraban al pueblo voces, manchando la conducta del 
gobierno y generales que les querían sacrificar, y que el rey se ausentaría, 
fueron la causa del alboroto, infundiendo en las mujeres esta idea. Sea 
o no sea verdad, es cierto que una mujer llamada Francisca Paiell con 
otras de su séquito empezó muy de mañana a vocear: «A las armas, a las 
armas, hermanos, que desamparan a Montjuïc». A las 7 dadas, bajaron 
del castillo algunos paisanos y mujeres y dieron noticia de ocupar los 
sitiadores las obras exteriores y de retirarse los pertrechos. Crecieron las 
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voces en toda la ciudad. Unióse un considerable número de la más inferior 
gente que no estaba empleada. Crecieron las voces: «A las armas, que 
fraguan traición contra el rey y contra nosotros, vamos todos a Montjuïc». 
Y en número de más de 500 fueron a las casas de la Diputación y Ciudad 
gritando que se enarbolasen las banderas de San Jorge y Santa Eulalia. 
Se aumentó el numero y uno de entre ellos gritó: «Vamos primero al 
rey a pedirle licencia y que nos señale cabos». Pasaron a San Pedro 
donde se hallaba el rey. Salió a lo alto a dejarse ver. Empezaron a gritar: 
«Señor, pedimos licencia para sacar las banderas y subir a Montjuïc». 
Confundiéronse los cortesanos. La Guardia catalana no permitió entrase 
ninguno. El rey con constancia de ánimo considerando los daños que 
podían seguirse les dijo les daba licencia, que les daría cabos.
This dangerous situation led to an absurd assault on the Bourbon 
troops, which were much better prepared and commanded than the civil 
protagonists of such attack.
Embistieron a montón a los sitiadores con tan acelerado ardor en los 
ramales a la parte de las obras exteriores que penetraron en las líneas y 
obligaron a los defensores a retirar tres banderas que tenían enarboladas. 
Al mismo tiempo, Agustín de Códol y Roset, que seguía al diputado 
con número de fusileros y paisanos, penetró hasta la línea de la casa de 
María la Pastelera. Los sitiadores rechazaron el ímpetu de los sitiados 
y intentaron penetrar en la línea de comunicación de los sitiados para 
cortar la retirada a la gente que había penetrado en las líneas. No 
consiguieron el intento, impedido del fuego continuo de los sitiados. 
En este tiempo llegó el general Uhlefeld con 500 hombres y con cariño 
empezó a persuadir a los ciudadanos a contenerse. Con todo, no pudo 
reprimir la furia. Dieron otro avance, ocuparon algún terreno y fueron 
precisados a abandonarle, porfiando obstinadamente y los estragos que 
padecían les enfurecían en vez de servirles de escarmiento y conducta a 
combatir con más precaución y ordenanza. 
In the confusion even the Conseller en Cap,4 Francesc Nicolau de Santjoan, 
died because a citizen shot him to avoid him stopping the bells tolling 
for sometent.5 Finally, the fortress was evacuated on the 24th, after 21 
days of fighting. The successful defence of this Catalan stronghold was 
decisive because, despite being eventually conquered, the Bourbon army 
suffered many casualties and the Allies received enough time to send 
reinforcements to Barcelona.
4 Head of Barcelona City Council.
5 The sometent was a Catalan paramilitary militia-like organization, separated from the 
regular professional army, created in the Middle Ages to self-protect civilians and defend 
the land during wartime. More broadly, cridar a sometent (to call for sometent) means to 
toll the bells with the signal for raising the militia.
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The Allied reaction
Meanwhile, on April 17th Allied troops gathered in the area near Martorell, 
under the command of Lord Peterborough and Prince Henry of Hesse-
Darmstadt, and small groups of mountain fusiliers hastened to take 
control of mountain passes all around Catalonia. Seeing that Barcelona 
did not appear to be in imminent danger of surrender, Peterborough 
wanted to minimise the risk for the fleet and troops, and therefore his 
initial orders intended the bulk of reinforcements to land at Tarragona 
instead of going directly to Barcelona, as expressed in this letter, written 
on  April 22nd 1706 (Ministry at Home, 1712, p. 98-99):
The destiny of Spain depends upon the arrival of thirty of her majesties 
ships before the taking of Barcelona: to see the fleet there, that is like 
to decide this important affair, would make one mad. There is not above 
eighteen ships of force, and about ten frigates, and two bomb-vessels; 
it is very unfortunate, that by the end of April a competent number of 
the forty sail designed to stay at Lisbon for our relief in spring, should 
not be in these seas by this time, when the great fleet may almost be 
expected, which the Queen has written to the king of Spain sailed the 
12th of March. 
The circumstances of the Sea are so uncertain, that without forming any 
judgment, I only lament our ill fortune; for I cannot conceive any other 
enterprize could be taken in hand, that could anyways prevent the arrival 
of the succours and the fleet for an hour; if any such have taken place, 
the loss of Spain, the risk of the King’s person, and the sacrifice of all her 
majesties troops, is owing to absurd a measure; and as I always informed 
our ministry, I can only say, our hard fate was that our destiny depended 
upon others, not ourselves, for I am confident we have done our duty; 
but in our present condition I only offer my advice, to pretend to more 
without being upon the place, or apprized of all circumstances, would 
be very indiscreet: I still continue to think that the Men of War [vaixells 
de guerra] should get rid of Transport-ships, and all incumbrance, before 
they come near the enemy, it being uncertain how their number may 
increase every day: so that a descent at Veneros [Vinaròs], a little beyond 
Peniscola, or at Tortosa to choose, at least no nearer than Tarragona, is 
what I have advised already, and continue in the same mind.
However, Peterborough’s forces were much smaller than those of 
Tessé, so it did not seem feasible for breaking the siege cordon around 
the city. In addition to the regular troops, many mountain fusiliers and 
sometent fighters disturbed the Bourbon rearguard, harassing food 
and ammunition convoys and threatening their lines of communication, 
according to Castellví (1997-2002, vol. II, p. 93-116):
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El día 24 entraron en la plaza 30 paisanos con 7 prisioneros que tomaron 
dentro de sus tiendas. El 27 Milord hizo revista de las tropas en San 
Cugat. Se halló con 800 caballos de los regimientos de don Rafael y don 
Juan Nebot, Moragues, de Morrás, y un escuadrón de Samper, dragones 
ingleses; infantería, 4 batallones ingleses muy disminuidos, el regimiento 
de la Reina; fusileros, hasta 1500 y con las milicias repartidas en la 
circunvalación del campo, hasta 15.000. El 28 llamó a consejo. Tratóse 
de socorrer Barcelona por tierra, que el socorro que se introducía por 
el mar era muy costoso. Milord [Peterborough], de quien dependía el 
todo, alegó que la introducción de socorro por tierra era difícil, que la 
gente arreglada era poca; que de los fusileros y milicias descendiendo a 
la llanura no se podía tener seguridad alguna y era necesario mantenerse 
en las avenidas de los montes, que la primera consideración era mantener 
aquel pequeño cuerpo para defender la persona del rey en el caso de 
resolver pasar a Tarragona, que así lo había advertido al rey; que la 
introducción de socorro aunque costosa si era precisa, debía fiarse a la 
contingencia del mar poco a poco. El general Nebot alegó que el socorro 
podía introducirse a menos costo por tierra, que esto alentaría más los 
sitiados y mitigaría el ardor de los sitiadores. Nebot propuso el plano por 
la parte del río Besós que aprobaron los concurrientes, a la excepción 
de Milord, que sólo por complacer convino en ello, sin la intención 
de ejecutarlo. Antes del anochecer del mismo día mandó marchar las 
tropas y seguido del general Nebot se puso a la frente. Mandó seguir 
los fusileros y entrada la noche llegaron a la orilla del río Besós sin ser 
sentidos. Nebot previno a Milord que pasado el río debía combatirse 
con la gran guardia. Milord mandó retroceder las tropas y declaró se 
introduciría por mar el socorro; que las milicias y fusileros sin el abrigo 
de las tropas quedarían sin acción y no incomodarían a los sitiadores; 
que la plaza no necesitaba de numeroso socorro; que manteniéndose 
las tropas abrigando las milicias, los sitiadores no podrían valerse de 
los víveres del país, ni abastecer su campo, donde se padecía escasez. 
Milord, seguido de la caballería y del general Nebot, pasó dos veces a 
reconocer el cuartel de los sitiadores a la parte de Besós y deliberó que 
el príncipe Enrique con 80 ingleses entrase en Barcelona. Lo ejecutó la 
noche del día 29 al 30 y entró en el puerto a las 2 y media de la mañana. 
El arribo del príncipe causó en la ciudad mucha alegría, que el solo 
nombre de esta familia animaba a los menos briosos al peligro.
The attack to the city
Finally, after having secured Montjuïc, the Bourbon troops prepared 
to begin siege operations around the city of Barcelona. Sappers’ work 
started from the slopes of the mountain, with the intention of assaulting 
the city on its southern side, near the mountain. Meanwhile, defenders 
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continued to come out with cavalry and fusilier units to ruin the siege 
works; the besieged were motivated because the English fleet, finally 
spurred on by the imminent danger that threatened the city, was coming 
from Lisbon to relieve it:
Desamparado el castillo, los sitiadores, amanecido el día 26, enarbolaron 
a lo alto de él sus vencedoras banderas. Costoso sitio, inútil conquista 
poco ventajosa al rey Felipe por la lamentable pérdida de 3000 valerosos 
soldados, de 4500 bombas y un gran número de balas; favorable a todas 
las consideraciones a los sitiados. Los sitiadores empezaron con tanta 
celeridad la trinchera que este día trabajaron dos ramales. El uno desde 
la línea de comunicación dirigido a la parte del mar; el otro bajo de Santa 
Madrona cerca de la Cruz Cubierta, dirigiéndola al baluarte y puerta de 
San Antonio, fortificando con tres ramales el declivio de la montaña que 
miraba a la ciudad y cubrían el trabajo y el mismo día con los cañones 
que batieron a Montjuïc empezaron con 4 distintas baterías el disparo a 
impedir el trabajo de los sitiados en los lienzos de la muralla que corre 
desde San Antonio al baluarte del Rey y Atarazanas. Maltrataban los 
trabajadores porque las baterías del declivio de la montaña dominaban 
y descubrían los trabajos. Este día a las 4 de la tarde los sitiados hicieron 
una vigorosa salida con 300 granaderos y 500 infantes mandados por 
los coroneles Kaulbars y Castiglioni. Se ejecutó con tanto coraje que 
deshicieron el ramal de la trinchera de la parte de Santa Madrona, 
desalojaron las tropas que cubrían los trabajadores. 
On the other hand, Charles 
rejected the advice of most of 
the Allied officers and politicians, 
who urged him to embark and 
leave the city because of the risk 
of the city falling and the King 
being captured by his enemies. 
Meanwhile, the casualty list 
continued to grow on both sides 
due to the ongoing skirmishes, 
in which Desvalls’ mountain 
fusiliers stood out. The tactics 
employed in this type of fighting 
were something halfway between 
open field clashes and siege 
warfare, and are extremely 
interesting, especially those used 
by the Allies. The combination of 
cavalry with miquelets allowed 
quick attacks to be organised to 
put Bourbon troops in check.
French map showing the fortifications of Barcelona in 1705-1706 
(ICC). It clearly shows the close connection between Montjuïc 
and the wall section between Sant Antoni and Santa Madrona 
gates.
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El día 6 a las 9 de la mañana el general Camprodón con dos escuadrones 
de dragones y con la mayor parte de los fusileros y milicias que mandaba 
don Antonio Desvalls, a quien seguían los coroneles de fusileros Bac y 
Mas de Roda, pasaron a desalojar los sitiadores de una casa que ocupaban 
muy ventajosa para facilitar por aquella parte la introducción de socorro 
en la plaza. El capitán don Jaime Carrera fue mandado a sostener los 
fusileros que penetraron el edificio y pasaron a cuchillo la guarnición y al 
mismo tiempo impidieron el socorro. Presidiaron la casa con la compañía 
de voluntarios de don Antonio Caraccioli y fusileros. Los sitiadores 
junto a Gracia unieron un cuerpo y cargaron sobre los sitiados. Pasó el 
príncipe Enrique con tres escuadrones a sostenerles. Animó de nuevo los 
fusileros y paisanos. Seis escuadrones de los sitiadores de la vanguardia 
deshicieron un escuadrón de los sitiados. El príncipe detuvo el ímpetu 
de los sitiadores. Animó de nuevo a los fusileros que, favorecidos del 
terreno, daban continuas descargas. La caballería de los dos partidos 
llegó a mezclarse.
The event that would reverse the whole campaign was about to happen: 
the arrival of the English fleet in Barcelona, commanded by Admiral 
John Leake. It had made a long journey to help the Catalan capital, as 
related by Castellví. A curious attempt at bribery by Bourbon supporters 
took place during the trip, but it was refused by the Admiral without 
even thinking.
Volvió a Lisboa y en 18 de abril, que se le unió una escuadra de 14 
navíos y se halló con 30 navíos de guerra, llegando en Lisboa en 15 de 
abril el aviso que el rey Felipe pasaba a sitiar Barcelona. El 19 llamó 
a consejo y se resolvió que las tropas aliadas que acababan de llegar 
sobre navíos de transporte pasasen a los navíos de guerra y luego se 
tomase el rumbo a Cataluña. Al vicealmirante caballero Byng, que a 
5 de abril con 13 navíos de guerra y 150 de transporte que se había 
hecho a la vela desde Santa Elena y llegado a Lisboa el 17, se le dejó 
orden de seguirle luego que llegasen los cuatro navíos que escoltaban las 
tropas de Irlanda, dejando los transportes y asimismo los cuatro que se 
esperaban de Gibraltar donde debían embarcar dos batallones. Leake se 
hizo a la vela la noche del 19. Los seis navíos que cruzaban las alturas de 
Cartagena y Cádiz recibieron duplicados avisos de milord Peterborough 
del estado de Barcelona. Dieron aviso al almirante Leake, a quien en las 
alturas de Cádiz se le acercó un barco genovés. En él había un extranjero 
que le hizo la proposición que deteniéndose todo el mayo en los mares de 
Andalucía sin pasar a Barcelona le entregaría letras de 100.000 doblones 
de regalo. Éste era un emisario de Mr. Amelot y princesa de Ursinos. 
Despreció el almirante con magnanimidad el ofrecimiento. ¡Oh!, si 
este ejemplo fuera imitado de todos los ministros, pocas llaves se 
encontrarían que abriesen puerta a los arcanos de los gabinetes y cuán 
más felices serían los ministros y soberanos. Los primeros vincularían en 
su posteridad aplausos y no ignominias, los segundos lograrían aciertos 
en las deliberacio nes, ventajas en sus dominios y practicarían justicia en 
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los beneméritos. Detúvose Leake en las alturas de Altea porque su fuerza 
era débil hasta que se le unió el almirante Byng en 29 de abril, porque 
no quiso arriesgar empresa de tanta monta. En 28 fueron unidas las 
escuadras y en 29 dio aviso a milord Peterborough el enviado Stanhope. 
A los 6 de mayo se avistó la flota a las alturas de Tarragona. Al avistarse 
la flota a las alturas de Cataluña tocaban en los pueblos las campanas. 
La noche del día 7 de mayo hubo en Tarragona una especie de alboroto. 
Llevaba el pueblo en alto un retrato del rey Carlos con antorchas gritando 
en confusión, mandando salir a las ventanas a los que consideraban del 
otro partido y les obligaban a que en voz alta dijeran: «¡Viva Carlos III!»
Peterborough changed his mind given the difficulties to introduce 
overland support. He departed for Vilanova, where he embarked with the 
rest of the troops. Finally, on May 8th, the Allied fleet came to Barcelona, 
where it drove away the Bourbon warships and roused the besieged to 
euphoria.
Pasó la flota a Sitges y Vilanova. Allí se embarcó milord Peterborough, 
los generales Wills y Palm; embarcaron hasta 500 ingleses. El número de 
tropas que venía sobre la flota, disminuidas en la larga navegación, no 
llegaban a 3000 hombres y las que desembarcaron en Barcelona excedían 
en poco este número. Los almirantes ofrecieron desembarcar hasta 
4000 de su marina. El día 8 al amanecer desapareció la flota de las Dos 
Coronas de delante de Barcelona y las fragatas de los sitiados tomaron 
tres barcas francesas. El día 8 a las 7 de la mañana los sitiados empezaron 
a descubrir la armada aliada y cerca de las 10 del día desembarcó milord 
Peterborough. Consistía la armada en 53 navíos de guerra y muchos de 
transporte. Desembarcaron los almirantes Leake, Wassenaer, Allmonde y 
Van der Dussen y el enviado Stanhope y el general de infantería conde de 
Noyelles al servicio de Holanda con el supuesto que mandaría las tropas 
del rey Carlos. Luego empezaron a desembarcar las tropas. El rey Carlos, 
al avistarse el socorro hizo cantar el tedéum en su capilla y después pasó 
a ver las tropas en el desembarcadero. Después pasó el rey Carlos a la 
Rambla marchando calle Ancha, calle de San Francisco y se formaron 
en la Rambla. El rey con toda su corte pasó a verlas y le saludaron con 
tres salvas. Batieron las banderas: parte de ellas pasaron luego a coronar 
la muralla a la parte de San Antonio y se dejaron ver de los sitiadores al 
sonido de diferentes instrumentos. El rey pasó a reconocer los trabajos y 
apuntó dos morteros. El resto de las tropas se apostó cerca de la brecha y 
los sitiadores estaban alojados a la punta de la contraescarpa del baluarte 
de San Antonio. Los sitiados y sitiadores duplicaron los fuegos. El rey pasó 
a reconocer la batería principal de la cortadura. Los ciudadanos desde 
luego demostraron su contento agasajándoles con copiosos refrescos, 
pero fue preciso impedirlo por el daño que podía ocasionar a la salud 
de la tropa recién llegada de tan dilatada navegación. Fue voz que Milord 
a la noche hizo volver a embarcarse 2000 hombres y que a la mañana 
siguiente los hizo desembarcar a fin de abultar el número del socorro.
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The arrival of the English fleet was the factor that convinced the Bourbon 
besiegers that it was impossible to assault the city with a guarantee of 
success. So they began withdrawing towards the French border, as a 
march towards Valencia or Aragon could be very dangerous because 
the Allies controlled the mountain passes with the Catalan mountain 
fusiliers. Negotiations were conducted between the Marquis of Aitona, 
a Catalan nobleman at the service of King Philip, and several miquelets 
officers, who agreed to establish a truce that allowed the Bourbon army 
to leave. In the following excerpt, it is worth pointing out the various 
arguments that both Austriacist and Bourbon people asserted to justify 
their choice of sides:
La tropa se hallaba fatigada, la caballería muy flaca, los víveres pocos y 
el trabajo era incesante para apartar el fuego de milicias y fusileros que 
por instantes con más tesón se aumentaba. Oponíanse a todos los pasos 
y la fatiga cansaba en instantes la tropa. El marqués de Aitona atribuyó el 
aumentarse la incomodidad en el tránsito a los saqueos e incendios que 
habían ejecutado diferentes partidas. Fue de sentir que si no se entraba 
en trato con los paisanos que la tropa disminuiría en extremo y sería 
preciso abandonar parte de los equipajes y enfermos y que la experiencia 
enseñaba que en instantes se aumentaba el número; que él se ofrecía 
a entrar en plática con los paisanos y que tenía esperanza que podría 
su representación contenerlos porque muchos eran vasallos suyos, y 
conseguir una especie de convenio nada ignominioso a las armas ni al 
rey, antes justo en la piedad del rey no destruir vasallos ni pueblos de los 
cuales se consideraba señor y perdonar con magnanimidad las repetidas 
quejas que pudiera tener de ellos.
El rey Felipe, a quien la benignidad le es natural, alabó su parecer y 
ofreció su real palabra de hacer observar lo que él conviniese, asegurando 
no les molestarían las tropas en el tránsito. Éstas debían penetrar los 
desfiladeros de San Celoni, pueblo que pertenecía al marqués. El paso, a 
la verdad, era angosto y no poco difícil de superar sin mucha sangre. El 
marqués, por diferentes sendas, mandó tres paisanos pasar a encontrar 
a Ramis de San Celoni, hombre de representación en el pueblo, y a 
ofrecerle que sobre su palabra pasase a encontrarle. Ramis lo ejecutó. 
El marqués en nombre del rey le prometió que de allí adelante no se 
cometería hostilidad ni se permitiría a las tropas entrar en ningún pueblo 
a fin de evitar motivo a la queja. Ramis ofreció al marqués interponerse 
con el mayor arte que le fuese posible a mitigar el ardor que al tiempo 
era delicado y los naturales enfurecidos, que él tenía a gloria ser humilde 
vasallo de la casa de Montcada. Ramis suplicó al marqués que dándole 
palabra de no ofenderse le permitiese explicarle una duda. El marqués 
le alagó y le animó a que la dijera. Ramis le habló así: «Mi duda consiste 
cómo V.E., que es originario catalán, y tantos otros grandes señores 
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que poseen tantos grandes pueblos en Cataluña y todos les veneran, 
ayudan a destruir su patria y pueblos, ultrajando las leyes y privilegios 
que fueron solemnemente jurados». El marqués le respondió: «Ramis 
mío: España le aclamó rey, Cataluña le juró por su señor. Si los ministros 
han faltado en algo a hacer observar las leyes el rey ha sido engañado y 
mal informado, que su recta y real inclinación es ser en todo religioso. 
Todo se enmendará, que yo y muchos otros somos los más interesados. 
Vosotros cuidad de la labor de vuestras tierras, que es modo más fácil 
de conseguir un general y recto restablecimiento, y yo prometo que de 
todo informaré al rey». Ramis se despidió y le dio palabra que pasaría a 
encontrar al coronel Mas de Roda, que sabía había salido de Barcelona 
con 800 fusileros, que ya estaba muy cerca con 3000 paisanos de milicias. 
Mas de Roda era vasallo del marqués, el cual había encargado a Ramis 
le dijera de parte suya que dejarían dos cañones y un mortero para que 
pareciera ser victoriosos y no poner en sospecha su obrar. Ramis pasó a 
conferir con Mas de Roda bajo pretexto de poder hacer mayor oposición 
a unos molinos que estaban muy cerca. El coronel Mas consintió en la 
proposición. Su gente se hallaba muy fatigada. La dividió en diferentes 
partidas entre los montes y mucha parte de ella mandó marchar a Gerona 
con el motivo que el ejército quería atacar la plaza. El ejército se puso 
en marcha, penetró los desfiladeros con poca oposición en San Celoni y 
se mandó observar una rígida disciplina. El rey agradeció a Aitona este 
servicio. El mariscal de Tessé dijo al marqués: «Es mucho de admirar 
que V.E. haya podido contener la insolencia y orgullo de esta nación». 
El marqués le respondió: «Cada nación y aun cada una de las provincias 
sujetas a un mismo rey tiene métodos distintos de atraerles, apaciguarles 
o irritarles. Esta es una nación en cuyos naturales con la urbanidad y 
civil trato se encuentra cuanto se puede desear de las más racionales 
naciones; al contrario, irritándoles con severo trato y injuriosas voces 
son más feroces que los armenios tigres. Es nación que con galantería 
hace más que la más sujeta nación; con la fuerza aborrecen el predominio 
y absoluta autoridad porque nacieron y vivieron con libertad». Llegó el 
ejército a San Feliu de Guíxols. En esta villa y demás de la carrera las 
tropas encontraron con qué mantenerse y acémilas para conducir los 
enfermos y llegó el ejército sin incomodidad a descansar en las llanuras 
del Ampurdán, donde se detuvieron ocho días y el rey Felipe llegó el día 
19 de mayo a Prats de Molló.
A Portuguese document shows the magnitude of the tragedy regarding 
the Bourbon withdrawal, for the awesome amount of materiel left in the 
siege cordon (Pedrozo, 1706, p.14):
−	 140 Peças d’artelharia de bronze, das quaes doze sao de 
Campanha, & as mais de calibres de 24, 36 & 48 livras de balla.
−	 140 Morteiros de bombas de bronze con suas caixas de ferro
−	 50 Barris [barrils] de polvora
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−	 40.000 Ballas d’artelharia de differentes calibres, sem incluir 
as que estão no fosso, na brecha, & que se tem junto na Praça 
[totes les disparades].
−	 2.000 Bombas carregadas [la munició dels morters].
−	 500 [barrils de] Ballas miudas de arcabuz, & clavinas 
[carrabines].
−	 40.000 Enxadas, icaretas, & varios instrumentos de mover a 
terra.
−	 12.000 Pares de çapatos.
−	 2.000 Sacos de farinha [per a les tropes].
−	 3.000 Sacos de cevada [per als animals].
−	 Uma grande porção de trigo.
−	 200 Escadas de mão [escales de mà per a l’assalt]
−	 Carretas, & vários instrumentos de artelharia hu numero grande, 
ainda se não tem averiguado.
 
Peterborough’s performance
Lord Peterborough’s admirers came out in defence of the Earl’s 
performance during the siege of Barcelona. This provides several 
interesting ideas to keep in mind when trying to understand the besiegers’ 
keys to success. The first is undoubtedly the arrival of the British fleet 
with the long-awaited reinforcements. However, according to Freind, 
Siege of Barcelona by the Bourbon army, according to Alexander 
Forbes’ French map (ICC).
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several of Peterborough’s decisions also helped to keep the Bourbon 
troops from conquering the city. Among these, the attempt to destroy 
the Bourbon line of communications using selected English troops and 
Catalan miquelets. Therefore, as it was subsequently confirmed, the so-
called “small war” on the Catalan theatre of war was very important, 
apart from the large clashes on which military history traditionally 
focuses (Freind, 1707, p. 36-39).
They who were so ready to attr ibute the Honour of taking Barcelona 
to any rather than to the Earl of Peterborow with equal justice deny 
his Lordship to have had any share in the relief of it, imputing the 
entire preservation of that place to the timely arrival of the Fleet. This 
no doubt was very reasonable and for tunate, and what his Lordship 
was indefatigably industrious in hastening: But considering that the 
Enemy had for two days before this made a practicable Breach, let 
any unprejudiced man judge, whether the appearance of our Fleet 
upon the Coast, could be the only reason of preventing their assault; 
nay, rather, whether it was not a reason for them to attack the Town, 
as they might easily have done, with more vigour and dispatch. 
The Terror sure must come from some other quar ter: And I think we 
may very impar tially assign it to my Lord Peterborow’s being posted 
in’ the Mountains with a few Troops of his own, and a good number 
of Miquelets; which his Lordship disposed of to that advantage, as to 
cut off the Enemy from any communication with the Country, hinder 
all their par ties from falling out, and give them continual alarms and 
uneasiness in their Camp. If they had made an Attack upon the Town, 
they had good reason to fear they might be attacked themselves 
at the same time from the Mountains: And they were unwilling 
to venture the disorders that might have happened to their Army, 
which they designed for other Services as too plainly appeared soon 
after. It must be conviced, that my Lord had but a very few regular 
Troops with him. But those who have had a thousand oppor tunities 
of being acquainted with his dexterity in surprising, and his peculiar 
Ar t of managing weak instruments to elude and confound the force 
of a strong Enemy, will easily be convinced that the Appearance he 
made and the Alarms he gave from the hills, was not the effect of 
Chance and Hurry, but the pure result of a good Conduct: And that to 
his unwearied Vigilance and uncommon Stratagems, we owe, in a great 
measure, the Infatuation our Enemies were then possessed with.
So the troops Castellví mentioned as placed outside Barcelona under the 
orders of Lord Peterborough played a very important role in Bourbon’s 
impossibility of assaulting the city, and the miquelets combined with 
English dragoons and other selected troops were essential for the Allied 
victory.
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However, praising Peterborough can not hide the fact that the attack 
on Barcelona was possible in part thanks to the English commander’s 
decision to send the bulk of the troops to Valencia, besides the fact that 
the English fleet was delayed in arriving at the Catalan theatre of war 
from the Atlantic.
A comparison of the two sieges of Barcelona
From the defence of Lord Peterborough, we can conduct an interesting 
analysis by comparing both sieges in Barcelona: the Bourbon siege of 
1706 and the Allied siege of 1705. First we see how the Allied line of 
communications was based entirely on the British fleet, while in turn, 
in 1706 the Bourbon army relied on  supplies slowly marching overland, 
due to the control of Queen Anne’s warships in the Mediterranean sea 
(Freind, 1707, p. 39-41).
Perhaps it may be no disagreeable entertainment to the Reader, if I 
should make a short comparison of these two Sieges of Barcelona: The 
Actions being both of them extremely remarkable for the difference not 
only of the Event, but of the circumstances the Armies were in when 
they entered upon the Siege, and of the Methods which they used in 
carrying it on.
When it was attacked by Her Majesty’s Arms, the Success was every 
where despaired of; and the Attempt opposed by many Councils of War: 
nor without reason, since the Garrison was, double our number in Horse, 
and almost equal in Foot; And the English Army, unprovided of Artillery 
and all things else which are thought necessary where a Siege is in good 
earnest intended, was in a manner supplied with nothing but from our 
Fleet.
But when the French attacked they had a Royal Army, encouraged by 
the presence of a King, led by a Mareschal of France, and countenanced 
by the Fleet under the command at the Lord High Admiral. The Success 
was presumed certain all over the World, and insured by the most 
famous Engineer of France; not without very good grounds, for their 
preparations of all kinds were equal to such hopes: Their Army was 
numerous, not less than 24.000, their Troops in. good condition, and the 
quantity of Warlike Stores with which they were furnished for that Siege, 
almost incredible. We may judge of the rest by the Artillery they left 
behind upon their Retreat, which was upwards of 100 Brass Canon fit for 
Battery, and mounted upon the proper Field-Carriages.
Then we see how in both cases, unlike what happened during the 
siege of 1713-1714, the besieging armies began the assault by trying 
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to conquer the Montjuïc castle. Once this goal had been achieved, 
their efforts focused on breaching the southern side of the city walls, 
which correspond roughly to the present-day Avinguda del Paral·lel. The 
Bourbon siege of Montjuïc was five times longer than the Allied siege, 
and this is one of the keys to understanding the defeat of the troops 
commanded by Tessé. Additionally, the comparison provides interesting 
details about the situation of the Allied camps in 1705 (Freind, 1707, 
p. 41-44).
The circumstances of the two Armies that severally sat down before 
this place being so unlike, the Methods by which they attacked it must 
needs be very different. The very Works thrown up by the French would 
have destroyed the Earl of Peterborow’s Army in labour and fatigue 
alone. For they begun their Trenches from the bottom of Monjuick-hill 
at the distance of twice Musket-shot, and continued 23 days battering 
the Fort with 50 pieces of Cannon, and lost 3000 of their best men in 
taking that Citadel, which the Earl of Peterborow secured with little loss 
in less than an hour. And besides these Works at Monjuick, they carried 
on their Entrenchments to a vast length, all along the West-side of the 
Town; and finished them: with such regularity and exactness, as if they 
had designed to secure them against the insults of the strongest Army.
When the English besieged the City, they were scarce more than 7000 in 
number, and was necessary that even this little Body should be divided 
into two Camps, so situated as not to be able to relieve one another under 
three Leagues march, round by the foot of the mountains: so that the 
Garrison had double the Force of either part of our Army. This was the 
only contrivance by which the sitting down of such a handful of men, not 
capable of surrounding the Town, could have had the effect of a regular 
Investment.
The disposition of these two small Bodies was thus happily ordered: That 
on one side in the plain was covered by a Fort just on the edge of the 
Sea, and great retrenchments were carried on to a little village, where 
the walls of some Gardens and a River gave security to the right of the 
Camp; and the Waters upon occasion might be made use of to render the 
flat Grounds between them and Barcelona almost impassable. That on 
the other side was placed in a little Valley betwixt Hills so conveniently, 
and out of sight, that though within small-shot of the walls, the Enemy 
could only incommode us by the random shot of their Biscayne muskets 
[fusells amb pany de sílex]. The Works leading from the little Camp 
betwixt the Mountains to the Battery were so inconsiderable, that two 
High-ways supplied almost the use of Trenches; which were relieved 
with those different faints and disguises, that we lost very few Men in 
changing the Guards.
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Allied counter-offensive
After the failure of the Bourbon siege and the defeat of Tessé’s army, 
which was virtually destroyed during the retreat to France, the Allies 
decided to depart for Madrid and Castile. But they did not know whether 
to go through Aragon or Valencia. The first option, advocated by Charles 
III, was to march to Aragon to include this territory of Austriacist 
tendency within the territories defended by the Allies. There were two 
reasons, however, that tilted the scales towards the march to Valencia: 
the only forces that could be considered a Bourbon army in the Peninsula 
(commanded by Count de las Torres) were there, and the English fleet, 
which dominated the Mediterranean, could support the Allied army in 
terms of logistics and transportation. Thus, Peterborough and the rest of 
the officers, and the King himself, concluded that the best route to get to 
Madrid was the one passing through Valencia.
Although it seemed that the Bourbon would pose no threat for several 
months, the English and other Allies decided to leave several troops 
to defend Catalonia, as shown in the following document written in 
Barcelona on May 18th 1706, at a council of war in the presence of the 
King (Freind, 1707, p. 65-66):
Forces to remain in Catalonia
In Barcelona
Marines Will’s, English – 1.000
Breton’s, English – 500
The City Regiment, his Majesty’s [Regiment de la Ciutat de Barcelona] 
– 1.000
Clariana’s Horse [Regiment de cavalleria Clariana] – 150
Total: 2.650
In Girona
English Fuziliers – 500
Hamilton’s English – 500
St.Amant’s Dutch – 600
Don Joseph Paguera’s, his Majesty’s  [Regiment de la reina Anna]– 400
The Deputation, his Majesty’s [Regiment de la Diputació] – 400
Don Rafael Nebot’s Horse, his Majesty’s [Regiment de cavalleria Rafael 
Nebot] – 400
Moraga’s, his Majesty’s [Regiment de cavalleria Moragues] – 300
Total: 3.100
In Lerida
Palms Dutch – 700
Sobia’s Regiment, Horse [Regiment de Cavalleria Subies] – 150
Total: 850
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In Tortosa
Don Antoni Paguera’s, his Majesty’s  [Regiment de Guàrdies Catalanes] 
– 500
Total for the Garrisons in Catalonia
Infantry – 6.100
Cavalry – 1.000
Total: 7.100
As it can be seen, most troops involved in the defence of the Catalan 
territory were either English or made up of Catalan soldiers integrated in 
regiments created by Archduke Charles himself.
As for the troops that went to Valencia, these are the data provided:
Infantry
My Lord Peterborow sends by sea to Valencia Englishmen – 1.800
In the said Kingdom there are, including the Regiment of Ahumada – 
1.200
The Neopolitan’s of Castillioni’s Regiment – 1.000
Colbach’s Regiment – 500
Total: 4.500
Cavalry
The Guards of Zinzendorf – 500
Morras’ Regiment [Regiment de cavalleria Morràs] – 500
Killigrew’s and Cunningham’s – 1.000
Total: 6.500
So the Allied army was being split into two parts of almost equal 
strength. Although this was dangerous, the absence of an important 
Bourbon force in the Iberian Peninsula allowed this decision.
Valencia or Aragon?
Peterborough was criticized because he sent the majority of troops to 
Valencia rather than to Aragon, as Charles tried at first, and also because 
he moved slowly to Madrid with hardly justifiable precaution. These 
events were part of a hard-fought dispute between the monarch and the 
English commander to deploy troops in the best way to try to get to 
Madrid quickly (Freind, 1707, p. 70-71):
The Reader will observe, that in this Council of War there is a 
disposition of all the Troops we had on this side of Spain: a number 
perhaps that will be surprising to those, that remember how 
vigorously and early the Parliament, after the first Siege of Barcelona, 
voted a strong reinforcement to be sent immediately to those par ts; 
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and that accordingly the London Gazet te of June 24, 1706 did his 
Lordship the honour to put him at the head of an Army of 25,000. 
But however his Lordship, contrary to his usual for tune, happened 
to be magnified in this particular; all the Forces his Lordship could 
muster up in Valencia, (his Majesty having been pleased to remand, after 
my Lord was aboard, about 2,000 of the 6,000 ordered thither) were 
somewhat above 4,000, and wanted of the twenty five thousand 
lit tle more than the old twenty.
This Council of War which his Lordship obtained, so solemnly agreed 
upon and a second time confirmed, shows the Earl of Peterborow’s 
earnestness and impatience for the march to Madrid. In order to 
which, the day being settled for the King’s leaving Barcelona, nay, 
and the very route of his journey adjusted, his Lordship having sent 
all the Cavalry before, went on board the Fleet with the Foot, who 
were in no condition to march for want of baggage necessaries, and 
landed at Valencia the beginning of June.
Next, the author explains the formation of Lord Peterborough’s regiment 
of dragoons, required because of the lack of horsemen in the force landed 
in the area of Valencia. Note that, unobviously, transferring soldiers from 
horse to infantry regiments was not surprising, which means that many 
soldiers could ride without problems.
Likewise, buying horses for Peterborough’s regiment at 10 pounds each, 
is confirmed by an entry in the accounts book mentioned earlier in this 
work (Freind, 1707, p. 71 74).
His Lordship thought he could make no better use of his shor t stay 
here, than to recruit his shattered Cavalry; which he not only did, but 
mounted a new Regiment of Dragoons, draughted out of the companies 
of Foot; there being always i n  this Country, and especially in  our 
circumstances, which required dispatch, a necessity for a  good body 
of Horse. In which single Regiment I can’t but remark what may seem 
a Paradox to some, that his Lordship saved the Queen near 20,000 l. 
[lliures] the Horses, one with another, costing not above 10 l. a piece, 
which if they had been transpor ted from England or Ireland, would 
have stood Her Majesty at least in 60 l. as we found those actually 
did which first went upon the descent into Catalonia. Indeed it may 
justly be said of his Lordship, that however liberal he was of his own, 
no one was ever a more frugal manager of the public Stock: his 
Lordship given several instances in this extraordinary War, that he 
could sometimes maintain an Army without money, as well as take 
Towns without men. And this Regiment, to shew his Lordship had 
no great mind to delay his march into Castile, had their route given 
them, the very same day they were mounted.
God save Catalonia! England’s intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)   102
Another justification for this delay when starting the march to Madrid 
was the lack of mules needed to quickly move provisions and other 
materiel used by the army. Thus, the importance of logistics for the 
mobility at that time is shown, usually the key factor for the complex 
manoeuvres carried out.
And here his Lordship’s indefatigable pains, in procuring and 
purchasing Mules for the baggage of the Army, deserves to be 
taken notice of: which, though it may at the first view seem trif le, 
yet, considering the extreme want we were in for them, and our 
incapacity to take the Field without them, as well as the difficulty 
and trouble to get them in a Country just exhausted by the Enemy, 
ought to be looked upon as no ordinary piece of service; I am sure 
it was a service that no one there but his Lordship could at that time 
have done. At least those that saw his Lordship for three weeks 
together, from morning to night, fatiguing himself in this manner, 
and submitting to the drudgery of the lowest Officers, did not at all 
suspect that his Lordship had to little inclination to march, as some 
have since pretended to discover.
The doubts regarding the route to get to Madrid (from Valencia or 
passing through Aragon) finally broke into a heated argument within the 
Allied High Command. While the English considered the first option the 
most appropriate, Charles finally chose the second in order to regain the 
Aragonese territories and then head off to Madrid to be crowned king. 
Thus, although both forces finally arrived near Madrid, all these tensions 
gave the Bourbons a long enough period to recover from the defeat of 
Barcelona (Freind, 1707, p. 74-77).
To facilitate our entrance into Castile, his Lordship immediately sent 
Lieutenant General Wyndbam with a body of 1,500 men to besiege 
Requena; a strong and troublesome Garrison, and indeed the only 
one in the road to Madrid, and the first frontier Town of the Enemy: 
the enterprise succeeded to our wishes  and the way lay open for his 
Majesty’s march. For his Lordship proved to the King by the constant 
passing of Deserters as well as Expresses, that there was nothing now 
to hinder his Majesty from reaching Madrid with a small party of 
Horse only; and he thought a King needed not much persuasion to take 
possession of a Crown, when would be rather a journey of Pleasure, 
than a March, and this to be easily performed in a fortnights time.
My Lord having made all the necessary preparations for the carrying 
on the King and the Troops, was surprised to find such a delay in the 
Court: and though by frequent Messages and Letters he had urged the 
necessity of the King’s departure from Barcelona his Majesty did not 
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think fit to set out from that place till near a month after the time agreed 
upon. This was yet a greater surprise to his Lordship, when he had notice 
that the King, upon his arrival at Tarragona, had entirely altered all the 
scheme of his march, and was resolved to go round by Saragosa. The 
Earl of Peterborow represented, with all the earnestness he could, the 
danger of the least delay in so critical a Juncture; the hazard as well as 
the great inconvenience of so tedious a march through so barren and 
mountainous a Country, and where his Majesty might run the risk of 
being intercepted and surprised by the Enemy. His Lordship showed a 
more than ordinary Zeal in soliciting this affair: sent Letters every day to 
dissuade his Majesty from his designed journey, dispatched a Deputation 
of the Valencian Nobility transmitted the Opinion of Councils of War 
where the Spanish Ministers as well as English assisted, unanimously 
desiring and pressing the King to continue his march the easiest and 
nearest way by Valencia, as was first proposed.
The numerous reinforcements from France finally tipped the balance 
towards Philip’s supporters, with the withdrawal of the Allies from 
Madrid and their decisive defeat in Almansa on April 25th 1707.
God save Catalonia! England’s intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)   104
Lerida 1707
In little over a year, the situation in the Iberian Peninsula experienced a 
dramatic turn for the interests of the Allies. After the destruction of the 
Bourbon army in the failed siege of Barcelona, the diverse viewpoints 
and ongoing discussions among the various commanders and the King 
had resulted in a strategic planning full of uncertainty, which gave 
Louis XIV time to help her grandson with troops and money. Thus, a 
new Bourbon army was created that drove the Austriacist troops out 
of Castile and, thanks to an excellent manoeuvrability and to the Duke 
of Berwick, their talented commander, they managed to catch most of 
the Allied army around Almansa. The Austriacist troops, led by the Earl 
of Galway, were not in readiness for combat, but still agreed to fight a 
battle.6 The consequences were disastrous for the Allied army, which 
was annihilated, leaving the doors of the Crown of Aragon open for 
Berwick’s troops.
In the 18th century, a great victory at the beginning of a military 
campaign (at about spring time) established the best conditions to exploit 
the success, which is what the Bourbon army did at the time. It recovered 
most of the territories of Aragon and Valencia and, to quickly close the 
Peninsula’s eastern front, proceeded to attack Catalonia. The first major 
city was, of course, Lerida, the conquest of which would reopen the road 
to Barcelona.
The attack on the city
Theoretically, Lerida was a population that had to fall quickly into the 
hands of the Bourbon army. The successive sieges suffered by the city in 
the 17th century had damaged its defences, and in addition the garrison was 
not too numerous. Under these conditions, the Allies knew the intentions 
of the Bourbon army and took several steps to begin defending the city. 
Among these, arming clergymen and numerous contingents of civilians 
stands out (as part of the Coronela of Lerida). Taking into account that 
the siege would begin late in the campaign, defenders hoped to be able 
to resist in the city until the cold weather forced the Bourbon besiegers 
to withdraw (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. II, p. 390-403).
6 An important feature of the 18th-century combat is that the deployment of an army 
into battle line was extremely slow. Due to the fact that different units had to be combined 
in lines measuring miles, an army that didn’t want to engage with an enemy had usually 
enough time to withdraw before the opponent was in position to attack.
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Al comprender los sitiados que el duque de Orleans se dirigía a atacar 
la ciudad, el príncipe Enrique de Darmstadt llamó a consejo. Asistieron 
en él el general Wills, el general don Miguel Ramón y Tort, de quien 
son las noticias que vamos a referir, dos coroneles ingleses, un brigadier 
y dos coroneles holandeses y el coronel portugués don Pablo Gaetano 
de Alburquerque. El general Ramón era gobernador en el nombre; el 
príncipe Enrique, comandante en la apariencia; el general Carlos Wills, 
en las direcciones, porque de él dependía la mayor parte de las tropas. 
Altercóse el punto si desde luego se rendiría la ciudad o si se defendería. 
El príncipe, el gobernador 
y coronel Alburquerque 
fueron de sentir de 
defenderla. Dedujeron que 
el número de los naturales, 
paisanos refugiados, 
compañías de milicias y 
fusileros, comprendidos los 
eclesiásticos, era de 2700, 
que todos los seculares 
habían ofrecido interpolarse 
con las tropas, que esto 
alentaría las demás ciudades 
y villas grandes de Cataluña 
por la emulación de imitar 
a los de Lérida, que siendo 
la estación adelantada, 
defendiéndose la ciudad 
teniendo los sitiadores poca 
artillería y pertrechos, se 
conseguiría que Orleans 
sería forzado a levantar el 
sitio.
However, the English and the Dutch decided it was better to defend only 
the La Seu castle, as the city was too large to be defended by the soldiers 
available. Discrepancies between the Catalans and the Allies lasted 
throughout the siege, and were undoubtedly one of the main reasons for 
the Allied defeat in the battle.
El general Wills, seguido de ingleses y de un coronel holandés, expuso 
que el número de las tropas era poco; que cada día disminuiría por el calor 
y sufrida fatiga; que la defensa de la ciudad consumiría la mayor parte; 
que el castillo quedaría después indefenso; que las fortificaciones de la 
ciudad eran débiles, irregulares y de poca defensa; que, retirada la gente 
The Bourbon siege of Lerida, according to Tindal (ICC).
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al castillo y provisiones, se ganaría el tiempo a más ventaja, obligando a 
Orleans a levantar el sitio. Últimamente protestaron en cuanto a la tropa 
inglesa. Los oficiales holandeses hicieron los mismos reparos, con la 
circunstancia que resolviendo el príncipe defender la ciudad ayudarían 
con su tropa. Wills, insistiendo el príncipe en las instancias de defender 
la ciudad, se adherió a que quedase el gobernador en la ciudad con los 
paisanos. Éste respondió estar pronto, que consideraba a lo menos dejar 
500 infantes y quedó el consejo indeciso. Este día, que fue el 12 de 
septiembre, el general Wills se detuvo (a) entregar las llaves de la ciudad 
y castillo. El gobernador dio parte al príncipe. Éste le mandó, a fin de 
inclinar a Wills (aunque conoció el desaire) que le entregase las demás 
llaves y las de los almagacenes. Las aceptó Wills sin más cumplimiento 
y puso guardia inglesa. Tuviéronse diferentes consejos. Jamás Wills se 
removió de su primer dictamen. 
While cavalry and fusiliers harassed the already present besiegers with 
constant attacks and coming out of the city, the rest of the Allied army 
was kept away from the action because of its terrible state. There were 
several Catalan regiments hastily created to reinforce the few Austriacist 
units in Catalonia.
En este tiempo los aliados desde Solivella pasaron a Cervera; de allí, 
se acamparon en Tárrega. En este campo se unieron al ejército cuatro 
batallones de los dos regimientos que levantaron ingleses con el nombre 
de la Reina Ana, el regimiento formado de nuevo del marqués de Rubí 
y hasta 800 hombres de los regimientos de los coroneles don Manuel 
Desvalls, don Juan Reart y de don Francisco Sagarriga.
Under these conditions the siege dans les formes began, with the Bourbon 
besiegers opening the first parallel and the artillery batteries bombing 
the city.
La noche del día 2 al 3 de octubre los sitiadores empezaron a abrir la 
trinchera desde el convento de San Francisco contra la ciudad a la parte del 
Carmen, cerca de la orilla del Segre. Era la muralla muy débil y irregular. 
Los sitiados habían construido de fajina y tierra algunas defensas como 
medias lunas. Empezaron el trabajo ocho batallones, cuatro de guardias 
españolas y cuatro de franceses, al orden del general Mr. de Legal. 
Abrieron dos líneas paralelas cada una de 400 toesas, aplicando 4000 
trabajadores. Al amanecer la artillería del castillo empezó a disparar con 
15 cañones contra los trabajos. La fusilería de la ciudad hizo fuego y 
con 10 cañones que apostaron en aquellas imperfectas fortificaciones 
incomodaban a los trabajadores.
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Meanwhile, Wills helped the Lerida inhabitants and troops defending the 
city, although he kept some of his troops out of danger with his defensive 
planning. From the military point of view, his initial choice was probably 
correct, since, as proven during the assault, the city’s defences were 
too weak to withstand an attack from the powerful Bourbon forces. 
Nevertheless, leaving the inhabitants of Lerida to their fate before the 
assault was not a popular decision, as the English had left the Catalan 
defenders’ houses and families at the mercy of the attackers.
El general Wills, que se mantenía en el castillo, insistía en hacer llamada 
y capitular por la ciudad porque a más de su ardor miraba el brío y 
resolución de los naturales. Día y noche asistía al reparo de las ruinas. 
Su presencia inflamaba a los moradores y milicias que, unidos con las 
tropas, manifestaban el más resuelto ardor y demostraban querer morir 
en la empresa de defender la ciudad. Esto inclinó al príncipe a esperar el 
asalto, que fue el motivo de la total ruina de los moradores. La defensa 
era arriesgada. Las brechas eran tres y perfectas del todo: una a la parte 
de Magdalena; otra al Santo Espíritu y la tercera a la parte del Carmen; 
y las tres tomaron el espacio de 230 pasos. Ocupaban las brechas 
quinientos ingleses, holandeses y portugueses y mil hombres de la nueva 
tropa, milicias y fusileros al orden del teniente coronel Kinolan, inglés, 
y del sargento mayor Ranfore. Asistía el príncipe con el gobernador de 
la plaza.
El día 12, perficionadas las brechas, resolvió el duque de Orleans dar 
el asalto. Pasó a la trinchera. Destinó 10 batallones, 10 compañías de 
granaderos. 200 hombres armados con petos, la brigada de Orleans, 
pronta a sostenerles a la orden del teniente general Mr. de Averay, 
mariscal marqués Orcado y del brigadier Mr. de Lambert. Al ataque por 
la derecha destinó cuatro batallones; dos de las guardias españolas, dos 
francesas, seis compañías de granderos y 400 trabajadores, sostenidos 
de dos batallones de Auvergne. A la brecha de la izquierda destinó 
cuatro batallones, dos compañías de granaderos, 300 trabajadores. A las 
7 de la noche empezó el asalto. El combate fue obstinado, dos horas 
duró la porfía, dos veces los sitiadores fueron rechazados. Unióse la 
brigada de Orleans y al tercer avance ocuparon los sitiadores el baluarte 
del Carmen. El combate continuaba en el tesón de ocupar el baluarte 
de Remolins. No pudieron penetrar en el espacio que corría desde la 
Magdalena a la puerta del Santo Espíritu, que era desde la muralla vieja 
a la nueva, porque el continuo fuego que hacían las milicias desde la 
cortadura lo impedía. Ocuparon el baluarte del Carmen y dominaron un 
ángulo del de Remolins. El príncipe envió un sargento mayor holandés 
con 200 soldados y 400 milicias a impedir los sitiadores a internarse en la 
parte del Carmen. El combate fue rudo. Encendióse de nuevo, enviando 
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el príncipe 100 soldados de refuerzo y algunas milicias. Quedó herido 
el sargento mayor y muerto un capitán de granaderos holandés y los 
sitiadores entonces dominaron el todo. El sargento mayor inglés Ranfore 
hizo el mayor esfuerzo por desalojar los sitiadores del ángulo de Remolins. 
Una bala le rompió el brazo y murió el capitán inglés Vanderbucon. Esto 
facilitó a los sitiadores ocupar con menos sangre ambos baluartes.
The plunder
In this situation, the defence of the city became desperate, as the 
Bourbon forces already controlled a large area within the fortifications 
that allowed them to advance into the city and impose their numerical 
superiority.
Al amanecer del día 13 el duque de Orleans entró en la ciudad. Empezaron 
a internarse 15 compañías de granaderos. Marchó un cuerpo a cortar 
las milicias que se mantenían en la cortadura a la parte del Carmen, 
que se retiraron después de tres órdenes que les envió el príncipe. Envió 
al amanecer un tambor al duque de Orleans. Le escribió que siendo 
obligado a abandonar la ciudad le rogaba tratar con mansedumbre tantos 
inocentes eclesiásticos, familias y niños que se retiraban al pie del castillo. 
Respondió Orleans que aquellas personas le habían servido en la defensa 
de la ciudad, que si él quería capitular por los castillos, se trataría de ellos 
y serían incluidos, que de otro modo serían tratados como tomados a 
discreción y por asalto. Internáronse las tropas, ciñeron por todos lados 
la ciudad a las 10 del día.
Castellví explains at this point why there was widespread looting in the 
city, with indiscriminate attacks on civilians. According to the conventions 
of war at the time, civilians could not participate in the fighting, but since 
they represented a large part of the armed contingent of defenders, the 
French officers considered it was right to treat them as they did. This 
included the religious temples as well, due to the active participation of 
the various ecclesiastical orders in the Allied defence. The plunder was 
meticulously organized, contrary to what might be expected, and the 
brutal result was a city in ruins, looted and burned.
El saco empezó a las 10 del día por dos soldados de cada rancho. 
Sufrieron saco los templos de Santo Domingo, Santa María Magdalena 
y San Andrés y otros, a la excepción de las parroquias de San Juan, San 
Lorenzo y iglesia de jesuitas, aunque sufrió riesgos. El Cabildo había 
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retirado la plata a Barcelona. Todo padeció contingencia; hasta la plata 
que particulares y iglesias entraron en el castillo sufrió naufragio, que 
en él se batió de ella moneda, a la excepción de los sagrados vasos. El 
sagrado en los templos que no fueron saqueados no valió a particulares 
que habían retirado sus efectos ni a las personas refugiadas se eximieron 
de ser las más despojadas de sus precisos vestidos que cubrían la 
honestidad de sus cuerpos. Hasta los eclesiásticos no fueron exentos. 
En la parroquia de San Lorenzo un soldado flamenco de las guardias 
libró del saco el archivo, que después, en agradecimiento, aquella iglesia 
le procuró licencia de retirarse del servicio, se le procuró casamiento 
en la ciudad, donde se estableció. En el convento de Santo Domingo, 
estando expuesto el Venerable, pasaron a cuchillo algunas personas y 
entre ellas al P. Domingo Barrientos, valenciano, barón de ejemplar vida, 
con tres más. Los templos, la mayor parte quedaron profanados y el de 
dominicos, caballeriza. Tomaron presos todos los capuchinos y descalzos 
y desterraron los más de los religiosos a Castilla y, a la excepción de los 
jesuitas, pocos se eximieron de exilio. Dieron fuego a 50 casas de los 
más señalados ciudadanos y temiendo no se comunicase mandó el duque 
apagarle. El pillaje y saqueo fue muy considerable. Era la ciudad rica y los 
lugares de la comarcas habían retirado todas sus preciosidades a Lérida, 
de modo que, según refiere Mr. de Quincy, todo el ejército se enriqueció. 
A las 7 de la tarde mandó el duque cesar el saqueo y retirarse a sus 
cuerpos. Los días consecutivos, por el espacio de ocho días, continuó 
el saco y hasta rendido el castillo padecieron los moradores repetidas 
desgracias y las más de las familias retiradas a las iglesias. La hambre las 
extrañó de su patria, desnudas y mendigas. Estos dos grandes príncipes 
fueron murmurados: el de Orleans, de no haber puesto desde luego 
guardias a las iglesias y cuando las puso de no imponer rigurosa pena a los 
oficiales a quienes se confió la guardia, de no imponer una composición 
sobre los efectos retirados a las iglesias o bien mandar sacar fuera de los 
templos con correspondiente decencia los bienes de los ciudadanos, no 
queriendo concederles les valiese el sagrado del lugar; el de Darmstadt 
fue murmurado de no haber evitado esta desgracia, capitulando por 
la ciudad después de abiertas las brechas antes de esperar el asalto, 
considerando no poder defenderla por su debilidad y falta de fuerza.
The assault to the castles
Having conquered the city, the Bourbon army still had to control the two 
major fortresses in the area: the castles of El Rei and Gardeny. The task 
was not at all simple: civilian defenders fought fiercely, as the enemy’s 
widespread sacking of the city had made them understand that there 
would be no forgiveness for them if they lost the battle.
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Al retirarse los ciudadanos al castillo, nació la mayor consternación, 
defendiéndose de calle en calle. Animados del príncipe de Darmstadt, 
mantenían el fuego en las avenidas del castillo. Crecía el ardor en el 
príncipe, resentido de la respuesta de Orleans, y en los moradores se 
aumentaba el encono, perdida la esperanza de salvar sus casas y efectos, 
haciendo los últimos esfuerzos. Turbó del todo el ánimo de los moradores 
no querer admitir el general Wills las mujeres y niños en el castillo, que 
se apartaban del peligro. Los ciudadanos se alteraron. El príncipe hizo 
protesta al general Wills. Éste cedió de su resolución y a las 11 del día 
empezó a admitir mujeres y niños en el castillo.
At this point the work began to besiege and conquer the Castle of El Rei, 
where English and Imperial troops defending Lerida had taken refuge.
[...] el duque despachó a Madrid con la noticia a don Antonio Sentmenat 
y, acompañado de los generales y ingenieros, reconoció la situación 
del castillo. Llamó a consejo, resolvióse hacer línea de circunvalación 
para asegurar no entrase socorro y precisar a los sitiados a desamparar 
todas las avenidas del castillo, estrecharles al corto recinto de él y abrir 
la trinchera principal a la parte de Balaguer, dirigiéndola desde San 
Francisco a los pozos de la nieve que están al declivio del monte, que esto 
facilitaría poder minar el castillo y al mismo tiempo abrir la trinchera a la 
llanura de San Martín, nombrada lo Pla dels Gramátics. La noche de este 
día se empezó a abrir la trinchera en el almacén del trigo del Cabildo para 
arruinar las casas y colegio de la Concepción, que estaba en el frente, 
que impedían batir el castillo, y al mismo tiempo desalojar los sitiados de 
la parte de San Hilario. Abriéronse al mismo tiempo ramales para abrir 
brecha a la parte de los pozos. Es en aquella parte elevada la subida del 
castillo y parte de roca. En fin, emprendióse el ataque por la parte más 
inaccesible de la campaña, siendo la que daba más facilidad la parroquia 
de San Martín, y después experimentaron las dificultades. La noche del 
15 los sitiados mandaron salir del castillo toda la caballería portuguesa y 
bagajes, que llegaron al campo de los aliados sin riesgo.
El 16 recibieron los sitiados dos correos, uno de Barcelona y otro del 
campo, acabó de salir el resto de la caballería y bagajes, en número 
dé 400. La caballería de los sitiadores se acampó en dos líneas a la 
otra parte del río y el 18 adelantaron  los  trabajos de la parte de San 
Francisco y empezaron a arrojar bombas, causando grande estrago, y 
el 19 una bomba maltrató 25 personas. El día 20 se concluyó la línea de 
circunvalación.
Meanwhile, the besieged men tried to save time because they expected 
the Allied army would be able to drive the Bourbon besiegers out of the 
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area after a few days. However, the undertaking was desperate because 
the Segre river stood in the Allies’ way to Lerida, which would provide the 
Bourbon army with an excellent chance to destroy the remaining Allied 
troops. In the following excerpt two of the most serious consequences 
of the Austriacist defeat in Almansa are expressed: first, the shortage of 
foot units, which could not escape from the persecution of the Bourbon 
cavalry after the defeat, and were thus almost totally captured; and the 
effect the disaster had on the morale and confidence of the Allied army, 
which desperately needed some kind of success to reaffirm its value.
Los sitiados el 29 recibieron por dos ciudadanos cartas de milord Galway 
que les esperanzaba de socorro. Permanecía acampado en las Borjas, 
poco más de 4 horas de distancia. Allí mandó el rey Carlos unirse al 
ejército toda la caballería y cuanta infantería fuese posible, la mayor 
parte tropa nueva. Consistía el todo en 58 escuadrones y 19 batallones; 
de ellos, 10 diminutos y nuevos; 4 eran los que Milord había levantado, 
6 de los provinciales, de ellos sólo 2 con las divisas y no completos, 9 de 
tropa vieja; 20 piezas de campaña. Las milicias y fusileros eran en algún 
número apostados hasta cerca de Torres de Segre. Llegó en este campo el 
conde de Uhlefeld a procurar facilitar el socorro de Lérida. El rey mandó 
al conde de Centellas y a don Miguel de Pinós pasasen a conferir con los 
generales aliados para el mismo intento. Tuviéronse diferentes consejos. 
Asistió el conde de Noyelles. Los generales deseaban socorrer Lérida. 
Conocían la importancia. Les instaba el deseo de recobrar la opinión que 
permanecía cadente en el manejo de la batalla de Almansa. Ninguno lo 
facilitaba con más calor que las Minas, que su ardor excedía a la reflexión 
propia de un general comandante. Adherían portugueses a su dictamen. 
Sólo el general don Pedro Mascarenhas expuso con sabio sentimiento 
que el terreno era llano; el desguazo del río Segre, difícil, que ocupando 
las Dos Coronas la ciudad era preciso el tránsito; que la caballería de las 
Dos Coronas era mayor en número, la infantería excedía en mucho a la 
aliada y que la mayor parte era levantada de nuevo. Resolvióse despachar 
un correo a Barcelona, instando mayor número de tropas. El conde de 
Noyelles se opuso porque eran pocas las que quedaban en Gerona. 
Escribió su sentir al rey Carlos sobre el socorro. Exponía que el socorrer 
la plaza era muy contingente y arriesgado, que no se debía exponer 
la tropa porque, perdida, quedaba Cataluña sin defensa. El enviado 
Stanhope insistió que se socorriese Lérida. Galway no pudo adherirse 
a su parecer y le hizo entender que se arriesgaba el todo, que era caso 
como imposible por la situación del terreno, paso del río y superioridad 
de los contrarios. 
As we can see, those in favour of an Allied attack were Archduke Charles 
and especially James Stanhope, an English officer that was characterized 
by its constant aggressiveness when commanding troops. On the other 
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side, some Bourbon units were posted to keep watch on the Allied 
army as the siege progressed. This  and the difficulty to cross the Segre 
finally determined, on November 8th, a note being sent to General Wills 
informing him of the inability to relieve the besieged fortresses: Lerida’s 
fate was sealed.
En este tiempo los sitiados y sitiadores continuaban la operaciones. El 
estado de unos y otros era lastimoso. Los sitiados padecían no creíbles 
estragos de las bombas y no era menos insoportable la disentería que 
padecía la guarnición y milicias, a que se añadían la gran sed que sufrían 
las milicias y demás refugiados, que era del todo intolerable, añadida 
la gran fatiga. Un paisano llegó a dar medio peso a la centinela de la 
cisterna por permitirle mojar un pañuelo para después chupar el agua, 
que el general Wills en los 10 días primeros, apoderado de la agua, no 
quería dar ninguna pequeña porción y después se conseguía a peso de 
plata. Pasaron de 1200 personas las que murieron de la sed y disentería. 
A los sitiadores escaseaban los forrajes, víveres y municiones. Les 
faltaba artillería y más que todo el tiempo las tropas sufrían considerable 
trabajo y pérdida por lo costoso de adelantar los ramales en terreno tan 
empinado. Unos y otros continuaban con tesón venciendo los obstáculos.
When on the 11th Wills received notification from Galway announcing 
that he could not help him, the English officer tried to convince the 
other commanders that they should surrender. Despite the disagreement 
among the various officers, Wills managed to persuade the others to sign 
the surrender of the garrison remaining in the two castles..
Los habitantes y naturales eclesiásticos y seculares quedaron a la libre 
clemencia del rey Felipe que, ocupada la ciudad, el duque no quiso 
escuchar proposición. Luego después el príncipe mandó un ayudante a 
cumplimentar al duque de Orleans. Los días 12, 13 y 14 hasta las 10 del 
día fueron empleados en allanar las brechas, que con trabajo podía salir 
la guarnición. A las 10 dadas del día 14 el príncipe se puso en marcha a 
la frente de la guarnición, descendió la brecha: batiendo las cajas entró 
por la puerta de la Magdalena y atravesó la ciudad. A la plaza de San 
Juan esperaba el duque de Orleans, duque de Berwick y muchos oficiales. 
El príncipe saludó a Orleans con la espada. Marchó 10 pasos. Dejó la 
tropa y fue a encontrar al duque de Orleans. Se hicieron recíprocos 
cumplimientos. El duque de Orleans hizo detener al general Wills en 
represalias porque pretendió que el brigadier don José de Chaves durante 
la suspensión en el sitio de Elche había sido detenido. Wills representó 
el perjuicio que se le hacía por haber de dar cuenta de las operaciones 
del sitio. El príncipe manifestó su bizarría de ánimo y dio palabra a 
Orleans que se daría libertad a Chaves. Condescendió a consideración 
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del príncipe. Éste se detuvo con Orleans hasta que hubo pasado toda la 
guarnición y siendo tarde se despidió. Toda la noche marchó el príncipe 
y al amanecer llegó a Juneda, 5 hora, distante de Lérida. 
The conditions of capitulation
Unlike what happened during the Thirty Years War, the vast majority of 
urban assaults made during the 18th century ended with an agreement 
to surrender after the attackers had reached a sufficiently advantageous 
position. This lowered the cost of war in human and economic terms, 
since it avoided the indiscriminate looting of cities and, at the same 
time, it kept order among the attacking soldiers, who were not allowed 
to disappear for days in the town searching for booty.
Unfortunately for its inhabitants, the case of the city of Lerida was 
different. The duration, and especially the conditions of the attack 
triggered a brutal and indiscriminate looting of the city once the Allied 
defences were dismantled. The majority of residents and soldiers were 
able take refuge within the castle of Lerida, where they waited for the 
Castle of Gardeny’s garrison to help them. However, as we have seen, 
both strongholds surrendered on the 11th.
As an example of such agreements, here we reproduce what was signed 
between attackers and defenders of these two places, as it has reached 
us in Francesc de Castellví’s Narraciones Históricas.
The ceremony that accompanied the defenders while leaving the city 
towards the Allied safety zone, without being arrested or disarmed and 
even bearing part of the artillery guns that had defended the city so 
far, might seem surprising. The usual dynamics of the armies’ march 
at the time is also shown, according to which the troops marched for 
two days and the third was used for resting, baking bread and preparing 
other cooked foods. As a final note, it is worth pointing out how the 
agreements made during the War of the Spanish Succession cared about 
injured people and the sick, for whom most of the stipulated clauses are 
concerned (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. II, p. 464-465).
Artículos de la capitulación del castillo de Lérida y fuerte de Gardeny 
entre S.A.R. el Sr. duque de Orleans de una parte y S.A. el Sr. príncipe de 
Hesse Darmstadt, comandante general de dicha plaza. 
1. Que todas las tropas de los aliados, así españoles como de 
cualquier otra nación que sean, saldrán en el espacio de 
tres días de la firma de los presentes artículos con todas 
sus armas, caballos y bagajes, tambor batiente, cuerda 
encendida, bala en boca y banderas desplegadas, con entera 
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libertad y seguridad de sus vidas y libertades, marchando 
a la armada bajo el mando del marqués de las Minas por el 
camino más corto, i no siendo obligados a marchar más de 
4 leguas por día, descansando uno de 3 en 3 sin acampar, 
donde serán provistos de forraje y alojamiento sin paga. La 
guarnición tendrá libertad de tomar pan y provisiones para 8 
días y marchará por la brecha al amanecer sin ser inquietada ni 
molestada en su marcha por pretexto alguno y será conducida 
al marqués de las Minas y escoltada de 100 caballos de nación 
francesa, y el bagaje marchará por el camino más cómodo 
que a una legua de la plaza se incorporará con la guarnición.
Acordado como mañana día 12 de este mes las puertas 
del castillo y fuerte de Gardeny nos sean entregados, esto 
es, que nuestras tropas ocuparán lo de fuera, en donde 
concurrirá un oficial general para impedir la entrada de 
los soldados y las dichas puertas se dejarán abiertas y 
entregadas a mediodía.
2. Con las citadas tropas saldrán también los comisarios 
de guerra, todos los ingenieros, oficiales de artillería, 
artilleros, minadores, bombarderos y asistentes de la 
artillería, capellanes de regimientos y generalmente todos 
los que se hallarán pertenecientes y dependientes de dicha 
guarnición, como proveedores, vivanderos y otra cualquier 
gente destinada para la asistencia de las tropas con todo su 
equipaje.
Acordado en cuanto a lo que es necesario la marcha de 
la guarnición, quedando lo demás incluido en los mismos 
artículos.
3. Que se enviarán al castillo 150 carros de a 4 mulas para el 
transporte del equipaje de los oficiales, enfermos y heridos 
que se hallan en estado de seguir las tropas.
Acordado.
4. Hallándose los oficiales y soldados enfermos y heridos 
en tal estado que sea conveniente dejarlos en Lérida para 
su curación, entonces los comisarios, médicos, cirujanos, 
boticarios y otros dependientes tendrán la liber tad de 
quedar con ellos hasta que los enfermos y heridos puedan 
unirse al ejército, sea en el campo u cuar tel del marqués 
de las Minas, en el cual caso se les darán los pasapor tes 
necesarios y los convoyes como juzgaren los oficiales 
más conveniente, de suer te que ellos no reciban daño 
alguno en Lérida ni en las marchas, y que se les darán las 
provisiones necesarias y los carros en las villas y lugares 
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en la distancia de tres jornadas; y para la seguridad de 
dichos enfermos y heridos se darán rehenes, quedando 
en las casas par ticulares u hospitales, de donde no serán 
desalojados bajo cualquier pretexto que sea hasta que se 
hallen en estado de marchar.
Acordado.
5. Toda la harina, ganado, vino, medicinas y todas las otras 
provisiones necesarias para los enfermos y heridos que 
se encuentran en los almagacenes, se dejarán en manos 
de lo médicos, cirujanos y otros asistentes del hospital 
para el vito y servicio di dichos enfermos y heridos. 
El gobernador entregará todas las cosas necesarias 
medicamentos y provisiones para los heridos y enfermos, 
pero los médicos, cirujanos y boticarios no podrán 
entregar ni tomar cosa de los almagacenes sin orden de 
nuestro gobernador.
6. Los sitiados saldrán con cuatro piezas de cañón de 
bronce, es a saber, dos de a 12 libras de bala y dos de a 6 
y para cada pieza pólvora y balas para seis tiros, y se les 
darán los tiros necesarios para conducir dichos cañones 
hasta el ejército del marqués de las Minas, como queda 
dicho.
Acordado.
7. Todos los prisioneros hechos antes y durante el sitio serán 
restituidos con buena fe de las dos partes.
Acordado.
8. Ningún soldado será detenido ni sacado de sus filas bajo 
pretexto de deserción y ningún otro motivo.
Acordado.
9. No entrarán en el castillo ni fuerte de Gardeny tropas 
francesas, españolas ni otras ningunas antes que las 
guarniciones hayan salido, menos que con consentimiento o 
licencia de los generales de ambas partes.
Acordado como deuda en el primer capítulo.
10. Los derechos e inmunidades de los eclesiásticos, religiosos 
y ciudadanos que se hallan en el castillo de Lérida serán 
mantenidos, protegidas y guardadas sus vidas, libertad y 
bienes como lo han gozado y gozaban en todo tiempo antes 
del sitio y el gobernador y ciudadanos tendrán la libertad 
de disponer de sus efectos en el término de 4 meses y de 
retirarse donde quieran sin impedimento alguno. 
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Todos los eclesiásticos, religiosos y ciudadanos que se 
hallan en el castillo tendrán la libertad de salir con todos 
sus efectos y de pasar al cuartel de los enemigos o salirse 
en el espacio de seis días y sus efectos luego que podrán 
tener carros y mulos para llevárselos.
11. Las armas de los enfermos y heridos serán entregadas a los 
oficiales que quedarán encargados de dichos enfermos y se 
darán a los soldados hallándose en estado de marchar.
Acordado.
12. Los comandantes del castillo de Lérida y fuerte de Gardeny 
harán entregar fielmente todas las municiones de guerra 
y provisiones sin desperdicio alguno y por este efecto se 
permitirá a un comisario de guerra y otro de artillería tomar 
inventario de todo lo que hay en dicho castillo y fuerte de 
Gardeny.
Acordado.
13. Que no se permitirá a eclesiástico alguno ni a otra persona 
el llevarse ornamentos ni otras cosas dedicadas al uso de la 
iglesia y del obispo.
Acordado.
Todos los artículos referidos serán debidamente cumplidos 
e inviolablemente observados según sus voces, sentido e 
intención como en ellos viene expresado.
Lérida noviembre, a 11, de 1707. Felipe, duque de Orleans. 
Enrique, landgrave de Hesse.
Despite the enormous superiority of the Bourbon forces at the end of 
1707, they were unable to move to Barcelona after the capitulation of 
Lerida. The main reasons were, firstly, that the fall of the city occurred 
in November, so the offensive against Barcelona would have to wait 
until the following spring.7 Besides, the results in other fronts were more 
favourable to the Allied interests. In Flanders, Marlborough overwhelmed 
the French army once again, now in Oudenaarde (1708), and in Northern 
Italy an expedition of Prince Eugene of Savoy attacked Toulon, the main 
Bourbon naval base in the Mediterranean (Paoletti, 2006). Although the 
result was a defeat for the Allies, who had withdrawn from the area, 
they managed to sink most of the French fleet located in this harbour. 
7 In the 18th century, fighting during winter was uncommon because it was difficult 
to afford the logistics needed to keep troops active, apart from the deaths and illnesses 
among soldiers due to low temperatures.
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Another consequence was that some of the Bourbon troops had to leave 
the Peninsula, in order to reinforce the contingent defending the city 
of Toulon. Thus, the Bourbon did not have enough forces to conquer 
Catalonia during the period 1707-1709 (Ostwald, 2000), a time that the 
Allies used to recover from the defeat in Almansa and build a powerful 
army that allowed them to reverse the military situation at the Eastern 
Peninsular front in 1710.
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                                       ALMENAR 1710
From the surrender of Lerida until 1710, there were not any more large-
scale military actions on the Eastern Peninsular front, because the 
Bourbon army was not able to launch major campaigns against Catalonia, 
given its precarious situation on the other fronts that had to be defended. 
However, in 1710 Philip’s troops began a campaign, this time aimed at 
definitely conquering Barcelona. Unfortunately for the Bourbon interests, 
the Allies had rebuilt their army, thanks largely to the massive arrival of 
recruits and money from England. Therefore, when the Bourbon forces 
tried to advance into Catalan territory through the Urgell region, they 
failed to achieve fruitful results. Despite the long blockade of the town of 
Balaguer, the Bourbon army could not conquer it, and the Allies received 
constant reinforcements during the spring and summer of 1710. So the 
Bourbon commander, the Marquis of Villadarias, had to withdraw to the 
outskirts of Lerida to prevent his weary troops, who had also suffered 
several epidemics, from suffering greater hardships.
The Bourbon retreat
Because of the alarm generated by the arrival of reinforcements at the 
Allied camp, what have initially been an organized retreat, finally turned 
into an exhausting march that decimated the Bourbon army, as shown in 
a letter included in Narraciones Históricas (Castellví, 1997-2002, vol. III).
Recibióse el aviso cierto el día 24 de julio en el campo de Ivars que el 
general alemán barón de Wetzel estaba en marcha desde el Ampurdán 
con un cuerpo de 6.000 hombres para unirse con la mayor prisa a los 
aliados que se hallaban acampados bajo de Balaguer a la parte de Urgel; 
que los alemanes, que acababan de desembarcar en Barcelona, estaban en 
plena marcha para el mismo efecto, sin dejarlos refrescar. Consideraron 
los generales en el consejo que se tuvo delante del rey, en el campo de 
Ivars, que los forrajes eran muy escasos, los calores excesivos en aquel 
llano; que no era posible atacar a los aliados, que su número se había 
aumentado y su campo más fortificado. Estos motivos y la necesidad de 
mantener el condado de Ribagorza propio para los cuarteles de invierno, 
obligó al rey a tomar la resolución de levantar el campo, mejorar de 
terreno y impedir a los enemigos de penetrar en Aragón. El día 25 muy 
de mañana se puso en marcha el ejército; duró 10 horas. En ella padeció 
en extremo la infantería. Era el calor excesivo; faltaba el agua, murieron 
no pocos, y en particular de la infantería flamenca, no acostumbrada a 
este clima. Pasóse el Segre sobre el puente de Lérida. 
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Prelude
Among the information provided in Lord Mahon’s work,8 written in the 
19th century, an interesting document stands out written by General 
Stanhope on July 31st 1710, and addressed to the Earl of Sunderland.9 
The letter explains with complete clarity the conditions under which the 
Battle of Almenar10 took place, and also the role played by the English 
troops. 
The first thing that is reflected in this letter is Stanhope’s aggressiveness, 
in broad contrast to the caution showed by both King Charles III and 
Guido von Starhemberg. In view of Stanhope’s urgent need to attack, 
the Allies adopted a compromise solution by posting some troops under 
the command of the English officer to act in the vanguard of the army 
(Lord Mahon, 1832, appendix cxi-cxv).
My lord,
Three days after the date of my last to your Lordship, which went by Mr. 
Craggs, our succours joined us about nine in the morning, upon which 
a council being called, it was strenuously urged by the English, Dutch, 
and Palatines, to march immediately to Lerida, in order to force the 
enemies to a battle, by cutting them off from that place: but the King and 
Mareschal strongly opposed, and showed themselves determined not to 
venture any thing. Their pretence for not doing it was, that the enemies’ 
army might get to Lerida, and cross the river before we could be up with 
them; which afterwards proved to be otherwise, since they did not get 
over the river, by twelve hours, so soon as was pretended they would. 
Our next thought was to cross the Segre at Balaguer, and push to get over 
the Noguera, to which purpose I was despatched with eight squadrons of 
dragoons, and 1000 grenadiers, with which I marched at midnight, and 
took post at Alfaraz [Alfarràs], on the Aragon side of the Noguera, at six 
in the morning of the 27th. 
The enemies had commanded ten squadrons of horse, 1000 
grenadiers, and seven battalions of foot, to prevent our taking post: but 
notwithstanding that they had much less way to march, the negligence 
of their commanding officer, the Duke of Sarno, made them come late; 
for we did not discover them till nine in the morning: and when they 
did discover us, instead of attacking us, they possessed themselves of 
Almenara [Almenar], a village on the Noguera, about two miles below 
8 Philip Stanhope inherited the title of Lord Mahon from James Stanhope, on whom it 
was bestowed after the capture of Port Mahon.
9 Lord Sunderland was one of the five Whigs elected to lead the English government, as 
part of the cabinet known as the Whig Junto.
10 The place name Almenar has a variety of spellings in English sources. The most 
common spelling is Almenara, but there are some villages in Castile with the name of 
Almenara, not to be confused with the Catalan village of Almenar we are talking about. 
Other common spellings are Alminar and Almanar.
God save Catalonia! England’s intervention in Catalonia during the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1711)   120
Alfaraz, where we were. About noon, our left wing of horse passed 
the river, which I formed on a plain about cannon shot from the river, 
between which plain and the river was a deep valley. By this time the 
enemies’ horse came up space and formed before me about eighteen 
squadrons, which I was going to attack, when the Mareschal came up 
and prevented, seeming still determined not to hazard any thing.
The troops on both sides were gradually accumulated in the vicinity 
of Almenar, deployed with their cavalries above the town, on the 
high plateau overlooking the entire area. Bourbon sources collected in 
Castellví’s Narraciones Históricas relate the same approach to the battle:
El día 26 marchó el general Sello con un cuerpo de dragones y caballería 
a ocupar la orilla del río Noguera, río que media entre Lérida y Balaguer, 
y apostarse en buen terreno creyendo que desde allí se socorrería el 
castillo de Areny, que tenían bloqueado los voluntarios y miqueletes. 
Marchó tarde el general Sello, y al llegar cerca del lugar de Almenar 
avisaron los batidores que los enemigos se formaban en el terreno que 
debía ocupar. Los enemigos (según los desertores) al tiempo que se les 
unía el general Wetzel hicieron movimiento; y en el consejo que tuvieron 
delante del Archiduque fue resuelto que el ejército marchase a atacarnos, 
forzando una marcha, y nos cortase el camino de Lérida, presentándonos 
batalla. Revocaron esta resolución oponiéndose al Archiduque, siguiendo 
el sentir de Starhemberg, que fue de marchar luego un numeroso 
destacamento a la otra parte de Balaguer y ocupar la parte opuesta del 
río Segre, tomar el paso del río Noguera, marchando al mismo tiempo el 
ejército. Ejecutaron con tanta prisa la marcha que a las 7 de la mañana 
el cuerpo de su vanguardia había pasado ya el río Noguera, ocupado el 
mejor terreno y el paso de Alfarrás. Dos horas después llegó el general 
Sello. Le pareció no atacar a los enemigos, aunque se consideró superior 
en fuerza. Dio aviso al rey que estaba en plena marcha con el ejército. 
Esta suspensión dio tiempo a que todo el ejército enemigo pasase el 
puente de la Noguera. El rey confirió con el marqués de Villadarias.
The battle
After repeatedly asking the King and Starhemberg for permission, 
Stanhope finally gave the order to attack at dusk, just when all the Allied 
army had crossed the Noguera river at Alfarràs. It is worth noting this, 
unknown even to Stanhope, because this is why Starhemberg took so 
long to give him permission to attack. A defeat of the Allied cavalry 
when half the troops had not yet crossed the river would have been 
extremely dangerous for the Allied army.
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I herefore marched to them 
with the left wing, which 
consisted of twenty-two 
squadrons, which were 
formed in two lines, and 
a corps de réserve of four 
squadrons; the ground 
we were drawn up in, 
not allowing us to make 
a greater front. So soon 
as we began to move, the 
squadrons of the enemies 
which had come down the 
rising I mentioned, retired 
to their line. When we got 
up that rise, with my first 
line consisting of but ten 
squadrons, we found the 
enemy drawn up in two 
lines, the first of twenty 
two squadrons and the 
second of twenty, with two battalions of foot betwixt their lines, and a 
brigade of foot on their right. I was therefore forced, so soon as I came 
in presence, to make a halt to get up some squadrons from the second 
line, the ground where the enemies were being so much wider than that 
which I had marched from; besides that getting up the hill had put our 
line in some disorder.
It is noteworthy how Stanhope guided the march of horse regiments 
because, despite the substantial number of troopers involved (about 
4,000), he managed to stop and reform them, all in full view of the 
enemy, showing the great experience, calmness and courage of the 
Allied officers. Another important aspect was the sun’s position, which 
lit the battlefield from behind the Allies in such a way that the Bourbon 
horsemen did not realize of the magnitude of the Allied attack. This is 
not something that can be undervalued, as the dust raised by the four 
thousand trotting horses would have magnified the effect of the sunlight, 
while undermining the morale of the defenders, who could not see 
exactly what was falling on them. This is highlighted by an anonymous 
source, a horseman of Lord Raby’s regiment who was present at the 
battle (Falkner, 2005, p. 223):
About an hour before the sun set on the 16th day of July 1710, our 
squadrons had orders to advance, the left [of] our army being a great deal 
nearer to the enemy than our right, therefore our right wing was obliged 
Battle of Almenara, according to Tindal (ICC).
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to advance as fast as our horses could go. The sun then was not above 
a quarter of an hour high [per sobre de l’horitzó] when the left began to 
engage and the right was soon and behold how like lions our men fell 
upon them with sword in hand.
Despite the initial reservations of some Allied commanders, the attack 
was very successful. Although some points of resistance faced up to the 
attackers, the line of Bourbon cavalry was broken up by such a fierce 
attack led by the English commander.
The enemies were so good as to give us the time we wanted; we brought 
up six squadrons and put our line in good order, which consisted thus of 
sixteen in all: six English, four Dutch, and six Palatines. Mr. Carpenter 
and I were on the left; Mr. Frankenberg, the Palatine General, and Major-
General Pepper, on the right. So soon as ever we were thus formed we 
attacked them; and, by the blessing of God, broke their two lines, which 
consisted of forty-two squadrons.
On the right were the Gardes du Corps and other choice regiments, 
which did not do ill, but their left made no resistance. I cannot sufficiently 
commend the behaviour of all the troops that were engaged, which never 
halted till we had driven their horse off the plain, beyond their infantry, 
which was in the valley; and if we had had two hours’ day light more, 
your Lordship may be assured that not one foot soldier of their army 
could have scaped. 
The night gave them an opportunity to retire to Lerida, which they did 
in such confusion, that they threw away their tents, lost good part of 
their baggage, and some of their cannon, and have continued ever since 
encamped within and about the glacis of Lerida. The Duke of Anjou and 
all his Generals were in the action.
Consequences of the victory
As a result of the fight and the chaotic withdrawal of the Bourbon army, 
an odd situation took place in which King Philip was escorted by Catalan 
troops. The event is explained in the Bourbon letter collected by Castellví 
and it had no major consequences, but it does show how the Bourbon 
officers mistrusted even the Catalans in their ranks.
Podía suceder un infortunio en esta retirada por la imprudencia de un 
señor de la corte. Iban retirándose los dragones catalanes de Marimón; 
se unieron con las guardias del rey. Este cortesano dijo en voz alta al 
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rey: “Señor, ruego a V.M. se retire 
por esta parte siguiéndome, que 
estos son dragones catalanes”. 
El rey, con cuerda reflexión y 
sabia prevención, se volvió a 
ellos y les dijo: “Hijos, ahora 
estoy seguro entre vosotros”. 
Respondieron: “Viva V. M. que 
moriremos defendiéndole”. Llegó 
el rey a Lérida fuera de camino, 
siguiéndole los dragones. Perdióse 
parte de la secretaría, que erraron 
el camino por la gran obscuridad. 
Luego que se esparció la voz de 
la retirada del rey, perdió del todo 
la forma nuestra gente, y aún a 
la tarde del día 28 iba llegando 
gente bajo el cañón de Lérida. No 
hay duda en que nos favoreció la 
noche, y que los enemigos estaban 
vencedores, y al apagarse el día se 
dio fin al combate.
Despite the swift action, the battle was extremely hard, according 
to Stanhope. The fact that two Allied colonels died is quite relevant, 
because it demonstrates that high-ranking officers put themselves 
at risk in combat, especially horse regiment officers, and often had a 
higher percentage of casualties than other soldiers (Lord Mahon, 1832, 
appendices CXI-CXV).
I am sorry, now, my Lord, to tell you, that this action has cost her 
Majesty very dear, in the loss of two young men of quality, who would 
have made a great figure in this country, and done it great service,- my 
Lord Rochford and Count Nassau. Lord Rochford had joined us with his 
regiment from Italy but the day before; and he brought it in so good 
order, and set them so good an example, that, though they had to do with 
the best troops of the enemy, they beat them. I have often had occasion 
to mention Count Nassau to your Lordship: he was this day on the left 
of all, at the head of his own regiment, which was outflanked by several 
squadrons, and exposed to the fire of their infantry; notwithstanding 
which disadvantages he broke what was before him, and, after so 
vigorous an action, was unfortunately killed by a cannon from a battery 
of our own. Enclosed I send your Lordship the list of what other officers 
have been killed and wounded.
Battle of Almenar, according to the manuscript map found in the archive 
of Turin
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Out of the six squadrons of her Majesty’s troops which were engaged, 
viz. two of Harvey’s, two of Nassau’s, two of Rochford’s we have 200 
men killed and wounded, and four out of five of them with swords. A 
Palatine regiment which was on our left, and a Dutch regiment which was 
in the centre, have likewise suffered considerably; the others had better 
fortune, having met with little opposition. The commanding officers of 
all nations signalised themselves; and it has been of no small use to me, 
who had been very little conversant with the treble service, to have the 
assistance of Mr. Carpenter, who was with me during this whole action, 
and did not a little contribute to the good success of it..
As for the Bourbon army, the defeat had reduced its cavalry, and 
especially its morale, which was decisive for the further development of 
the campaign. Moreover, the defeat at Almenar confirmed that without 
the help of Louis XIV and the French forces, Philip was unable to keep 
the Spanish territories under control, given the threat posed by the Allies.
Nosotros hemos perdido al duque de Sarno, al coronel marqués de 
Gironella y otros oficiales. El general don Próspero Verboon queda 
herido y prisionero, y hemos perdido hasta 400 hombres. Creemos que 
el número de los enemigos es mayor, entre ellos el conde de Nassau, 
pariente de la reina Ana. Ayer se acampó el archiduque en Almenar. La 
culpa de este desorden hay algunos que la atribuyen a la conducta de 
nuestro general, criticando que no debía haber mandado a la caballería se 
avanzase tanto; que, al contrario, debía retirarse más atrás, mejorando de 
terreno, mayormente que podía discurrir que el todo del ejército enemigo 
estaría cerca a unirse con su destacamento; y que nuestra armada no 
podía llegar a tiempo de sostener el reencuentro. Ello es cierto que al 
discurrir de los más, tanto en el combate como en la retirada le atribuyen 
sin rebozo la culpa. El rey despachó ayer dos correos, uno a París y otro 
a esa corte. Se asegura que el rey, por aquietar ciertas diferencias entre 
los generales, ha pedido al rey su abuelo un general. No es de dudar que 
nuestro mayor enemigo es la discordia que hoy reina entre los generales.
Afterword: defeat at Brihuega
After the victory of Almenar, the Austriacist army continued to advance 
into Aragon, where some weeks later it had a decisive victory against the 
Bourbon army. Philip’s troops broke up and, as happened in 1706, the 
Allies were again able to choose their strategic goals and achieve them 
without hindrance from opponents.
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Spurred on by English 
officers, and particularly 
by James Stanhope, 
the Austriacist troops 
advanced into Castile to 
dominate the centre of 
the Iberian Peninsula, 
and especially its capital. 
Philip had to flee Madrid 
for the second time 
and Charles was finally 
crowned King of Spain. 
However, in the long term 
this strategic decision was 
one of the Allies’ worst 
mistakes during the war, 
although it seemed quite 
an interesting option in 
the autumn of 1710.
On one hand, lack of connection with the Austriacist territories of 
Aragon, Valencia and Catalonia disrupted both communications and 
the logistics line for the Allies, which were very elongated and highly 
vulnerable to Bourbon dragoons raids. On the other hand, failure to close 
the passes connecting France and the Iberian Peninsula allowed Louis 
XIV to send a large contingent of troops to his grandson. These troops 
were under command of the Duke of Vendôme, and to finally restore 
the situation, another French army under the command of the Duke 
of Noailles invaded the north of Catalonia to threaten the Austriacist 
territories. Since the bulk of the Allied army was in Castile, it was an 
optimal situation for the Bourbon’s interests, because there was no 
Allied force large enough to fight with. This offensive therefore further 
destabilized the precarious strategic situation of the Allies.
Noailles decided to besiege Girona at the end of 1710, with the intention 
of smoothing the way to Barcelona. The Allies were certainly surprised 
by the fact that the siege began in December, as it was unusual to conduct 
offensive actions in late winter. Given the serious strategic situation, 
the Austriacist commanders decided to retreat to Catalonia to pass the 
winter there. The English contingent took a different route from the rest 
of the army, and was surprised and surrounded by Bourbon forces in 
Brihuega, where they surrendered a few days later. In turn, Starhemberg, 
the supreme Allied commander, met the entire Bourbon army in 
Villaviciosa, when trying to help the English (not knowing that they had 
Armies marching and Battle of Denain on July 24th 1712, according to Tindal (ICC).
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already surrendered). Both sides claimed victory in the muddled battle 
that took place on December 10th. However, the clash left Vendôme’s 
army so damaged that Starhemberg was able to retreat to more optimal 
positions in the Segarra area.
The demarcations of the armies were not much changed during the 
following campaigns, because the 1710 campaign went on well into the 
following year and Vendôme did not move until summer of 1711. The 
attempt to cross the Allied defensive line culminated in the Battle of Prats 
de Rei and the subsequent siege of Cardona, two Allied victories that left 
the Bourbon army badly damaged and withdrawing again to Lerida. But 
the English army was no longer present in Catalonia after the surrender 
of Brihuega, except for some small units. In the Iberian Peninsula there 
were no significant battles in 1712-1713, due to the opening of peace 
negotiations, as mentioned throughout the book. 
In addition, the Imperial army was solidly defeated by Marshal Villars’ 
troops in Denain, and the war situation quickly deteriorated for the 
Austriacist side, as, for their part, the English and the Dutch were 
negotiating agreements with the Bourbons. 
The Treaty of Utrecht ended the English intervention in Catalonia, and 
shortly afterwards the final chapter of the War of the Spanish Succession 
began: the Catalan campaign of 1713-1714.
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As we have seen throughout this work, the English intervention in 
Catalonia is a complex issue, because there are political, diplomatic, 
economic and military factors involved in it. In particular, the relationship 
between the last two items contributes to a new perspective with regard 
to the proceedings of the English government.
England’s animosity toward the Bourbons was caused by the constant 
struggle between William of Orange and Louis XIV in the last quarter 
of the 17th century, and it moved from an extreme position (reaffirmed 
by the slogan “No peace without Spain”) to a position tending towards 
negotiation. Undoubtedly, France’s economic ruin caused by the war 
was one of the causes, because around 1712 no one in England saw the 
French King as an enemy capable of dominating and subjugating the rest 
of Europe. Moreover, the incredible expense that the conflict imposed 
on England, which we have discussed in part (as Flanders accounted for 
the highest expense), contributed to the decline of the war party and 
the next government adopted a Tory position, inclining towards signing 
advantageous peace.
Either way, the thousands of English soldiers that fought in Catalonia 
were largely responsible for the Catalan revolt prospering and Charles 
becoming the first monarch for centuries to hold the court in Barcelona. 
The battles in which these soldiers participated are some of the most 
decisive moments of the war in Catalonia, as is highlighted by the authors 
of the time, and the countless small acts of war involving English units 
make the army led by Peterborough and Stanhope one of the largest 
military forces that ever fought on Catalan lands. Paradoxically, it was a 
force made up of foreigners.
The legacy of this intervention was also very relevant. Apart from the 
enormous production of war materiel required by the army, which 
certainly benefited certain manufacturing families, the English army 
was taken as a reference by the Catalan army led by Antoni de Villarroel 
and the Marquis del Poal in 1713-1714, as shown in the manual written 
by Colonel Joan Francesc Ferrer. It was undoubtedly one of the reasons 
why the Catalan State held out against the Bourbon attack for more than 
a year, while the invaders required another French intervention to put an 
end to the Catalan adventure.
Conclusions
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